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ABSTRACT 
 
Scholars examining the relationship between the prison and social inequality demonstrate 
that race, ethnicity, and class disproportionately impact imprisonment rates as well as 
imbalances in how different groups fare upon release. Yet, the prison itself remains a black 
box: inequality goes in, and inequality comes out, but little is known about the structures 
or practices contributing to inequity between those milestones. This dissertation addresses 
this gap by investigating the reproduction of inequality within prison. In particular, it 
investigates disparities resulting from systems of penal labor. To do so, it draws on 18 
months of ethnographic fieldwork spent working alongside incarcerated laborers at a men’s 
state prison and 82 in-depth interviews with prisoners and facility staff. The prison is here 
analyzed as a competitive employment system. Adopting this lens, this dissertation makes 
sense of the mechanisms and pathways through which prisoners of the same custody level 
and housed in the same facility are nevertheless differentially classified based on the skills 
and resources they possess. It uncovers meso-level structures through which the 
imprisoned are sorted into different labor tracts, as well as the micro-level strategies that 
they employ to navigate and cope with this system. And it examines how labor stratification 
behind bars impacts prisoners’ material wellbeing and understandings of self-worth. This 
has direct consequences for how punishment is experienced across groups, as well as for 
prisoners’ preparations for release. Beyond merely confirming the relationship between 
criminal justice system contact and stratification, this work reveals a chain of inequality 
resulting in particular groups facing disproportionate imprisonment, barriers to resource 
acquisition during incarceration, and discriminatory treatment upon release.   
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INTRODUCTION: 
Prison Labor & Stratification 
in the Era of Mass Incarceration 
 
How much power and talent sometimes perishes…almost for nothing, 
in prison and in hardship!  
– Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House 
 
 
A concrete and steel warehouse sits, monolithic, beneath an open sky, surrounded in all 
directions by razor wire fencing. Inside, in a slate-grey room, 40 men stand shoulder-to-
shoulder along two narrow steel tables. Leaning over boxes of plastic wrap and stacks of 
bread, meat, and cheese, they hurriedly assemble sandwich ingredients. The loud hum of 
nearby freezers is joined only by the crinkle of plastic and the occasional chatter of the 
workers. These men are prisoners of Sunbelt State Penitentiary, a medium-security men’s 
state prison complex located in the U.S. Sunbelt region.1 As a facet of their punishment, 
they spend their waking hours here, in the “food factory,” working six-hour shifts, five 
days per week preparing prison meals. A correctional officer in gleaming sunglasses peers 
down at them through the thick windows of his central office. Civilian staff members—
called “white shirts”—stroll through the site. Sometimes they wrap sandwiches alongside 
the men; other times they supervise from a distance. 
The tallest worker on the line is Soto, a broad shouldered 30-something man from 
Mexico. At 6’6”, he towers over his coworkers and prison staffers. He hunches forward to 
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perform his daily sandwich-wrapping duties. At the end of the day, he says, his back and 
legs are often sore from the strain. “I have to move around. … I got to move because, just 
standing there—I'm too tall. As tall as I am, I got to move around. [If I don’t] my knees 
will start hurting.”  
Soto has worked in the food factory for the past 16 months. Because of his good 
behavioral record and exemplary work evaluations, he is paid more than most of his 
coworkers in his work program, but still receives less than $0.50 per hour for his labors. 
This amounts to a weekly take-home pay that prisoners and correctional officers alike attest 
is hardly enough to subsist on behind bars, where prisoners must use their earnings to 
purchase supplementary food as well as pay for medical visits and various fees. In addition 
to the low rate of pay, Soto struggles against the monotony of the labor. “I've lost the will 
to come in and work here. You know what I mean? … And now it's just like—it's just like 
Groundhog Day. It's just the same thing, boom-boom.” He mimes the process of slapping 
together sandwich materials into plastic. “Cheese, no cheese. That's all that it is.” With a 
laugh, he reiterates, “That's all that changes is cheese or no cheese.” Though he has 
attempted to switch to more desirable positions within the institution, he has not yet 
succeeded in moving to a new prison job. His options, he tells me, are limited. “I can’t 
work certain jobs. I can’t work the good jobs because I’m a Mexican national. They tell 
me I have to work here.” Being quite sociable and expressive, and possessing a high school 
diploma, Soto at one point sought to work in the prison call center. He was deemed 
ineligible, however, because of his immigration status. “I don’t got the papers. Need to get 
them papers!” There are few “good” jobs (see Kalleberg 2011) within the prison that 
foreign nationals are eligible for, and Soto, lacking a competitive set of skills or social ties, 
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has struggled to move up. “If I try to get into any other job—one of the jobs that people 
want—you got to know somebody to get you in. You know what I mean? I know a lot of 
people in that yard, but I just can't seem to get the job. I don't know what's going on.” 
 
Across the sprawling complex of the warehouse prison (see Irwin 2005), a very 
different prison workplace is abuzz. Here, another group of incarcerated workers sits in 
swivel chairs facing personal computers in the prison call center. Their individual cubicles 
are adorned with sales scripts, motivational slogans, and family portraits. They speak 
politely through their headsets to customers in the outside world. These salesmen in orange 
pitch television advertising packages to business owners across the country who have no 
idea they are speaking to incarcerated men. Air-conditioning keeps the room at a 
comfortable temperature and music from a mixture of genres plays softly through wall-
mounted speakers via internet radio. The prisoners work autonomously as the single staff 
member skims over paperwork in his window-lined cubicle, humming along to the music. 
They occasionally crack jokes or share tales of frustrating calls. When a sale is made, some 
cheer.  
 In the middle of the room sits Jake, a muscular white prisoner in his late 30s with 
tattooed arms and a booming voice. His central cubicle reflects his position in the office. 
Formally, he is the “inmate trainer,”2 tasked with introducing new hires to the call center 
system and sales procedures. Informally, he is often regarded as possessing a wider array 
of responsibilities in the work program. “I’m the trainer,” he tells me. “What I do is train 
guys when they’re brand new. And I also try to keep everybody on the same track. I guess 
on the outside that’d be called a manager.” Though prisoners are barred from holding 
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authority positions over one another in any official capacity, Jake is sometimes referred to 
as the “informal manager” or “inmate manager” of this work site. 
 Jake has worked in the call center since the early weeks of this, his most recent of 
a string of prison terms. Offering over $1.00 per hour in pay in addition to a comfortable 
work environment and engaging, skilled activity, the call center is considered one of the 
best prison jobs. With this higher rate of pay, Jake has been able to accumulate a healthy 
bit of savings that will help him get on his feet upon release. What’s more, the civilian call 
center manager, with whom Jake has fostered a positive relationship, has expressed 
willingness to refer him to employers on the outside. Jake attributes his success in securing 
this highly sought-after position to (1) having already had call center experience and (2) 
knowing someone on the inside who could give him a referral. “When I got over here [to 
Sunbelt State Penitentiary], I heard that they have a phone job. And I've done phones like 
this down in [another prison]. … One of the guys that was up here living in my [housing] 
pod, I kind of told him, ‘Hey, this is what I used to do,’ and this and that.” He was quickly 
hired. “When I came, I just came to be on the phones and try to have a good job on the yard 
and I didn't realize what it was going to be until I got here. … I've learned a lot in the time 
that I've been here.”  
 
It is by now popular knowledge that the U.S. has more prisons and prisoners than 
any other nation. Despite containing less than 5% of the world’s population, it holds nearly 
25% of its prisoners, including 1.5 million individuals held in state and federal prison 
facilities (Pfaff 2017; Wagner and Rabuy 2017; Walmsley 2016). Less well-known, 
however, is the fact that a vast number of these imprisoned men and women are put to 
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labor. Indeed, the majority of able U.S. prisoners spend their waking hours working, many 
of them mandatorily, to produce goods and provide services for penal institutions, other 
federal and state agencies, and private contractors such as Wal-Mart, Whole Foods, AT&T, 
Microsoft, and others (Guilbaud 2010; Stephan 2008).3 For incarcerated individuals like 
Soto and Jake, participating in penal labor programs is vital to getting through a prison 
sentence. This is how they pass their time, make money to purchase goods and services on 
the yard, potentially learn (or hone) marketable skills, and maintain positive outlooks and 
self-images behind bars. As the above accounts illustrate, however, not all prison jobs are 
the same, nor are all prisoners accorded the same opportunities.  
Prison administrators and front-line staffers attest that any prisoner demonstrating 
good behavior and positive work performance will “automatically” move up in the 
hierarchy of prison jobs. As one correctional officer (CO), a man that I call Byrne, told me, 
“Everybody usually starts here [in the food factory]. Then, if they do well, they get those 
good jobs. Nobody gets the sign shop [a prized work site] who just showed up on the yard.” 
The way for a prisoner to improve their station in the prison employment system is 
straightforward, according to CO Byrne: “If they get three E’s [excellent reviews] in a row 
on evaluations, they can basically ask for a new job. It has to do with attendance, attitude, 
and performance. If you’re a new guy, you make sandwiches. And then you go from there.” 
This perspective aligns with a prominent argument from penal labor proponents, who 
contend that “Prison labor provides…a pathway to correct deviant behavior and possibly 
find personal redemption” (Benns 2015: 5; see also, Brown and Severson 2011; American 
Civil Liberties Union 2004). Yet, although Soto consistently received the score of 
“excellent” on his biweekly work reviews as a result of his strong attendance and 
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performance record (in addition to maintaining a positive attitude and friendly relationships 
with staff), he remained relegated to work in the food factory—a so-called “bad prison 
job.” His pathway appeared halted at making sandwiches. Jake, on the other hand, secured 
a highly sought-after position in the prison call center—a “good prison job”—within weeks 
of first arriving to the yard.  
It is not the severity of their crimes (both have been convicted of violent offenses), 
nor their disciplinary records (both possess clean behavioral reports), nor even their work 
performance (both are regularly lauded as excellent workers by overseers) that dictated the 
job search outcomes of these two incarcerated men. Rather, as this dissertation contends, 
it is the possession of valued skills and resources, as well as differences in race, ethnicity, 
and nationality, that influence prisoners’ positions in this employment system (that is, an 
organized system of labor complete with diverse jobs, workers, wages and perks, and 
established rules and norms for classifying and regulating these workers, overseers, and 
work sites [Kalleberg 2011; Marsden 1999; Osterman 1987]). And, as I will illustrate, such 
variation in prison labor market outcomes has direct implications for prisoners’ 
understandings of punishment, their social and economic standing while behind bars, and 
potentially their prospects for release. In this way, carceral experiences—and penal labor 
experiences particularly—reproduce and exacerbate social inequalities between prisoner 
groups along the lines of class, race, and ethnicity. 
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The Prison & Inequality 
 
An enduring question in sociology and criminology asks: How does contact with 
institutions such as the prison shape social inequalities? As the project of mass 
incarceration in the United States expanded beginning in the 1970s, the impact of the 
criminal justice system on disparities across communities grew increasingly apparent 
(Carson and Anderson 2016; Mitchell 2014; Western 2006). In efforts to unpack the nature 
of such processes, scholars of punishment and inequality have largely focused on two 
related phenomena: pre-prison discrepancies reflecting disproportionately harsh 
sentencing for certain segments of the population and post-prison disparities in terms of 
how different demographic groups fare in reentry processes following incarceration. A 
common strand between much of this research is an emphasis on work—labor market 
participation and job quality impact chances of imprisonment (Lageson and Uggen 2013), 
while employment outcomes are commonly relied upon to evaluate successful transition 
back into society after prison (e.g., Bouffard et al. 2000; Seiter and Kadela 2003). 
First, a rich body of scholarly work has unveiled imbalances in the likelihood of 
imprisonment along class, racial, and ethnic lines in the era of mass incarceration (Simon 
1993; Wacquant 2009b; Wakefield and Uggen 2010). Indeed, today’s prisoners are 
disproportionately “drawn from the lowest rungs in society” (Western and Pettit 2010: 8), 
resulting in prisons which overwhelmingly “house the jobless, the poor, the racial minority, 
and the uneducated, not the merely criminal” (Wakefield and Uggen 2010: 393). In terms 
of class, the poor comprise much of the prisoner population, despite similar rates of 
reported criminal activity across class divides (Morenoff 2005; Wheelock and Uggen 
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2008). Labor market non- or under-participants are overrepresented in the prison system 
as labor market gaps leave many susceptible to the carceral apparatus (Wakefield & Uggen 
2010; Weiss 2001; Western 2006). Furthermore, many of the nation’s prisoners are high 
school dropouts (Pettit and Western 2004; dropout incarceration rates are even higher for 
black Americans). In terms of race and ethnicity, the nation’s prisons are disproportionately 
filled with minorities, particularly black men (Beckett et al. 2006; Blumstein and Beck 
1999; Lynch and Sabol 2000; Steffensmeier et al. 1998; Van Cleve 2016; Western 2006). 
Whites and racial/ethnic minorities engage in similar rates of law violation; yet, these 
groups face different and inequitable attention from policing and surveillance apparatuses. 
Scholars have argued that a new racial caste system has emerged in the United States as 
rising numbers of racial and ethnic minorities are confined to prisons and accordingly 
disenfranchised and cordoned off from mainstream society (Alexander 2010; Blackmon 
2008; Smith and Hattery 2008).  
Researchers have promoted several theories to account for these patterns (Garland 
2017; Pfaff 2017). Some contend that penal policy and practice have shifted away from an 
emphasis on targeting and treating individual offenders, instead prioritizing the 
management and incapacitation of aggregate groups deemed threatening to security as well 
as budgets (Feeley and Simon 1992). The continued swelling of prisoner populations under 
mass incarceration into the 2000s corresponded with the further development of “risk 
management” oriented policing and judicial strategies reliant on more punitive penal 
apparatuses targeting particular demographic groups (Feeley and Simon 1992; Garland 
1990; Wacquant 2000, 2001, 2013). The prison system, according to this line of thought, 
has expanded to contain a surplus population who, lacking employment and social 
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supports, have been relegated to non-participation in the formal labor market (Wacquant 
2009a). Voters commonly support such punitive practices, reflecting what scholars have 
identified as a reactionary culture with an “appetite for punishment,” favoring “law and 
order” policies and the “war on crime” (Garland 2001b, 2013; Simon 2007, 2010). 
Second, scholars have highlighted marked patterns in how different groups fare 
upon release from prison. Increasingly punitive criminal justice policies and practices in 
recent decades have had negative effects for the life chances and prospects of those coming 
into contact with the criminal justice system. Sociological and criminological scholarship 
in this area has identified disparities in terms of health outcomes (Massoglia 2008; 
Patterson 2010; Schnittker and John 2007; Spaulding et al. 2011), family formation and 
family stability (Apel et al. 2010; Comfort 2008; Edin 2001; Lopoo and Western 2005), 
civic engagement (Manza and Uggen 2006), and other outcomes for disadvantaged groups 
after they exit the prison. In this way, the contemporary prison operates to exclude 
marginalized groups from mainstream society. Perhaps the most prominently studied effect 
of criminal justice system contact has been in the arena of labor market and wage outcomes 
(Cantora 2015; Solomon et al. 2004; Stoll and Bushway 2008; Sutton 2002; Wakefield and 
Uggen 2010; Western et al. 2001). Employment and earnings are negatively impacted by 
imprisonment (Pager 2003, 2007; Pettit and Lyons 2009; Sutton 2002; Western 2002; 
Western and Beckett 1999). In addition to being removed from labor market participation 
while behind bars, offenders encounter continued exclusion once their sentences are 
completed (Freeman 1992; Western and Pettit 2010; Western et al. 2001). As such, they 
face significantly reduced employment rates and earnings, often unable to (re)enter formal 
labor markets in the free world (Freeman 1992; Holzer 2009; Pager et al. 2009; Pettit and 
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Lyons 2009; Western and Beckett 1999). This may reduce their wages by as much as 10% 
to 30% (Geller et al. 2006; Pettit and Lyons 2009; Pettit and Western 2004; Wakefield and 
Uggen 2010). 
Post-release prospects, though diminished for all ex-captives, are notably bleaker 
for members of minority groups in the United States, who face discrimination along the 
lines of race as well as criminal history, which interact in racialized perceptions of 
criminality. Formerly-incarcerated Latino men, for instance, experience decreased lifetime 
earnings at more than double the rate of formerly-incarcerated whites, while formerly-
incarcerated black men face approximately four-times the white rate in addition to 
experiencing the longest-lasting wage penalty over the life course (Western 2006; See also 
Pettit and Lyons 2009). Several mechanisms have been identified to explain the link 
between criminal history and diminishing labor market returns. Felons may be stigmatized 
or discriminated against by employers during the hiring process (Boshier and Johnson 
1974; Holzer 1996; Pager 2007; Solinas-Saunders et al. 2015). In many jurisdictions, ex-
prisoners may be formally, legally barred from employment in many industries (Love et 
al. 1996; Western et al. 2001). Additionally, prisoners often face limited opportunities for 
skill development or capital accumulation behind bars, which, when coupled with removal 
from formal labor market activity, may result in an erosion of marketable skills and 
resources (Wakefield and Uggen 2010; Waldfogel 1994) as well as social ties useful for 
finding work (Hagan 1993).  
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Bridging the Gap: Studying Prison (Work) Experiences 
 
The study of inequality surrounding the prison has devoted much attention to uncovering 
and understanding disparities in which groups are imprisoned and how they fare upon 
release. This emphasis on pre- and post-prison inequity has resulted in part from a lack of 
useful data for studying factors contributing to inequalities while offenders are still in 
prison. Indeed, as mass incarceration flourished following the 1970s, researcher access to 
the inside of the nation’s prisons grew rare (Cunha 2014; Goodman 2011; King and 
Liebling 2008; Reiter 2014; Wacquant 2002).4 As a result, comparatively little is known 
about key structures and practices behind bars. According to a 2014 National Research 
Council report, “Most research on social and economic effects treats prison as a black box, 
with little detailed study of what takes place inside and its potential effects” (Travis et al. 
2014: 354, emphasis added). Reiter (2014) goes one step further, framing the prison as a 
veritable “black site,” intentionally restricting entrée. This project ventures to bridge this 
empirical and theoretical gap by drawing on ethnographic and interview data from the 
inside to explore how variations in prisoners’ carceral experiences—and the structures 
which shape them—may produce different outcomes of imprisonment. Though vital to our 
understanding of punishment and inequality in the contemporary era, such factors remain 
understudied.  
A central finding of this dissertation is that the contemporary prison—and, in 
particular, labor within such facilities—is structured such that different prisoner groups 
have vastly different experiences of punishment. Despite official rhetorics to the contrary, 
the institution of penal labor today does not function to transfer skills and positive outlooks 
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to the imprisoned. Instead, lines are drawn—and jobs are assigned—on the basis of 
prisoners’ existing skills, knowledge, social ties, and demographic characteristics, much as 
they are in the outside world. As a result, rather than addressing deficits in individual 
abilities or resumes, this institution reflects and exacerbates inequalities observable in the 
outside world. As Wakefield and Uggen (2010) note:  
 
Prisons tend to house those with the least human capital, 
financial capital, and social capital. … If prisons are not 
successful in addressing deficits—and there is ample 
evidence to suggest they are not—widespread incarceration 
reinforces existing disadvantages, to the detriment of 
inmates and the communities to which they return (393-
394).5  
 
Existing research tells us that penal labor is impactful in this regard. Post-release 
survey and interview studies suggest that participation in skilled, vocational work 
programming while behind bars may have positive effects on desistance as well as job 
market prospects following incarceration (Gaes et al. 1999; Seiter & Kadela 2003; 
Solomon et al. 2004; Travis & Vischer 2005). Scholars contend that working in prison may 
reduce criminal activity by adding new structure to prisoners’ lives (Cohen and Felson 
1979); transferring a sense of self-control and an ability to delay gratification, a lack of 
which is argued to have influenced criminal behavior in the first place (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi 1990); or bolstering prisoners’ perceptions of self-worth and the development of 
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positive narratives about their lives (Maruna 2001). Working prisoners are also said to be 
better equipped for success than their non-working counterparts, having adopted a greater 
“stake in conformity” (Toby 1957), making them less likely to reengage in criminal activity 
(Cohen and Felson 1979; Sampson and Laub 1995).  
Despite these reported benefits of positive work experiences for the incarcerated, 
however, opportunities to acquire skilled work and training in the nation’s prisons are 
vanishing at a rapid rate (Gottschalk 2010; Lynch 2010). What’s more, recent survey 
research reveals that more sought-after skilled or vocational work opportunities behind 
bars are indeed inequitably distributed along the lines of race as well as gender (Crittenden 
et al. 2018). As a result, as the examples of Soto and Jake illustrated, prisoners today may 
have markedly different experiences of work behind bars. While Soto struggles to purchase 
additional food each week on his meager food factory wages, Jake has already begun 
financially planning for his release, amassing savings from his work in the prison call 
center. And, whereas Jake has been able to hone his marketable sales skills (building what 
his boss calls his “human capital” whilst simultaneously cultivating positive personal 
narratives to offset his employment history gaps following repeat prison stints), Soto has 
labored in deskilled monotony, striving fruitlessly to acquire a “good prison job.”  
These observations raise a series of questions. If “good prisons jobs” and “bad 
prison jobs” exist, what factors determine the allocation of such assignments? How is this 
system actually structured at the institutional level? How do prisoners navigate and endure 
the carceral employment system? What are the outcomes of labor sorting processes for 
incarcerated workers’ ongoing and interwoven experiences behind bars? And how might 
these internal prison phenomena connect to broader patterns of inequality? In addressing 
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these questions, this research reveals how the prison—via its structure and the practices of 
overseers, staffers, and other agents—actively sorts its wards via penal labor assignments. 
This system privileges those already endowed with valuable capabilities and resources, 
while erecting hurdles for those found lacking. In this way, the carceral employment system 
acts as a sort of sieve, filtering and sorting the prisoner population along criteria that the 
institution deems useful.6 Social barriers are here reproduced not between the poor and rich 
or the incarcerated and free, but within the narrower range of social class occupied by the 
prisoner population. By illustrating these processes of sorting and exclusion, this project 
stands as a link between research on pre- and post-prison disparities, revealing a chain of 
inequality resulting in particular groups facing (a) disproportionate rates of imprisonment, 
(b) barriers to skill development and resource acquisition during incarceration, and (c) 
discriminatory treatment upon release. Hence, while prison “marks” all offenders, the skills 
and qualifications that they bring in or develop behind bars have powerful effects as well. 
 
 
Penal Labor in the United States 
 
A primary objective of this dissertation is to better understand growing inequalities faced 
by individuals coming into contact with the criminal justice system. Examining prisoners’ 
work is central to this endeavor for at least two reasons. First, the institution of penal labor 
is far reaching. Work programming represents a core component in the organization and 
management of prison life. This is how most able prisoners spend most of their time. As 
such, it has the power to contribute a great deal to positive—rehabilitative—carceral 
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experiences for the millions of individuals behind bars; alternatively, it has the capacity to 
do great harm to these men and women already at odds with mainstream society. Second, 
penal labor directly influences the wellbeing of working offenders in a number of ways. 
Work assignments impact the amount of money that prisoners receive and, consequently, 
their social and economic standing while behind bars. In paid penal labor positions, wages 
may vary from less than $0.05 to over $5.00 per hour (Sawyer 2017).7 With more and more 
penal expenses being shifted to the incarcerated—via the privatization of care and services 
and rising fees associated with imprisonment—this pay gap has direct effects on the ability 
of incarcerated individuals to acquire basic goods and necessities through the prison 
commissary or through black market exchanges. Furthermore, for the incarcerated as for 
the free, work remains central to perceptions of self-worth in the face of barriers to dignity 
(e.g., Hodson 2001). 
 Before unpacking the linkages between prison work and the reproduction of social 
inequality it is useful to first highlight the centrality of work to the U.S. carceral system 
over time. To this end, I will provide a brief history of penal labor from the early years of 
American independence through today. 
 
Penal labor in early American history 
 
The history of incarceration and work in the U.S. are interwoven. As Jonathan 
Simon (1993) notes: “Wherever you look in the development of modernist penality you 
will find labor. Exhort the offenders with religious tracts, but make them work. … Educate 
them as citizens, but make them work. Treat their pathological features, but make them 
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work” (39). From the inception of the first penitentiary on American soil, prisoner labor 
power has been extracted by state and private entities alike. 1796 saw the passage of the 
first known law to enable prisoners to receive compensation for labor, by the state of New 
York. Carceral work programming remained prominent in the developing nation. The roots 
of today’s emphasis on work as a path to rehabilitation can be traced back to the penal 
reformers of the years following the American Revolution, who developed the penitentiary 
as a means to rekindle the “decency” that they saw as inherent to all deviants. They sought 
to counter the negative influence of corrupt families and peers by mobilizing rationalized, 
uniform deprivation and control (Gibson 2011; Rothman 1971). Often, this entailed 
working throughout the day in silence before being relegated to isolated individual cells 
overnight. Eastern State Penitentiary, opening in 1829, became an exemplar of this model 
(Rubin 2013). 
In 1865, the nation passed the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing 
slavery except as punishment for a crime. Throughout the ensuing era, following the 
American Civil War, prisoners came to be subjected to perhaps the harshest conditions 
faced by U.S. workers outside of the institution of slavery (Thompson 2011). The nation’s 
prisoners were compelled into tireless manual labor such as mining, laying railroad, factory 
work, and agricultural work with little reprieve (Ayers 1984; Lichtenstein 1996). It was 
during this time that the U.S. first mobilized its carceral labor force for profit on a large 
scale. Prisoners were leased out to private firms, or contractors would be allowed to set up 
workshops within prison walls to more efficiently utilize its captive workers (McLennan 
2008). In the South, it was even common for local law enforcement to systematically 
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fabricate charges in order to incarcerate greater numbers of poor black men to meet 
capital’s growing demands for greater, cheaper labor power (Blackmon 2008).  
This use of penal labor was pervasive in the public and private sectors until the late 
1920s, when states gradually abolished convict leasing programs, ending for what seemed 
like once-and-for-all with Alabama in 1927. New Deal legislation in the 1930s further 
limited prisoner production exclusively to state goods like license plates, road signs, and 
uniforms (Thompson 2011). Four decades later, however, legislation such as the Justice 
System Improvement Act and the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program 
would once more lift many restrictions on the production, sale, and distribution of prisoner-
made goods, paving the way for renewed privatization of prison work programming in the 
coming years (U.S. Department of Justice 1979; Walshe 2012). 
 
Penal labor in the era of mass incarceration 
 
The 1970s saw the inauguration of the “War on Drugs” in the United States. Begun 
under Richard Nixon and carried forth by Ronald Reagan and others, this symbolic war 
entailed harsher treatment of drug offenders and—in concert with the “War on Crime”—
more severe forms of policing, particularly in poor and minority communities. Expanding 
prosecutorial powers starting in this era further magnified disproportionate sentencing 
patterns (Lynch 2016). The prison became imbued with new responsibility: to incapacitate 
and punish the rising ranks of women and (particularly) men who had become the targets 
of this emergent racialized, retributive form of governance (Wacquant 2009b). As 
imprisonment transformed into the de facto response to more and more transgressions, the 
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incarcerated labor force grew proportionately. Today, in the context of heightened 
incarceration rates and privatization arising in the aftermath of the Drug War 70s and 
subsequent decades, state and federal prisoners have been put to work at record numbers. 
Approximately two-thirds of current U.S. prisoners participate in work programs within 
state prisons (see Figure 1) (Hatton 2017; Stephan 2008).8 Most penitentiaries engage in 
some manner of contracting out prisoner production or services to the private sector or 
state-run “correctional industries” businesses (Stephan 2008).  
 
 
Figure 1. The rise of prisoner labor in state prisons (Stephan 2008) 
 
Rather than far-removed total institutions, contemporary prisons are embedded in 
the economic world through prisoner labor. The variety of tasks in which working prisoners 
engage is vast. Throughout the country, convicts maintain and clean state facilities; engage 
in textiles, data entry, and other light industry; are contracted in public works projects, such 
as road and park maintenance, construction, and public lands upkeep; engage in 
agricultural work; work in call centers; and even fight fires in the free world (Goodman 
2012a, 2012b; Haney 2010; Hatton 2017; Solomon et al. 2004; Stephan 2008). As an 
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alternative to offshoring cheap labor, major U.S. firms such as Boeing, Wal-Mart, 
McDonald’s, Microsoft, Victoria’s Secret, and others have resorted to “in-sourcing” their 
production and service needs to the nation’s prisoners (Davidson 2015). 
Despite these expansive activities, working prisoners are not accorded the same 
protections or guarantees as other American laborers. For starters, those in many U.S. 
prisons remain forcibly compelled to work. In many states, “punishments for refusing to 
[work] include solitary confinement, loss of earned good time, and revocation of family 
visitation” (Benns 2015: 4). Typical OSHA regulations are not enforced in many prisons, 
leaving standards for a safe work environment unguaranteed (Atkinson and Rostad 2003). 
Social security and other state supports are denied as well (regardless of benefit status upon 
incarceration) (Social Security Administration 2010), as are interventions such as federal 
mandates for a minimum wage, leaving many to struggle to purchase necessary goods and 
services. Indeed, today’s “inmates-as-consumers” (Aviram 2015) are responsible for fees 
covering medical care co-pays, telephone use, room and board, electricity, and other 
amenities, in addition to the costs of supplementing diminishing institutional food offerings 
(Buchanan 2007; Gipson and Pierce 1996; Gottschalk 2006, 2010; Jackson 2007; 
Levingston 2007; Lynch 2010; Smoyer and Lopes 2017; Von Zielbauer 2007). 
 
Penology in the post-recession neoliberal era 
 
The state’s increasing reliance on penal labor aligns with a broader emphasis on 
fiscal responsibility coupled with self-reliance underlying the day-to-day management of 
the prison today. Indeed, a growing body of literature suggests that the U.S. is home to a 
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flourishing neoliberal penology. In it, systems of punishment have evolved to emphasize 
fiscal efficiency over rehabilitation. This may be observed in neoliberal discourses 
(emphasizing responsibilization and the new role of “inmates-as-consumers” [Aviram 
2015]), objectives (prioritizing budgetary concerns and financially efficient penal 
operations [e.g., Wacquant 2010]), and techniques (reliant on cost-shifting and internal 
competition via carceral labor systems [Buchanan 2007; Weiss 2001]) (see Conclusion). 
Scholars have identified pathways neoliberalism has taken in its rise as a dominant 
American discourse and rationale for penal practice (see Lacey 2013). Zooming in, the 
present work outlines the techniques of neoliberal penality as implemented and imposed 
within prison walls, unlocking a contemporary site of deep and lasting stratification. By 
foregrounding prisoners’ experiences, it reveals the ways in which neoliberalism is 
incorporated into the administration of punishment through mechanisms such as 
responsibilization and cost-shifting. Unlike past studies of the macro connections between 
political economy and punishment (e.g., Enshen 2014; Lacey 2013; Sutton 2002), this 
research considers qualitative differences in carceral experiences to reveal the ground-level 
influences  of neoliberal trends on carceral outcomes. Moving beyond classical critical 
punishment scholarship, which calls attention to macro patterns of labor appropriation 
through incarceration (Melossi and Pavarini 1981; Rusche [1933] 1978; Rusche and 
Kirchheimer [1939] 2017), this dissertation turns toward micro arenas in which labor is 
foregrounded in the contemporary prison and consequences for individual experiences of 
punishment.  
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Methodological Approach: The Ethnography of Penal Labor 
 
To illuminate the “black box” of the prison and examine on-the-ground realities of prison 
life and labor, I ventured into one such institution to observe day-to-day practices in this 
context. Drawing on unique ethnographic access to a men’s state prison in the U.S. Sunbelt 
region (here defined as the area below the 36th Parallel; see Browning and Gesler 1979), I 
conducted 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork across 2015 and 2016. I call this 
anonymous prison complex Sunbelt State Penitentiary (SSP). During these 18 months, I 
worked alongside incarcerated laborers in a variety of prison contexts, observing their daily 
practices and participating in many aspects of penal labor. I also shadowed staff members 
in a variety of capacities in order to examine different aspects of penal surveillance and 
supervision, the allocation of work, and the management of the prisoner population. 
Additionally, I interviewed 82 prisoners and staffers regarding their experiences and 
outlooks towards prison life and labor.  
To secure prison access, I first met with the Director of the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) under whose jurisdiction it fell. Following initial contact via post, I was 
invited to travel to DOC headquarters to outline my proposed research strategy and 
negotiate the particulars of such a project. These included the need to freely navigate the 
prison complex during prisoner work hours, formalizing processes of consent, accessing 
private spaces to conduct one-on-one interviews, ensuring that my presence would not 
burden departmental resources, and scheduling the requisite DOC training procedures 
before first entering the facility (consisting primarily of slides and video presentations from 
staff orientation modules detailing basic safety procedures and chains of command).  
32 
 
Following Director approval of my proposal, ethnographic observations took place 
within a medium security yard at SSP, which housed over 1000 men convicted of a variety 
of crimes, ranging from possession of a dangerous substance (i.e., drug possession) to 
“white collar crimes” (e.g., fraud or money laundering) to murder (after years or decades 
of good behavior, higher custody prisoners could eventually be moved to medium security 
yards if approved). Colloquially, participants referred to their unit by the general phrase 
“the yard,” which was meant to capture the housing bays, recreational yard space, and 
adjacent buildings. This particular unit was chosen because it contained a large prisoner 
population, most of its prisoners were eligible—and indeed required—to work, and it 
housed a model variety of work programs. These ranged from deskilled, despotically-
managed programs evocative of traditional images of penal labor (e.g., food service or 
contemporary chain gangs), to skilled, engaging work opportunities in more comfortable 
environments that participants said, “feels like a real job” in the “free world” (e.g., a fully-
functioning call center). Prisoners were unable to move between units, making each yard 
home to a contained labor market with its own unique work programs, staff overseers, and 
captive workforce. 
I was granted an ID badge so that I could enter and exit this facility freely. I was 
accorded the status of “volunteer” (typically reserved for non-employee entrants like 
visiting tutors or chaplains) to facilitate daily access. Prison volunteers occupy an 
ambiguous standing in the social order of the prison. The relative unfamiliarity of their 
position contributes to social encounters that do not necessarily adhere to established 
scripts and hierarchies. This unique status allowed me to sometimes strategically alter my 
role on-site. On most days, I operated as “worker” alongside penal laborers in different 
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work programs. Occasionally, I shadowed staff, observing institutional operations within 
and beyond prison walls. Experiencing each of these stages of programming, management, 
and security revealed a fuller portrait of prison labor, which structures time within the 
institution (Guilbaud 2010). Wearing plain clothes, my researcher status overt to 
participants, I freely traversed the facility at different times during prisoner working hours 
(weekdays between approximately 4:30am and 5:30pm) to observe work in multiple spaces 
as well as on the prison yard. Over time I became a regular fixture at SSP. I worked 
alongside prisoners of all ages, racial and ethnic groups, and criminal histories. To 
accommodate my online teaching duties during semesters, I was commonly on-site during 
three or four workdays weekly, which aligns with research strategies advocated by 
European prison ethnographers (King and Liebling 2008). Sensitive to the potential for 
institutional accommodations to my presence, I remained attentive for possible changes in 
operations on account of my fieldwork. The length of my data collection period helped 
diminish any effects of procedural alterations that might have influenced prisoner and staff 
practices early on. Additionally, I made sure to regularly arrive to the facility at different 
times of day and refrained from alerting participants or administrators to my schedule to 
impede the potential for behavioral or operational changes around my presence. 
Thousands of pages of fieldnotes were recorded across 18 months. Notes were 
typed upon returning from each day of fieldwork. Nearly 100% of the individuals I 
encountered at SSP quickly consented to participate in ethnographic observations. Indeed, 
only two prisoners declined to participate in observations; at their request, they were 
omitted from written fieldnotes. Many were enthusiastic about the prospect of sharing 
experiences and perspectives (see Copes et al. [2012] for a discussion of the reported 
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benefits of participation in qualitative prison research). Several participants warmly 
regarded me by nicknames like “Hemmingway” or “Kerouac” on account of my regular 
note-taking. Calls to “Put this in your book!” were frequent. 
To structure visits and better focus observations on consistent processes and themes 
over time, I spent most days alternating between four primary work sites within this unit. 
These four workplaces will be described in detail in the following chapter. For context, 
however, I provide a brief portrayal of each here. 
The first site was the sign shop—one of the two “best” prison jobs, according to 
participants—in which 30-40 working prisoners engaged in the skilled labor of producing 
street signs and other signage to fulfill state and private orders. Paying between $0.50 and 
$1.00 per hour, this was the second-highest paying job in the facility (only select skilled 
jobs like the sign shop and call center were allowed to pay above $0.50 hourly, per facility 
policy). This site was managed by three civilian employees of the state’s Correctional 
Industries program and was referred to as a “state-run” job. The most frequent customers 
of the shop were the state Department of Transportation and several universities. During 
fieldwork here, I participated in multiple stages of the screen printing and vinyl sign 
production processes.  
The second site was the fleet garage, a fully stocked auto garage where a small crew 
of four to seven men performed regular maintenance and repairs on the facility’s vast 
vehicular fleet. Like the majority of sites, the garage offered wages between $0.05 and 
$0.50 per hour; most mechanics received pay at the higher-end of this scale. The site was 
overseen by two civilian employees of DOC’s Facilities Division, as well as one on-site 
correctional officer. Due to accountability concerns expressed by staffers (should anything 
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go wrong in the repair of a vehicle), I was not enabled to directly participate in hands-on 
maintenance, nor did I attempt to. Instead, I operated in a capacity that one prisoner referred 
to as an “intern,” helping to move tools and supplies, check basic readings like fuel levels, 
and break down stations at the end of day. 
The third site was the food factory, an overwhelmingly derided food prep 
warehouse in which between 60 to 90 men daily rolled bologna, wrapped sandwiches, 
inventoried food stores, and engaged in a range of other largely-deskilled tasks. In this site, 
most workers received closer to the lower end of the $0.05 to $0.50 range per hour. This 
and all food services at SSP were contracted through and managed by a private firm. As 
such, aside from one on-site correctional officer, the food factory was overseen by a large 
staff of private employees of the firm, whom prisoners and staffers called “white shirts.” 
This was therefore described as a “private” prison job. Here, I participated in a range of 
tasks alongside prisoners, including wrapping up bologna and other meats, assembling 
sandwich supplies for daily lunches, and rolling biscuit dough in the bakery station. 
The fourth and final work program on which I focused observations was a call 
center. This was the highest-paying and second of the two most lauded jobs onsite 
(alongside the sign shop), in which a staff of around 25-35 men engaged in telemarketing 
to sell television advertising time. Prisoners in the call center received the highest wages 
in the prison and were the only workers to receive over $1.00 per hour—above even the 
national average of $0.89 per hour (Pryor 2005). Like the food factory, this work site was 
managed by a private firm as part of a public-private partnership with DOC. It was overseen 
daily by one or two private employees of that firm. Unlike the food factory, however, this 
work site was not home to an on-site correctional officer; additionally, it was considered a 
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skilled position and boasted of perks like high pay, free coffee, and music played through 
mounted wall speakers. For reasons such as these, it was commonly considered more 
similar to the sign shop (a “state-run” job) than to the food factory (another “private” job). 
Similar to restrictions faced in the fleet garage, I was not allowed to make sales calls in the 
call center. Instead, I listened in on calls, participated in trainings, and shadowed salesmen. 
Consent at these sites was established during “town hall” style meetings in which I 
read from a script detailing my project and answered questions from prisoners and staff 
before seeking affirmative verbal consent from each individual. Upon encountering new 
people, I went through the same process one-on-one. This was especially frequent at the 
food factory, where turnover was high.  
 
In-depth interviews 
 
To supplement observational data, I conducted 82 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with prisoners and staff—69 with prisoners and 13 with staff members across 
the institution. Prisoner participants were drawn from the four primary work programs 
where I conducted fieldwork. Questions covered topics relating to life and labor behind 
bars with particular interest in perceptions and practices of work. Interviewees discussed 
work histories in and out of prison, assessments of different work programs, navigating the 
prison employment system, challenges surrounding prison services, and expectations and 
plans for release (see Appendix A for the semi-structured interview schedule). The nature 
of the prison and prisoners’ dominated schedules sometimes made it difficult to secure time 
to conduct these interviews. Because of this, they ranged from 15 to 80 minutes, averaging 
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approximately 30 minutes. Interviews were recorded using a digital recorder that I was 
permitted to carry with me.  
Although most prisoners quickly consented to be included in observational 
fieldnotes, many were initially reluctant to engage in interviews. One reason for this was 
that many had experienced video or audio recordings used against them in court and were 
apprehensive of my tape recorder. One consented to talk to me in this capacity without the 
recorder, which I transcribed by hand during the interview. Several correctional officers 
were similarly reticent to be recorded, citing instances (often indirectly recounted to them) 
in which COs had been recorded and then sanctioned for statements or behaviors. Another 
reason that some were hesitant to consent to sit-down interviews early on was that these 
were conducted one-on-one. In prison, solo encounters between prisoners and non-
prisoners are often met with suspicion. For fear of attracting negative attention—including 
that of the racialized gang hierarchy behind bars—a small number declined to be 
interviewed. In several instances, prisoners who initially expressed such concerns later 
consented once I had been “vouched for” by other influential men and my presence became 
normalized. As time went on, prisoners and staffers alike grew more trusting of my 
motivations and consented to interviews at increasing rates. Influenced by the racial politics 
of the institution—informal rules governing and limiting interactions between racial/ethnic 
cliques (Goodman 2014; Walker 2016)—white prisoners were quicker to consent to 
recorded interviews in the early weeks of collection, increasing their final participation 
rates. The reluctance of other groups eventually faded but resulted in fewer interviews from 
racial/ethnic minorities overall.  The final prisoner interview sample demographics were: 
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20 Hispanic (12 Mexican-American, 8 foreign national), 34 white, 14 black, and 1 Native 
American.  
Unlike survey-based or other quantitative studies, the ethnographic and interview-
based approach that I employed in researching this institution enabled me to capture the 
organization of prison workplaces and the daily processes of prisoner labor at the micro 
level. In addition, this allowed me to illustrate the composition of various work programs 
which constitute an internal prison employment system (with its own captive labor force) 
at the meso level. Hence, these qualitative data reveal structures and processes not readily 
apparent via other methods.  
 
Sunbelt State Penitentiary and its prisoners  
 
Conducting research in a carceral institutional setting necessarily involves the 
participation of three parties: not only the researcher and respondents, but also the 
organization itself (see Borgatti and Molina 2005). Ensuring the confidentiality of my 
vulnerable prisoner participants, staffers, and the particular facility required the distortion 
of some characteristics. Anonymizing the prison was a condition of access, but I will here 
provide what information I can to help contextualize findings within these limitations. 
SSP is in the top quartile of U.S. prison facilities in terms of average daily 
population size (Stephan 2008). Providing direct demographic data of the prisoner 
population here has the potential to unintentionally identify the facility. With this in mind, 
I developed a strategy to provide approximate demographic information that will not map 
directly on to any single prison in the region. I aggregated the demographic information of 
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four comparable penal institutions to provide an approximate portrait of the prisoner 
population at Sunbelt State Penitentiary. These four institutions were chosen on the basis 
of being located in the U.S. Sunbelt region and possessing populations and security levels 
analogous to my field site. Table 1 provides the approximate racial/ethnic makeup of the 
population of SSP (also mirrored in the unit) derived from this aggregation. The 
demographics of individual work sites where fieldwork was conducted are also reported. 
These, too, were altered in proportion to the adjusted general population figures to maintain 
pertinent relationships. Rounding or changing organizational statistics for the purposes of 
confidentiality such as this is common in institutional ethnography (e.g., Kunda 2006). 
 
Table 1. Racial/Ethnic Composition of SSP Work Programs 
 Race/Ethnicity 
 White Black 
Mexican 
American 
Foreign 
National 
Other 
General Population 35% 33% 17% 13% 2% 
Call Center 70 20 8 0 0 
Sign Shop 39 43 11 0 7 
Fleet Garage 57 0 14 29 0 
Food Factory 24 24 19 32 1 
Notes: The percentages reported here have been adjusted to ensure the confidentiality of participants 
and of the institution itself. Percentages reported for work sites have been altered in proportion to the 
adjusted general population statistics. 
 
Sunbelt State Penitentiary is a large “warehouse prison”: a sprawling institution 
which, despite its size, crowds mass numbers of prisoners in limited space within housing 
units, relies heavily on new surveillance technologies to rigidly enforce institutional rules, 
and limits recreational and rehabilitative programming in an effort to strategically monitor 
and control the swelling prisoner population (Irwin 2005). As if reflecting the design of 
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sprawling metropolises in the Sunbelt, such expansive, crowded penal facilities are 
common in this region. Historically, the southern half of the United States was home to the 
rapid expansion of the institution of penal labor in the years following the abolition of 
slavery (Blackmon 2008; Thompson 2011). Today, in the face of chronic labor shortages 
and massive carceral populations that might be mobilized as surplus labor, the region 
remains the seat of such activity (Stephan 2008; Weiss 2001) while wielding growing 
influence over national penal policy (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). The contemporary 
warehouse prison has evolved to accommodate these trends. The many bodies contained 
by these facilities are increasingly put to work. The labor system that Irwin (2005) briefly 
noted in his description of the warehouse prison (e.g., p. 75) has since expanded to more 
fully utilize its captive workforce. Today’s prisoners are less the “products” stored in the 
carceral warehouse and more the warehouse workers that it puts to labor.  
This is a state prison, meaning its administrative and security staff are state 
employees. However, through various public-private partnerships, many civilian staff 
members (i.e., not correctional officers) are employed by private firms contracted to 
oversee services such as food production or medical care, or to manage particular work 
programs like the call center. The privatization of penal labor in this manner is 
accomplished via public-private partnerships through which individual businesses 
remunerate the Department of Corrections for the ability to operate behind prison walls. 
Unlike work release programs or traditional convict leasing systems, prisoners involved in 
such work details do not leave the penitentiary and their wages and other facets of care 
continue to be provided by the institution rather than directly by the firm.  
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Linking Prison Structures & Social Reproduction 
 
To make sense of the experiences of working prisoners—and to understand how variations 
in their experiences can contribute to different outcomes of punishment—this project 
applies theoretical concepts from the sociology of culture to the qualitative study of the 
prison. A central literature in this area considers the role of key social institutions, such as 
schools, in filtering or classifying individuals in ways that favor those from advantaged 
class or demographic backgrounds (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992; Stevens et al. 2008). Such institutions privilege those that exhibit outlooks, skills, 
and resources that are valued in particular social arenas (Bourdieu 1996; Willis 1977). The 
work of Pierre Bourdieu offers valuable insights in this regard. According to Bourdieu, the 
social world is made up of competitive “fields” in which actors strive to secure influence 
as well as valued resources or rewards (Bourdieu 1993b). Such resources are referred to as 
capitals. In this sense, the concept of capital goes beyond the typical understanding of 
simply financial capital to encompass many kinds of “resources that provide different 
forms of power” (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007: 23). Indeed, the structure of a given field may 
be “defined by the unequal distribution of capital” within it (Bourdieu 2005: 195). Capital 
may come in a variety of forms, including economic capital (wealth and property), cultural 
capital (embodied forms of useful knowledge or dispositions), and social capital (durable 
ties to influential others) (Bourdieu 2005). Approaching the social world through this lens 
highlights the ways in which certain individuals or groups (i.e., those who reflect or 
embody valued skills, characteristics, and outlooks) are rewarded greater access to desired 
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outcomes; those lacking in prized areas, on the other hand, may face significant hurdles to 
success.  
Social institutions act to filter or classify social actors in a variety of ways. For 
example, they may “sort and sieve” individuals along the lines of socioeconomic 
background (Blau and Duncan 1967). And, when rigid institutional structures demand 
adherence to particular dispositions or norms, groups that find themselves unable to 
conform may suffer (Willis 1977). In other words, rather than transferring valuable 
resources to those who lack them, such key institutions operate to merely classify 
individuals according to what capitals they already possess. According to Bourdieu, by 
privileging some and punishing others in this manner, institutions operate as agents of 
“ritual exclusion,” reifying the boundaries between different social classes (Bourdieu 
1996).  
 I approach the prison as a mediator of social mobility—and immobility—impacting 
a distinct rung of society. A primary way that this occurs, I maintain, is via the allocation 
of jobs in the prison employment system on the basis of prisoners’ cultural, economic, and 
social capital. Despite its expansive role in American society, detailed processes of social 
reproduction within the contemporary prison have rarely been explicitly empirically 
examined. Setting the stage for this effort, Chapter 1 will detail the expansive penal labor 
market at Sunbelt State Penitentiary. It asks: What does the employment system behind 
bars look like? And how do working prisoners evaluate and rank different work offerings? 
At the top of the prison employment hierarchy sit skilled, higher-paying “top-tier” work 
sites. I describe these and other work programs at Sunbelt State Penitentiary in 
ethnographic detail, drawing on prisoners’ own discourses surrounding prison jobs. The 
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result is an account of prisoner “folk rankings” of the work opportunities available to 
them—i.e., what things they value in a prison job, what they seek to avoid, and how they 
assess the management, organization, and daily realities of different labor programs.  
Scholars have established that different punishment technologies may be 
differentially deployed against prisoner groups. Varieties of carceral experiences have been 
documented, for instance, between women’s and men’s facilities (Kruttschnitt et al. 2013; 
Kruttschnitt and Gartner 2003; McCorkel 2003), and across custody or detention levels 
(Liebling 2015; Reiter 2016) to illustrate distinctive challenges that some may face in 
mitigating the pains of imprisonment (Crewe 2009, 2011; Sykes 1958). Viewing these 
dynamics through the social reproduction framework advances our understanding of such 
processes, revealing mechanisms and pathways through which prisoners in the same 
facility and of the same custody level are nevertheless sorted into different classes behind 
bars, leading to different outcomes for prisoner groups. To this end, Chapter 2 will detail 
how the contemporary prison relies on various sorting mechanisms through which it 
promotes those in possession of valued forms of capital, skills, and dispositions to positions 
in desirable “good prison jobs.” This chapter asks: If everyone must work, how are jobs 
assigned? Who (or what) is privileged in this process? Much like the elite schools studied 
by Bourdieu and others, I contend that the prison is not engaged in transferring new skills 
or outlooks; rather, it is “merely teaching fish to swim” (Bourdieu 1996: 73) (or what 
Wilson [1987] calls a “creaming” process). In each case, the technical functions of the 
institutions “effectively disguise their social function as agents of ritual exclusion” (ibid.). 
Unlike education institutions, however, American prisons not only “teach fish to swim,” 
but may also be said to teach rocks to sink. Those found lacking along valued criteria are 
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not merely barred from the top, but are actively relegated to the bottom of labor, economic, 
and social hierarchies within the institution via sorting into derided “bad prison jobs.” By 
consigning the un-endowed to the lower rung of the employment system, the prison 
facilitates conditions resulting in economic precarity behind bars, potentially promoting 
negative outlooks towards work (rather than positive “work ethics”) and impeding the 
acquisition or protection of dignity.  
 
 
Linking the Prison Labor Market & Carceral Experiences 
 
Researchers have recognized the prison system as a labor market institution with powerful 
implications for overall labor market participation, unemployment rates, and stratification 
in the free world (Sutton 2002; Wakefield and Uggen 2010; Western and Beckett 1999; 
Western and Pettit 2010). Critical scholars have even contended that penal policy responds 
to market needs and acts to actively control the labor power of the poor (Rusche [1933] 
1978; Rusche and Kirchheimer [1939] 2017; Weiss 2001). Yet, focusing entirely on 
broader “outcomes rather than processes” in this manner—that is, by emphasizing longer-
term, macro effects of incarceration and penal labor rather than the way that such 
institutions are organized in practice—risks losing sight of on-the-ground realities of this 
environment (Garland 2004: 167). Here, too, the prison remains a black box: it is connected 
to various outcomes for offenders and for society writ large, but our knowledge of how 
conditions and labor outcomes are linked is limited.  
45 
 
To address this, I draw on the labor process literature, which emphasizes “shop 
floor” organization and practice to make sense of the world of work across contexts. From 
this perspective, popularized by Michael Burawoy, workers are not merely cogs to be 
utilized unthinkingly by management; instead, they are agentic social actors who engage 
in various practices and strategies on the shop floor. To answer questions about why 
workers behave the way that they do—e.g., why they work as hard as they do or why they 
continue to participate in exploitative labor relationships—this perspective turns to the day-
to-day dynamics of the workplace (e.g., Burawoy 1979, 1985). By applying the labor 
process paradigm to the prison setting, I examine how the incarcerated actually perform 
penal labor, highlighting the strategies of working prisoners and the micro-level 
interactions between groups of incarcerated laborers and management. Employing a 
comparative lens, I explore how the labor process varies between different types of prison 
work sites.  
In line with this tradition, I approach worker agency using the metaphor of work as 
a “game,” in which laborers engage in collective practices and strategies aimed at 
navigating and enduring the realities of work while seeking desired outcomes (Burawoy 
1979; Sallaz 2015; Sharone 2014). In the prison context, such games might be understood 
as a form of “secondary adjustments,” or arrangements “by which a member of an 
organisation employs unauthorised means, or obtains unauthorised ends, or both, thus 
getting around the organisation's assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence 
what he should be” (Goffman 1961: 171). Through this lens, Chapter 3 asks: How do 
prisoners endure the conditions of penal labor? How do work environment, surveillance, 
oversight, skill level, and other factors influence strategies and practices to this end? It 
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examines the various “work games” at play across varying prison labor contexts to reveal 
that, beyond providing distinct experiences of work, these different sites facilitate notably 
different forms of worker action.  
In turn, I document how different work games map on to different approaches to 
(in)dignity, enabling some to acquire or safeguard self-worth while others may be too busy 
resisting mortification to engage in such pursuits. At the bottom reaches of the employment 
system hierarchy, in “bad prison jobs,” incarcerated laborers are occupied by strategic 
action aimed at actively defying indignities of prison life and labor to which they are unduly 
exposed. “Good prison jobs,” on the other hand, facilitate rhetorical and practical strategies 
through which workers engage in re-injecting dignity into their lives through their work. 
In this way, the structure of the prison employment system leads to different experiences 
of work, punishment, and individuals’ sense-of-self between sites. All such games must be 
carried out within boundaries set by the institution, however. As a result, even the simplest 
individual coping strategy may contribute to the reproduction of underlying structures 
detrimental to the larger worker population. 
Finally, this dissertation explores the outcomes of prison labor stratification in 
terms of the material wellbeing of working prisoners. In an environment in which some 
receive close to $0.05 for an hour of work while others receive over $1.00 for the same 
amount of labor time, experiences of life behind bars can vary greatly. Complementing the 
previous chapter’s focus on outcomes related to worker dignity, Chapter 4 turns toward 
another set of outcomes of labor stratification behind bars. It asks, broadly: How does the 
prisoner wage gap shape precarity on the inside? How does it affect prisoner access to 
important goods or services behind bars as well as their preparations for release? As a result 
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of wage disparities between prisoner groups, the disadvantaged often struggle to acquire 
substantial food or hygiene products from the commissary. They also face challenges 
related to participating in the prison black market, where ramen noodles are used as 
informal currency to purchase fruits and vegetables, warmer clothing, and more. Lower-
paid workers are also less equipped to afford numerous prison fees required to visit the 
doctor, call a loved one, or access electricity to power personal electronics. Higher-paid 
prisoners, conversely, have less difficulty acquiring such goods and services. Some even 
reported amassing significant savings for release and sending “remittances” home to 
support their families. For this reason, they were oft referred to as the “prison CEOs” on 
the yard. 
 
 
Summary Remarks 
 
Following 18 months spent working alongside the incarcerated men of Sunbelt State 
Penitentiary, my analysis of the employment system that is the modern prison reveals that 
the world of work behind bars is not organized around principles of equity or rehabilitation, 
as is officially maintained. This institution relies on carceral labor to maintain penal 
facilities and generate revenue for continued operations. As such, in the allocation of prison 
jobs, it prioritizes those among the incarcerated who already possess the skills and 
resources (valued forms of capital) necessary to efficiently contribute to this endeavor. 
Such capitals, unfortunately, are not evenly distributed amongst class, racial, or ethnic 
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groups in American society, and are particularly imbalanced amongst incarcerated 
populations (Wakefield and Uggen 2010).  
The core argument of this dissertation is that prisoner experiences of carceral labor 
play a significant role in reproducing inequalities along class, racial, and ethnic lines. As 
the following chapters will examine, the prisoners of Sunbelt State Penitentiary 
experienced punishment in markedly different ways, informed in large part by the skills or 
resources they possessed. The prison operates as sieve, placing them into different labor 
tracts based on these resources. In this context, outside disparities are reinforced by 
practices tied to job assignments, facility organization, and supervision, as well as by 
prisoners’ practices within specific contexts. In other words, social inequalities are 
reproduced between already-disadvantaged groups through the interplay of the structure of 
the penal facility, the prison employment system, specific work environments, formal and 
informal economic markets, and the strategic action of actors within these nested contexts. 
Thus, while contact with the prison system limits the job market opportunities of all ex-
offenders (Pager 2007), the resources, skills, and qualifications that they employ while 
inside the prison have powerful mediating and compounding effects on which men fare 
better or worse both during and potentially following incarceration. These structures and 
procedures map on to broader penological strategies of the post-recession neoliberal era. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A ‘City within the City’: 
The Prison as Employment System 
 
This strange house, in which I was to…endure so many sensations, of 
which, if I had not experienced them in reality, I could never have had 
even the vaguest notion. 
– Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House 
 
 
The Conventional View: Prisoner Labor as Monolithic 
 
In the morning hours of a clear summer day, eight men occupy a small patch of land on the 
side of a large interstate highway. The temperature, already climbing, will exceed heat 
advisory levels in a matter of hours. Seven of these men sport the same uniform: a vivid 
orange t-shirt, orange pants, and worn black boots. The letters D.O.C. are emblazoned 
down their shirt backs and pant legs. One man wears an orange bucket hat, two others wear 
wide-brimmed straw hats fraying at the edges, and the rest wear sweat-stained orange 
trucker caps. All wear sunglasses and yellow reflective vests for roadside safety. A decal 
on the side of a nearby van reveals that these are imprisoned workers from the nearby state 
prison complex, Sunbelt State Penitentiary. As traffic speeds past, they haul large, clear 
plastic trash bags over their shoulders, most already filled with refuse collected from the 
side of the road. They wield pointed rods called “litter sticks” to pierce strewn cups, food 
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containers, bits of plastic and paper, and other garbage that they will shake into the bags. 
Some hold two bags with the same hand, a sign that they are “beasting it”—a competitive 
game of one-upmanship that working prisoners sometimes play to see who can collect and 
carry the most in a given time. 
The eighth man stands in the shade of the van in stoic silence. He is a correctional 
officer tasked with surveilling this captive crew. His collared shirt and slacks—not to 
mention his fully stocked black utility belt and firearm—distinguish him from the orange-
clad workers. With thumbs hooked into his belt, he scans the surrounding area calmly, his 
face largely obscured by wraparound mirrored sunglasses and a dark cap pulled down low. 
He turns his head quickly to the left to watch an incarcerated worker who has momentarily 
set down his equipment to stretch. The man in orange leans backwards a bit, tilts his hat up 
to wipe the sweat from his brow, and briefly squints into the sight of the oncoming traffic 
and the spinning neon truck stop sign at the next exit, before picking up his bag and 
returning to his task. 
 
This roadside crew represents the quintessential image of carceral labor. For most 
of the morning commuters on this stretch of highway—like many Americans in general—
the passing scene of these trash collectors in orange will likely be their only firsthand view 
of forced labor. Aside from the occasional news story exposing some clothing line for the 
sale of prison-produced textiles, or depictions of incarcerated kitchen workers on popular 
television programs like Orange is the New Black, the institution of penal labor appears 
somewhat monolithic.  
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Yet, the on-the-ground reality of prisoner work is quite distinct from this popular 
image. In the early days of my fieldwork at SSP, I would quickly learn what those on the 
inside already knew: that the world of work behind bars is quite expansive, diverse, and 
competitive.9 The nation’s sprawling penal complexes are home to many different jobs of 
varying skill, pay, and perks. The prison relies on codified rules to organize its work 
proceedings and govern the assignment, management, and expectations of labor. It is also 
home to numerous informal norms, which often supersede official departmental orders in 
daily workplace practice. A large internal work force made up of the captive population 
navigates the penal labor market, compelled to compete for the most desirable positions on 
the basis of their skills, social ties, and other resources. And, as in the free world, a shrouded 
informal market, in which participants sell illicit goods and services, exists in the shadows 
of the formal system.  
Taken together, these features characterize what labor scholars call an 
“employment system”: an organized system of labor complete with numerous jobs of 
different skill and pay levels, diverse workers seeking these jobs to secure wages and 
various perks, and basic rules and norms that classify and regulate workers, managers, and 
work sites (Kalleberg 2011; Marsden 1999; Osterman 1987). The prison employment 
system is comprised of workers in the form of prisoners (although they cannot legally be 
categorized as “employees” [Gibson-Light 2017; Zatz 2008, 2009]). The produce goods 
and provide services that are utilized by other local, state, and federal institutions, as well 
as by private firms or consumers in many cases. In addition, correctional officers (COs) 
and other staffers fulfil the role of frontline managers, while administrators, the state, and 
the private firms that contract prisoner labor take the place of the owners found in free 
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world labor contexts. In essence, the entirety of the institution is organized in one way or 
another around penal labor. With few exceptions (such as the small subset of prisoners 
participating in morning education classes),10 most prisoners spend most of their weekday 
hours working. The institutional security apparatus and staff are tasked with coordinating 
and surveilling these workers and their activity. In this regard, the prison is not only an 
economic actor in terms of the provision of goods and services generated by the 
incarcerated workforce—acting as purveyor as well as “labor market institution” (Western 
and Beckett 1999; Western and Pettit 2010)—but also resembles a microcosm of the 
broader economy. As one staff member would put it: “The prison is like its own city, where 
the prisoners do all of the work.”11 
Approaching the prison as employment system, I highlight the perspective of the 
workers in this arrangement. How vast is the variety of labor duties that occupy their time 
in the penitentiary? How do they evaluate or rank the varied work offerings behind bars? 
Put another way: To be sent to prison today is to be sent to work; so, what does this work 
look like and how do prisoners feel about it? To address these questions, this chapter begins 
by illustrating the diversity of work at Sunbelt State Penitentiary, chronicling the sights 
and sounds of the bustling prison, in which much of daily activity revolves around work. 
Then, drawing on the insights of incarcerated participants, I explore the perks and 
drawbacks of different labor programs in their eyes. Not all prison jobs are equal, and 
workers’ valuations inform their practices and strategies as they navigate prison life and 
labor. Outlining participants’ folk rankings of these programs reveals that contemporary 
penal labor is not only diverse, but in fact stratified. Certain positions are coveted for their 
pay, conditions, and particular occupational and penological features, while others are 
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derided and avoided if possible. Finally, zooming in, I describe in ethnographic detail the 
environments of four select work sites—the food factory, the fleet auto garage, the sign 
shop, and the call center. These work programs, which sit at different positions on the 
hierarchy of prison jobs, represent ideal sites from which to assess the experience of 
contemporary punishment from different angles. This will set the stage for future chapters 
to explore structures, practices, strategies, and outcomes observable on the carceral shop 
floor. 
 
 
A Trip Through Sunbelt State Penitentiary: Prisoner Labor as Diverse 
 
Prisons are characteristically removed from society. This has been noted, for instance, in 
regard to the challenges posed for security staff, who report feelings of isolation and 
distrust (Lerman 2013). While the struggles of the correctional workers operating prisons 
have been explored (as has the extent of their powerful collective influence [Owen 1988; 
Page 2011]), the experiences of incarcerated laborers remain more obscured from public 
and researcher insight. Entering the prison to conduct ethnographic fieldwork, I was 
granted a rare look at this hidden and complex world of work.  
The road to Sunbelt State Penitentiary is long and narrow with little else to see in 
either direction. At 6:00am, two snaking lines of light crowd the lanes—one long row of 
red tail lights belonging to staffers entering the prison to begin their shifts, and one of white 
headlights belonging to the departing officers whom they are relieving. This is shift change 
at SSP. The night crew exits, the morning shift enters, and white transport vans—each 
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pulling a trailer complete with porta-toilet, water coolers, and the appropriate tools for the 
day’s work—sit idling by the prison gates, waiting for the outside prisoner work crews to 
be “turned out” to be transported to their destinations throughout neighboring counties. An 
incarcerated shoeshine looks on from his makeshift station—an old desk chair atop a 
wooden box—observing the staff and prisoners enter and exit for work, awaiting 
instructions from any CO who might require his services. Having no “customers,” he sits 
calmly in the chair, hands folded over his stomach.  
 By 7:00am, the work day for most incarcerated workers has begun. Just outside the 
gates, three grounds crew workers are spread out close to the road. Like other outside crews 
(that is, those who operate outside of prison walls), they wear reflective yellow vests over 
their orange attire. There appears to be no one immediately supervising them. Two of the 
men dig up weeds with ancient hoes, a third reclines in his wheelbarrow beneath a withered 
tree, one leg propped upwards. He leans forward slightly to get a good look at me over his 
sunglasses. Realizing who I am—“Flaco,” the resident researcher, and not a CO from 
whom he might fear punishment for lounging on the job—he nods and reclines back once 
more.  
 Closer to the main point of entry, another small crew drags red plastic rakes over 
an area of gravel. They pull their tools slowly along precise, parallel rows, like sullen Zen 
monks tending the garden. A CO stands by, leaning on a bent leg hiked up on a nearby 
picnic bench. Apparently lost in thought, his thousand-yard stare peers through the men. 
Beyond the layers of barbed wire fencing can be spied a large green tractor, driven by a 
smiling heavy equipment operator. He is dragging the perimeter around the interior of the 
complex grounds, loosening dirt and spreading it in even lines. This stretch of earth must 
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be smoothed over regularly as a security measure, so that the footprints of any attempted 
escapee will cleanly register in the fresh soil. As the tractor rumbles closer, the sight of the 
drab buildings of the institution temporarily melts into the thick clouds of dust it kicks up. 
 The shoeshine looks on as I approach the metal detector at the main entrance. A 
rigid CO asks, “Any weapons, explosives, ammunition, cell phones, pagers, laptops, drugs, 
alcohol, currency over $40, or any other contraband?” I answer “No,” empty my pockets 
into a plastic tub, and proceed through. A perimeter truck creeps by. The bulky pickup has 
bright spotlights bolted to its bed and a shotgun visibly mounted beside the driver. Birds 
chirp from coiling razor wire perches. A thick metal double-gate croaks open and I move 
forward through the security line. On the other side of the armored entrance, a prisoner 
throws open the door of a rickety shuttle bus. He is the driver. Another batch of night-shift 
COs and nurses emerge from the tram while incoming workers standby to board. Inside, 
the seats are hard plastic and it smells of coffee and sweat. As they step up, each rider 
announces their destination: “Hey, building 7.” “Max yard.” “Education.” The driver nods 
solemnly. Every seat fills and one man stands. 
The shuttle weaves smoothly between massive fading buildings—impenetrable, 
encased in steel and razor wire. We cruise along double layers of fences, 20 feet high and 
thick. Blinking red lights along the top signal that security systems are fully on-line. 
The ride through the complex offers a more thorough tour of the division of penal 
labor. As the shuttle progresses to its first stop, we pass the complex laundry where more 
men in orange lug bulging burlap bags out of industrial-era green machines under glowing 
sulfur lights. We pass a row of men hunched over in a row at the side of the road, hacking 
at weeds and rocks with old rakes. In the distance, a yellow backhoe bounces across an 
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open expanse, an incarcerated operator bobbing behind the wheel. We approach another 
shuttle and the two drivers exchange a nod as they pass.  
Through several layers of barbed wire fence sits the largest yard of the prison, 
where well over 1,000 men eat, sleep, and pass the time after each long day of work. At 
this moment, 100 or so stand together outside two massive gates. They are still waiting to 
be “turned out” for the day to head off to their work assignments. A bus with chipping 
white paint and barred windows waits on the outside for them to be passed through. Half 
will ride this bus to another area of the prison for work in the food factory—a food 
preparation warehouse where prisoners prepare lunches for the entire complex—to wrap 
sandwiches for the next six hours. The remainder will board another bus or a van to take 
them to other sites—the sign shop, the auto garage, the highway crews. On a different day 
I would view these “turn outs” from a closer vantage point. Prisoners waiting to be directed 
onwards shuffle around between the sally port gates. After 20 minutes, a CO emerges 
through a door to the small building connected to the secure entryway and waves them on. 
They quickly form a rough line and, one-by-one, stand before a small camcorder tripod, 
remove their hat, and state their name and number into the camera (a security measure 
implemented years ago, following the escape of a prisoner on an outside work crew who 
no longer resembled his ID photo, allowing him to elude local police). Some joke with 
other prisoners and with the COs. When the line moves slow, one man shouts out, “This is 
fucking ridiculous! I quit! Haha!” The CO behind the camera smiles and looks up, “Yeah, 
you better be playing.” When the next man reaches his mark, another dares him, “Hey, sing 
like Aerosmith into the camera.” After each prisoner recites his information, he shuffles 
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out the now-opened external gate and ascends the stairs to a bus waiting to transport them 
to work, wherever that may be. 
 Within the dust-worn buildings, others have already begun working. These are the 
men whose jobs take place on the yard—that is, within the confines of the secured area 
surrounding their housing bays. Not having to exit the gates means no long waits for the 
bus, no exposure to additional security staff, and no “strip shack” checks (“strip down, 
squat, cough”) upon returning at the end of shift. Incarcerated tutors help civilian educators 
set up their classrooms. Porters mop; “knob polishers” polish doorknobs and brass fixtures; 
“butt collectors” empty dustpans of spent cigarettes picked from cracks in the pavement. 
HVAC teams and electrical crews troubleshoot utility malfunctions. Veteran advertising 
salesmen are already two hours into a 12-hour shift of cold-calling customers from the 
prison call center. Kitchen workers shovel out “late breakfast” to the non-working prisoners 
still on the yard. And, off of official prison books, those operating in the informal economy 
gamble, amass others’ laundry to wash, clean up other men’s bunks, and carefully craft 
artistic “hobbycraft” items—portraits, cards, or sculptures constructed with clever 
combinations of goods from the commissary store—to be sold in the underground 
economy. 
 These varied activities observed during a brief trip through the facility represent 
only a portion of the available positions at SSP yet highlight the diversity of work behind 
bars. Each offers its own combination of perks and drawbacks. Some informally function 
as punishments dished out to noncompliant or uncooperative prisoners. Others are awarded 
to the most skilled and enterprising of the carceral population. All of these jobs are 
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evaluated against one another by workers navigating the penal labor market. In the 
following section, I draw on their accounts to outline the labor hierarchy. 
 
 
Evaluating Prison Jobs: Prisoner Labor as Stratified 
 
Incarcerated laborers draw on various criteria to evaluate work programs. Many parallel 
those made by workers in the free world. According to Arne Kalleberg in his study of 
“good jobs” and “bad jobs” in the American economy, the quality of a job may be assessed 
by its rate of pay, skill level, degree of control or worker autonomy, security and stability, 
opportunities for advancement, and available perks or fringe benefits (Kalleberg 2011). 
While researchers in the sociology of work offer a thorough understanding of how workers 
evaluate the sites and conditions of their labor in the formal sector, such processes remain 
underexplored behind bars, despite work’s central place in penal operations. Though 
similar in key ways, worker evaluations take unique shape when filtered through the prison 
context. In gauging the appeal of different prison jobs, the incarcerated weighed the nature 
of the work itself alongside the particular carceral conditions surrounding it. In what 
follows, I draw from accounts of working prisoners to construct a typology of “folk 
rankings” of prison jobs. The characteristics described below informed worker opinions 
regarding which jobs they might compete to secure, and which they might scheme to avoid. 
 
Prisoner pay 
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First and foremost, wages were of primary concern. Some American states offer no 
pay for prisoners’ mandated labors—a fact which has only contributed to the image of 
penal labor as a new form of slavery (Benns 2015; Blackmon 2008). Most prisons, like 
SSP, do provide some—if meager—payment. Yet, like in the free world, pay is far from 
uniform across work sites and between workers. At Sunbelt State, there persists a wide 
difference in pay between the lowest- and highest-paid prisoners. Those at the bottom rungs 
of the wage ladder receive $0.05 and $0.50 per hour, typically as compensation for 
deskilled tasks. For the majority of jobs at SSP, wages are capped at $0.50 per hour. To 
work one’s way up to the maximum pay, a laborer must receive positive work evaluations, 
receive no disciplinary tickets, and secure a high school equivalency degree. A select few 
work programs are permitted to exceed this cap. In these rare jobs, the highest paid could 
receive over $1.00 per hour.  
It was no coincidence that the work assignments considered the “best jobs” were 
also the best paying. At the call center, the starting pay for incarcerated salesmen well 
exceeded the max pay of most workers. If they meet their sales quotas and receive 
satisfactory reviews, they may receive quarterly raises. Similarly, those stationed in the 
sign shop earned between $0.50 and $1.00 hourly. They are eligible for a small raise after 
90 days. After six more months of satisfactory reviews, pay is bumped again and, after 
another 12 months, up to the cap of approximately $1.00 per hour. Outside work crews like 
the highway cleanup and parks service teams automatically receive the standard cap. In 
these positions, all workers are paid a flat $0.50 per hour.  
While hourly wages were salient to the incarcerated, other considerations affected 
workers’ calculations of pay. For instance, departmental policies dictate that call center 
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workers, because of their markedly higher pay, be subjected to automatic deductions by 
the state to cover room and board costs (which prisoners referred to as “tax” or “rent”). 
This and select other sites were also required to set aside a percentage of wages into 
prisoner retention funds. These are savings accounts which may not be accessed until the 
time of a convict’s release. Some viewed this system of forced-savings favorably—looking 
forward to the guarantee of some “start-up” money upon release. Marshall, for example, 
pursued a job in the call center for precisely this reason: “You get 27% of [your wage] to 
spend, 33% of it they put away, and the rest of it, DOC just takes for anonymous crap they 
make up as they go. But it’s cool to know that every time I spend 60 bucks, I'm saving 60 
bucks that I can’t spend. No matter what I want to do, how I do it, it's there.” Others 
preferred positions providing greater “take-home pay” for more immediate use. For 
instance, the prison sign shop and outside work crews, despite offering lower gross wages 
than the call center, enable workers to net a greater proportion of their pay, absent retention 
requirements and the higher mandatory deductions faced by call center workers. 
 
Skill level 
 
The skill requirement of a given work program carried considerable weight within 
the institution. As prison services decline throughout the country, skilled programming has 
become increasingly rare (Gottschalk 2010; Lynch 2010). Accordingly, the value of such 
positions has only risen behind bars. To prisoners at SSP, skilled jobs promised the 
potential to acquire or hone marketable skills to improve their prospects for labor market 
reentry upon release. One worker, Ben, related that he applied for a position in the prison 
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sign shop solely to build up his resume and “get real experience” to better his odds on the 
outside job market. “I didn’t think I’d live past 30,” he said. “So, I need a new plan for the 
next 30 years.”  
Skilled jobs are also likely to be more mentally demanding, making the hours in 
the day seemingly pass faster. This was important to prisoners, who frequently battled slow 
time during long sentences (Guilbaud 2010). “The perks of this job,” said one skilled 
laborer, “is that…time goes by pretty fast. Days, weeks, months pass by like no other job.” 
Skilled work also brought status on the yard for prisoners seeking distinction from those 
they deemed unskilled or unmotivated (referred to colloquially with terms like “cell 
warrior” or “youngster”). According to a skilled mechanic, in order to succeed in the auto 
garage, “You have to be a little bit more mechanically inclined and…at least be good 
working with your hands and willing to learn—and not be thinking that you know it all.” 
This contrasted his image of the kitchens, of which he said: The basis “to [being] able to 
work in the kitchen is just showing up.” Or, as one participant said of workers in the 
deskilled food factory, “You gotta have some drive [to get out of unskilled programs]. Lotta 
guys don’t really have that—that’s why they’re stuck in there.” 
Correctional officers, too, valued skilled work programs, yet offered somewhat 
different—though parallel—reasoning. For some COs, skill training promised fewer repeat 
offenders, since those with newly-acquired skills were expected to be less likely to engage 
in criminal activity on the outs. While walking across the open expanse of the prison yard 
one day, a CO waved his arm out over the non-working prisoners scattered about. Many 
had not been assigned to work programing because they were deemed physically or 
psychological unable to perform basic work tasks; others had disciplinary records that 
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precluded them from participation in labor programs. According to the officer, however, 
these men who today spent daylight hours shuffling about the track encircling the yard, 
playing basketball, doing pushups and squats, or just sitting together in the shade, would 
have been hard at work several decades ago: 
 
OFFICER:  25 years ago, when I started at D.O.C. … 
We had carpentry jobs available, 
bricklaying—that’s masonry—computer 
repair, uh, automotive. Row after row of 
jobs for inmates where they could learn 
trades, skills. That’s what it used to be 
about. 
RESEARCHER:  What’s it about today? 
OFFICER:  It’s less of that, that’s for sure. 
 
Beyond the promise of decreasing recidivism, COs saw security benefits in skilled 
work. To them, these programs not only functioned to transfer skills, but also provided “a 
great incentive” because prisoners “have to have good behavior” in order to secure and 
maintain such assignments. One officer lamented that:  
 
We used to have a solar [installation job], where they learned 
how to install and repair solar panels. That was a great one—
they really learned a good trade, plus it was a great incentive. 
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… ‘Cause you had to have good behavior. I don’t know why 
they got rid of it. We never saw any problems over there.  
 
More physically and mentally demanding labor was also expected to detract prisoners’ time 
and energy away from other, illicit behaviors. According to one staffer, “Work wears ‘em 
out, so by the end of the day, they’re exhausted—then you’ve got a good inmate.” 
 
Worker autonomy 
 
Prisoner movements and schedules are rigorously monitored and restricted. Any 
job promising greater freedom of movement around the work space or independence in 
taking breaks was highly valued. For some, this feature took some getting used to. In the 
engraving shop—where prisoners crafted fine plaques for D.O.C. and other state 
agencies—the daily flow of work depended largely on the frequency of orders that came 
through. During slow periods, workers were typically allowed to recline in their desk chairs 
and chat. Some played dominoes (referred to as “bones”) using handmade pieces crafted 
out of surplus plaque materials. Others played solitaire on a computer located within the 
shop. One afternoon, during a lull in the workday, I sat with Low-Light, a man who had 
been hired earlier that week. He told me about his experiences working various prison jobs 
across different yards and facilities over his 13 years behind bars. Higher-paying jobs “are 
the only ones where you can survive in here—[so] you can afford food and hygiene,” he 
informed me. “Otherwise, you’re relying on the state [to provide].” While we talked, the 
overseer of the work site walked through the door, looking to speak with one of Low-
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Light’s coworkers. Instinctually, he bolted upright in his chair and spun towards a nearby 
desk as if to look busy while the boss was in sight. When the coast was clear, he peered at 
the other engravers, who had not ceased their bones and solitaire games. With eyebrows 
raised, he confided:  
 
I’m still trying to feel my way around here. It’s weird when 
it’s slow—I get nervous when the boss comes around, seeing 
my sit. Like, ‘Oh, shit, should I jump up [and work]??’ But 
I think it’s cool. Not like in the bakery. That was slave work 
over there. Always working, busting your ass. They’ll jump 
down your throat if you slack off over there. 
 
“Sounds bad,” I replied. Shaking his head, he affirmed, “Terrible. You don’t really get 
breaks—only every once in a while, if they decide you do. Sometimes you have to work 
through lunch. You eat [while you] work at some of the positions.”  
Beyond the autonomy to take breaks, Low-Light and other incarcerated laborers 
valued the freedom to move about the work site without constant monitoring. Some 
positions allowed workers to take breaks without hassle. Particularly despotic work sites, 
on the other hand, were known to limit prisoners’ smoking, eating, and bathroom time, 
often arbitrarily. When a new worker at the food factory asked where the restroom was, 
one of the frontline staff members pointed him around the corner in the next room of the 
massive warehouse building. “There is always someone in there,” he informed her. “Then 
please stand in the line,” replied the staffer. Finding the bathroom occupied, as expected, 
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he stood alongside the wall and waited. A moment later, however, the supervising manager 
(the superior of the woman who instructed him to wait) emerged from her office. Spotting 
the man waiting for his chance in the bathroom, she instantly barked: “You cannot stand 
around. You need to get back to work until the bathroom is open!” Marching behind him, 
she escorted him back as he trudged to his work station. Catching my gaze, he rolled his 
eyes at the scenario. 
Incarcerated workers also valued being allowed input into the labor process. At 
SSP, certain positions provide relatively greater degrees of prisoner control over the day-
to-day work proceedings as well as training procedures for new hires. Some skilled 
positions, in which many workers were already experts in the field (as Chapter 2 will 
discuss), enabled the incarcerated to train one another, rather than rely on staff. According 
to one senior staffer, this was a built-in feature of skilled sites. Such jobs were often 
“different” than most in that “they have skilled workers [and] less turnovers, so they can 
really teach some skills. And staggered tenure, so they can train one another.”  
 
Job stability 
 
It was common for the imprisoned to be moved unexpectedly. They could be 
relocated to a new bunk without warning, “rolled up” in the middle of the night and 
transferred to a new yard within the facility, or transported to entirely new prisons or even 
new states without prior notice. Unpredictability, it would seem, is a central facet of 
punishment. As a result, any semblance of consistency or stability was appreciated by the 
prisoner population. In regard to work, this meant that work sites in which transfers, 
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demotions, and terminations were less frequent were prized. Carceral laborers may be 
hired, fired, promoted, demoted, get a raise, or get a pay cut at the discretion of whomever 
is the decision-maker overseeing them (on that particular day). With a touch of fatalism, 
one man sighed and said: “This is prison. They do what they want to us.” Still, some 
positions did offer greater stability. At the top of the employment hierarchy, workers in 
higher-paying, skilled positions were often placed on institutional “hold,” keeping them 
from being transferred to other housing yards, complexes, or states, save for rare security 
or disciplinary interventions. CO Bush, tasked with assigning prisoners to work and 
educational programing, said:  
 
You don’t want these guys moving from skilled jobs—the 
sign shop, the call center. … So, I’ll place a work hold on 
the skilled workers. They [DOC] can still move them, but it 
won’t be part of daily movement. There better be a reason 
[if they are to be moved]. 
 
The risk of transfer remained an everyday possibility for those in positions lacking this 
protection.  
Other prison work sites were notorious for high turnover and frequent demotions 
or restructuring. As one staff member put it, shuffling through the captive labor force was 
simple because “[we] don’t have to have a paper trail to fire somebody.” This was 
especially apparent in the food factory, where staff estimated a monthly turnover rate of 
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“about 20%.” According to CO Byrne: “[I get] about two new guys each day, I’d say. … 
There’s always somebody else for them to shoot in.”  
 
Internal mobility 
 
While unexpected demotions and other expressions of arbitrary authority 
represented a strong negative feature of a prison job, workers did appreciate the ability to 
move between stations of their own accord. The opportunity for advancement or promotion 
within a work site was considered a significant perk and many skilled and unskilled 
programs alike housed various “stations” through which prisoners might progress.  
One benefit of internal mobility is the option to learn or implement a wider variety 
of skills. As Eli looked forward to his release in 21 months, he shared his plan with me: 
“To learn every skill the [sign] shop has to offer—every station. … And this is the most 
enlightening [job] because the skills can be used on the outside. I tell new trainees, ‘Learn 
all this. You can find a job on the outside. Find a little sign shop.’” Another perk of landing 
a position at a work site where one could navigate between stations or tasks was the 
opportunity to break up the monotony of day-to-day prison life. By hopping between 
stations over the years, one could ensure a more diverse prison experience (which was 
particularly important for those committed for long sentences).  
 
Perks and fringe benefits 
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Numerous jobs boasted of more site-specific features in which incarcerated workers 
might find value. This included access to artistic or creative materials and outputs. One 
man, Jon, spent his down time in the sign shop constructing small jewelry boxes—complete 
with tiny functioning drawers and hinged components—to send home to his mother. He 
used leftover bits of cardboard (scavenged from the shipping counter, where completed 
signage orders are packaged to be mailed out) and affixed them using heavy duty tape or 
glue found in the shop. To decorate them, he used permanent markers (not available on the 
yard) and remnants of screen-printing ink and scraps of colored, adhesive-backed vinyl 
that he collected following finalized jobs. While prisoners were able to purchase arts and 
crafts supplies from a limited list at the commissary, the array of available materials that 
could be found around the shop was far superior (and could be acquired for free by those 
with access). 
Jobs involving food preparation or distribution offered their own perks: access to 
snacks and supplementary rations. Chow line workers, tasked with dishing out dinner to 
other prisoners, were known to frequently stash away vegetables, cookies, and other edible 
goodies when they got the chance. Snacking on the job was almost a given at such sites. 
According to an incarcerated cook, Adam, “If I wanna drink a milk, I’m gonna drink a 
milk. … It’s a perk of the job!” And, because they were charged with preparing each meal, 
kitchen workers were often able to secure additional chow. According to a prisoner named 
Willie, “There’s perks to working in the kitchen—you get to eat before everybody else, 
and then [again] after. So, you get extra meals!” 
Beyond enabling workers to consume snacks on the job, food prep positions also 
facilitated access to goods that could be smuggled and sold in the prison black market. The 
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overseers of the food factory constantly struggle to curb the theft of food. For some, such 
as the boisterous prisoner Santos, the act of stealing from his work site was often a highlight 
of the day. When I interviewed him, he provided details about recent smuggling endeavors. 
“I like the thrill,” he shared. “I like that thrill of getting away and not getting caught.” 
Though more open with his enthusiasm than most, Santos’ appreciation for the 
opportunity to “boost” food was representative of a broader trend. The informal economy 
of SSP was replete with cookies, chips, meats, and “black market zucchinis,” bell peppers, 
and other fresh veggies smuggled out of the kitchens and food factory by enterprising risk-
takers. For those ineligible or otherwise ill equipped to secure higher-paying jobs, securing 
access to a site from which they might pilfer in order to make extra money on the black 
market was a notable perk. For more details on the shadow economy of SSP, see Chapter 
4. 
 
Work environment 
 
Prisoners also heavily weighed the subjective “general environment” of each 
workplace, drawing on shared evaluative criteria and rhetorical tools. Participants from 
divergent racial, ethnic, and age groups all valued, for instance, working in a space where 
they might feel “normal,” receive “better treatment,” and temporarily “escape” (at least in 
one’s imagination) from the prison context. “It’s not the job,” maintained Gerald, “it’s the 
environment” that matters. Good jobs, according to him, were those which were laid back 
and positive. According to Marshall, the top two characteristics of a “good job” are higher 
pay and the ability to “feel normal.” Such positions enabled one to feel as if “you just sleep 
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at the prison,” with your actual day being spent at a workplace. Or, as Lester said, a positive 
environment can make work feel “like a vacation from prison.” 
Hours spent at such work sites were considered doing “good time.” Typically, it 
was work sites lacking a regular CO presence—with civilian staff members overseeing the 
workplace instead—that were referred to in this way. Bosses who were perceived as 
running the workplace “like a real job” rather than like a prison program were lauded. Ben, 
a long-time worker in the sign shop, noted, for instance, “Our bosses are civilians—they’re 
cool. So that helps.” 
 
Staying on the yard 
 
Another factor in the evaluation of prison jobs was a program’s proximity to the 
housing units where prisoners spent their nights. There were several reasons to value 
securing a job “close to home.” First, one could sleep more without needing to wake up 
early in order to catch the bus to work. Relatedly, not relying on the transport bus to get to 
work elsewhere in the institution (or, in the case of the outside crews, somewhere else in 
the region) meant potentially far less stress. Most prisoners are only paid for the time that 
they are at their work site, which means they may miss out on valuable wages if the 
morning bus is running late. According to Soto, prisoners “get screwed [if] the bus is late—
it’s not their fault [they’re late], but they get their pay docked. … When you make fifteen 
cents an hour, that shit adds up.”  
Another benefit of not needing to exit the yard for work is that doing so involved 
greater and more frequent exposure to the often-severe security protocols of the institution. 
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Perhaps the most invasive example is the strip shack—a small building attached to the bus 
port through which every prisoner must pass and undergo a thorough strip search on 
entering or exiting the unit. As one man somberly put it: “I just want to stay in the yard, 
man. I’m tired of having them look at my butthole every day when I go to work.” Some, 
however, willingly endured the indignity of frequent strip searches in pursuit of greater 
work opportunities. “Once you master that hurdle,” said Lemmy, “you can start looking 
for better jobs—outside the yard.” The outside work crews, for instance, were worth the 
strip shack experience, according to some, if only to access the open air of the free world. 
 
Compromising positions 
 
Finally, some positions were deemed problematic because being assigned to them 
might cause conflict for a worker. Some entailed one-on-one time with staff or involved 
directly “serving” officers or the institution. Positions such as shoeshine or staff barber 
were perceived to entail a degree of submission as workers directly serviced the needs of 
overseers. White prisoners at SSP collectively refused to work in either of these positions 
for this reason. “It’s degrading to polish up an officer’s boots,” as one man maintained. 
These jobs also required interacting directly with correctional officers for a sustained 
period of time, often with no other prisoners around. As such, men who actively pursued 
such a position could be met with the suspicion that they were a “rat.”  
Many were actively forbidden on penalty of violence from accepting such 
positions. Prisoners, for instance, described the imperative to follow rules handed down 
from the race-based hierarchy—central to “prison politics” (e.g., Skarbek 2014)12—which 
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dictated their avoidance of particular jobs. “White guys aren’t allowed to be shoe shines,” 
I was told. “That’s what the heads on the yard decided.” To violate these rules was 
reportedly to risk “catching a hot one” (being punched), getting “hit” (more thoroughly 
assaulted), or worse at the hands of designated enforcers. “There’s rules in prison,” said 
one man. “[Violating them] will put my life in jeopardy.” 
Another position prohibited by the “heads” who “called the shots” for each racial 
group was the fence crew. According to one high-ranking staffer, “That’s a real touchy 
one. Most of the guys, they get real political about putting up the fences to keep them in.” 
He went on: “It’s only the Mexican nationals that will agree to put them up. They’re like: 
‘You have work, I’ll work.’ But that’s just the politics of the yards.” Similar conflicts arose 
around working for the welding crew. Prisoners were allowed to work as welders but were 
expected to refuse any orders to repair prison locks. Tasks of these sorts, which entailed 
repairing the “means of captivity,” were typically evaluated negatively. As one participant, 
Seth, rhetorically asked, “Why would a man build his own prison?”  
There were, notably, some exceptions to these rules. The heavy equipment 
operators, for instance, regularly dragged the prison perimeter for security purposes, but 
this work was not forbidden by the heads.  Nor was the work of fleet auto garage workers, 
who spent their days maintaining and repairing the very vehicles upon which COs relied 
to police the prisoner population. When I inquired into these apparent discrepancies, 
participants often made distinctions that to me seemed arbitrary. For example, mechanics 
justified their work on the premise that they also repaired the transport buses used to move 
them throughout the facility, making their work necessary to ensure that “our people are 
safe.” 
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Folk Rankings of Prison Jobs 
 
In an attempt to organize participant accounts of different work offerings at SSP, Table 2 
presents a schema of folk rankings. Different agents sometimes privileged different 
features in their assessments of work, but most relied on some combination of the 
considerations outlined above. Many programs were appraised in broad strokes. For 
instance, certain jobs were likely to be referred to as “good” or “the best” (e.g., “That is 
the best job going” or, more colorfully, “This job is gold”); others evoked classification as 
“bad” or “the worst” (e.g., “That’s the worst job I ever had” or, with greater specificity, 
“It’s bullshit over there—they don’t pay good and they’ll work the hell out of you”).  
Piecing these accounts together, I adopt the language of “tiers” to capture patterns 
in how different positions were described. Rather than representing concrete 
classifications, this folk ranking system instead considers standings in more general terms. 
In doing so, it sets the stage for future chapters to explore how jobs along this hierarchy 
are allocated, and the outcomes of such processes. 
Work programs in the prison labor hierarchy at SSP fell broadly into three 
categories. The bottom tier contains primarily jobs which are unskilled and low paying, or 
which have otherwise been deemed problematic by prisoners. These typically met few if 
any of the positive standards outlined above. In many cases, participants near-unanimously 
derided them as “bad jobs.” Examples include scrubbing tiles on the floor crew, cleaning 
toilets as a porter, tarring roofs, working in the laundry room, or collecting cigarette butts. 
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Workers in such jobs often reported feeling “trapped,” with little hope of advancing to 
better opportunities. Some of these positions were assigned as punishment. On formal 
disciplinary paperwork, this sanction was listed as “extra duty.” Raking rocks as a “rake-
pusher” on the prison grounds crew stands as an example. According to one worker, Hoke, 
the job typically goes to “guys that screw up.” In this sense, “screwing up” referred to 
failure to comply with work assignments, unwillingness to follow instructions, or refusal 
to demonstrate deference or “work ethic.” A CO who had been tasked with supervising the 
grounds crew related that, “Some people just—I hate to say it this way—they just come in 
here more ghetto. They want to go exploit the system, get over on somebody.” He would 
later note, “Grounds crew [is for] trouble-makers. It’s like an informal punishment.” 
Negative assessments of some work programs initially appeared counterintuitive. 
For example, working as a shuttle driver seemed, at the start of fieldwork, like a good 
prison job: it allowed prisoners the ability to drive, it was officially considered a skilled 
position, and drivers might be afforded some privacy between routes, which was hard to 
come by behind bars. Yet, the drawbacks of the position became clear after speaking to 
prisoners in the know. Franklin, a former shuttle driver, shared that drivers were frequently 
subjected to intense scrutiny from staff member passengers: 
 
It’s the easiest [job] to get a [disciplinary] ticket at. 
Officers—if they’re having a bad day, you could have a bad 
day. The shuttles hold a capacity of 15 people, but at shift 
change, there could be 25, 26 people who want on. And they 
don’t care if they’re standing—they just cram on. Do I have 
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the authority to tell them, ‘Sorry, it’s at capacity’? No! But 
if I have to slam on the brakes and someone falls over, that’s 
an assault charge! That’s the games they like to play. 
 
Later observations confirmed Franklin’s description. Staff members often piled into 
shuttles, exceeding posted capacity. Every bump and sharp turn risked the vehicle lurching 
and a passenger falling. Additionally, staff members regularly requested stops deviating 
from the standard routes. This put drivers in a difficult position between their passengers 
and supervisors, all of whom had the ability to sanction them. The pay and hours were also 
undesirable. Drivers’ pay was topped at $0.25 hourly, far below the standard cap. What’s 
more, they worked 11½ hour shifts, three days weekly, making for tiring work and long 
periods of down time on off days. 
The middle tier of the prison employment system hierarchy contains jobs boasting 
some desirable features (e.g., skill training), but lacking in other valued areas (e.g., higher 
pay). Many of these positions elicited mixed sentiments from the prisoner population. 
Outside work crews, for instance, were highly regarded by some for the guaranteed pay of 
$0.50 per hour as well as the opportunity to venture outside of prison walls on a regular 
basis. This was not a universal consensus, however. Many regarded the outside crews as 
undesirable for the low degree of autonomy—not surprisingly, prisoners were even more 
heavily surveilled off of prison grounds by supervising COs. They were also regularly 
counted by COs serving as “checkers” who visited each crew multiple times daily. These 
positions also lacked stability. It was quite easy to get fired from the outside crews and 
many shared stories of being unexpectedly terminated for unclear or inconsistent reasons. 
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The labor itself was also sometimes disparaged for being grueling, monotonous, or 
“tedious.”  
Operators, who handled heavy machinery around the complex, are also captured by 
this middle category. Qualified heavy equipment operators were hard to come by in the 
prison and staff members prized—and often competed for—them. The ability to drive was 
considered a primary perk of this job, offering an element of freedom as well as momentary 
privacy while traversing institutional grounds, dragging for weeds. Yet, the position was 
sometimes disliked for its instability. Like the outside crews or tram drivers, it was 
relatively easy to get fired, according to operators. There were also no opportunities for 
advancement, resulting in a somewhat static work experience over long years behind bars. 
Other skilled positions were regarded in a similar light. The carpentry and welding shop 
was referenced as a “fine” work site for those entering prison with the proper skills. The 
HVAC crew, tasked with maintaining and repairing heating and cooling units throughout 
the institution, and the electrical crew reportedly offered enjoyable work but were not 
typically regarded as the “best” positions available. In what were sometimes considered 
“white collar” work sites, tutors, aides, and clerks directly assisted staff members with 
educational or office work. Though considered skilled, such positions allowed for very 
little autonomy or mobility. These also involved sustained one-on-one interactions between 
prisoners and staffers, leading many to eye such jobs—and the prisoners who accepted 
them—with suspicion. 
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Table 2. Folk Rankings of Prisoner Work Programs 
 
Work Site Hourly Pay 
Management, 
Oversight 
Skilled / 
Semi-
Skilled 
High 
Autonomy 
High 
Stability 
High 
Internal 
Mobility 
T
o
p
 T
ie
r Sign Shop 
Highest take-home 
($0.50 - $1.00) 
State ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Call Center 
Highest gross 
(over $1.00) 
Private Firm ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
M
id
d
le
 T
ie
r 
Outside Crews (Public 
Works, Highway Crew) 
High  
(flat $0.50) 
State     
Education Tutor 
Standard           
($0.05 - $0.50) 
State ✓  ✓  
Staff/Office Aide Standard State ✓    
Program Clerk Standard State ✓    
Library Clerk Standard State ✓    
Forklift Operator Standard State ✓  ✓  
Inmate Barber Standard State ✓    
Fleet Services Garage Standard State 
✓         
Unskilled – 
Skilled 
 ✓  
Operator/Heavy 
Equipment 
Standard State ✓ ✓   
Wastewater Standard State ✓ ✓   
Welder Standard State ✓  ✓  
HVAC Standard State ✓  ✓  
Carpenter Standard State ✓    
Plumber Standard State ✓    
Electrician Standard State ✓    
B
o
tt
o
m
 T
ie
r 
Yard Crew (Rake-Pusher 
/ Butt Collector) 
Standard State     
Recreation Clerk Standard State     
Commissary Standard Private Firm     
Laundry Standard State     
Grounds Crew Standard State     
Clean-Up Crew Standard State     
Porter/Janitor Standard State     
Floor Crew Standard State     
Trash Collector Standard State     
Roof Repair Standard State     
Maintenance Helper Standard State     
Painter Standard State     
Warehouse Standard State     
Fence Crew Standard State     
Tram (Shuttle) Driver 
Low  
($0.25 cap) 
State ✓    
Staff Barber Standard State ✓    
Shoe Shine Standard State ✓    
Kitchen Worker/Server Standard Private Firm     
Food Factory 
Standard            
(most low) 
Private Firm 
✓         
Unskilled – 
Semi-
Skilled 
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Finally, the few rare “top-tier” work sites are those that possess virtually all of the 
positive features that workers described. These were consistently regarded as the “best” 
available options and were highly competitive. Though the outside work crews and some 
skilled positions were held in high regard by many prisoner participants, only two work 
sites were near-universally praised. These were the call center and the sign shop. In 
addition to being the highest-paid offerings at Sunbelt State, both promised to keep workers 
occupied with skilled, engaging work tasks. Each, too, was known for according prisoners 
a greater degree of autonomy than could be found elsewhere. Furthermore, the sign shop 
and call center offered relatively high levels of stability and opportunities for prisoners to 
navigate between work stations.  
 
 
Four Prison (Field)Work Sites 
  
The remainder of this chapter will take a more in-depth look at four particular work 
programs: the food factory, fleet services garage, sign shop, and call center (see Table 3). 
Future chapters will explore processes of assigning, pursuing, managing, and carrying out 
work at Sunbelt State Penitentiary by drawing on extended observations at these programs. 
These four sites were chosen because they represent key positions on the perceived 
hierarchy of prisoner jobs. The food factory is a model “bad prison job.” It was selected to 
represent the lowest tier of penal labor because (1) newly-processed prisoners often began 
their penal labor careers at this high-volume site, (2) it housed unskilled (indeed, fully 
deskilled) work stations as well as semi-skilled positions, precipitating mobility and 
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distinction strategies, and (3) it was characteristically referred to as the worst prison job, 
rendering visible prisoners’ collective sources of discontent. Next, the fleet auto garage is 
a median position, eliciting mixed reviews from participants. It too contained both 
unskilled and skilled work opportunities, allowing greater insights into processes of 
mobility and distinction within as well as between work sites. Finally, the sign shop and 
call center were selected on the basis of being considered the best available offerings. From 
these sites, I could observe the top positions to which incarcerated laborers aspired. 
Additionally, both skilled, higher-paying programs promised a variety of perks; yet, the 
sign shop involved “blue collar” labor in the form of fabrication and printing, while the 
call center entailed the “white collar” work of sales. 
 
Table 3. Prison Work Program Fieldsites 
 
Managed by  
State 
Managed by  
Private Firm 
Higher Desirability Sign Shop Call Center 
Lower Desirability 
Fleet Auto 
Garage 
Food Factory 
 
These four sites also represent variation in terms of privatization. Work is often 
absent from public debates on prison policy and practices; however, when it is discussed, 
the focus is often on the privatization of prisoner labor (e.g., Chang and Thompkins 2002; 
Eidelson 2017; McGrew and Hanks 2017). By examining privately-managed penal work 
programs alongside state-run programs, I positioned myself to be able to observe what—if 
any—notable differences in prisoner experiences or understandings of work emerged along 
these lines. While I initially expected this to be an important division on-the-ground, what 
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I found was, at most, ambivalence. Good and bad prison jobs existed on both sides of the 
public-private divide and this factor was rarely mentioned by participants. 
The food factory and call center were distinct in many ways in the eyes of working 
prisoners but were similar in that each was managed by private firms contracting prisoner 
labor through public-private partnerships with the institution. As such, both were overseen 
by staff members employed by their respective firms rather than the state. Conversely, the 
fleet garage and the sign shop were considered “state” jobs because each was managed by 
a team of state employees. The garage was overseen by two civilian employees of the 
Department of Corrections in addition to a correctional officer who provided on-site 
security and controlled the use of tools. The sign shop was managed by three employees 
of the state’s Correctional Industries division (a public program instituted by the state 
legislator designed to utilize industry-style management strategies to coordinate certain 
labor programs within public facilities). Focusing fieldwork on sites that intersect along 
these criteria enabled me to move beyond debates over the positive or negative aspects of 
prison privatization to instead emphasize processes and structures cutting across such 
features. 
 
Food factory 
 
The bottom tier position eliciting the strongest negative consensus was the food 
factory. Over 18 months, I heard it repeatedly referred to as “terrible,” “forced labor,” “the 
worst job,” a “trap” or “trick” job, “probably the lowest job there is,” and other invectives 
from both prisoners and staff. Incarcerated participants cited many factors in their negative 
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evaluations of the site, including the low pay, poor treatment (“they treat everyone like 
shit!”), despotic oversight (via heightened surveillance, frequent revocation of scheduled 
breaks, and heavy restriction of movement), and limited or poor training (“it’s supposed to 
be ‘corrections!’”). On this latter point, several staff members agreed. One food factory 
civilian employee stated, “I think the only jobs that benefit them [prisoners] are ones with 
skills.” He gestured to a group of prisoners rolling lunch meat and continued: “This work? 
It doesn’t help them. But they have to do it. Nobody wants to work here, so we get the 
worst of the worst.”  
 
 
Figure 2. Bird’s Eye View of the Food Factory 
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The food factory was largely considered a punishment job—one that “catches 
people that don’t succeed.” Rollins and LD, both long-time workers in the prison sign shop 
who got their prison labor starts in the food factory, were explicit about its reputation: 
 
ROLLINS:  Oooh, let me just say that the discontent rises 
the further you go down the chain. 
LD:  Not to disparage any other inmates 
working— 
ROLLINS:  Right. There’s just still an employment 
hierarchy. 
LD:  The thing I like here [the sign shop] is being 
busy for 8 hours, but it’s not hard on my 
body. But the [programming] officer just 
throws people in the food factory. Matter of 
fact, if you get fired from here, you get sent 
there as punishment 9 times out of 10. The 
last 4 or 5 guys who messed up here got their 
[job assignment letter] sending them to the 
food factory the next day.  
 
It was certainly common to see new faces around the food factory each week. Prisoners 
were not allowed to quit the job, but they might be fired (temporarily, at least) along with 
other sanctions if they refused to board the morning bus or excessively violated work rules. 
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One staff member attributed the high turnover to the low pay: “Here, they get a dime an 
hour—nobody wants to stick around for that.” Though the food factory offered the standard 
pay range of $0.05 to $0.50 per hour, most prisoners received the lower end of this. As 
another staff member put it: “Most of these guys make fifteen if they’re lucky. This is the 
bottom of the bottom.” 
The daily labor at the food factory was monotonous and sometimes strenuous. This 
is where bagged lunches—“bag nasties,” colloquially—for the entire prison were 
produced. During particularly busy shifts, when many days’ worth of orders needed to be 
readied in advance, the food factory could ship out up to 60,000 meals. To enable this 
massive workload, it occupied an expansive warehouse building, subdivided into four 
primary stations: the storage warehouse, freezers, sandwich shop, and meat prep. Smaller 
stations, including a bakery, “diet prep” station, and dishwashing room, were nested within 
these larger areas.  
Entering the food factory through the loading dock door, one is struck by the sight 
and smell of hundreds of pallets of sliced bread, stacked five-feet high in columns along 
the warehouse periphery. Shelving units line the walls and cut across the middle of the 
long, high-ceilinged storage area. This warehouse station—which one prisoner called the 
“fishing docks”—was a nexus through which all incoming ingredients and outgoing 
prepared meals passed. Prisoners referring to themselves as “warehousemen” scurried back 
and forth lugging large boxes of newly-arrived food items or sliding stacked pallets from 
other stations towards the exit. Incoming deliveries often contained up to 40,000 pounds 
of food. Jerri, the civilian manager of the food factory, could often be found looking on as 
beeping delivery trucks backed up to the open sliding bay door. A former CO, she now 
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worked for the private firm providing food services at SSP. Also a fixture of the warehouse 
was Donald, a black prisoner adorned in orange with tattered shirt neck and sleeves. As I 
worked alongside the warehousemen loading and unloading pallets one day, he shouted 
instructions to the other prisoners working beside him: “This order needs sacks [bagged 
lunches] for Wednesday. Load them up on this truck! Save those ones there for the next 
truck.” The fast-moving warehouse was considered by some to be one of the better 
assignments within the food factory, relatively speaking. One key participant, Dean, would 
tell me that this was because time seemed to go by quicker on the hectic loading docks, 
since “we have so much to do and it has to get done by a certain time.” Some took pride in 
the fact that their work “helps run the whole prison”—a beneficial outlook in the face of 
the “just general shittiness” (in the words of one quiet warehouseman) of the otherwise 
overbearing food factory. 
Through swinging double doors—past a “Wet Floor” cone on which someone 
scrawled “JUST FOR SHOW” in an artistic act of resistance—and down a narrow hallway, 
a chill breeze blows steadily from the freezer section, or “Alaska,” as some prisoners joked. 
Halogen lights reflect dully off of giant steel doors. A worker in an orange sweatshirt and 
beanie emerges grasping a large box of cabbages. He plops it down on a wooden pallet 
outside the walk-in and another prisoner adorns it with a small sticker indicating the date. 
An onlooking “white shirt” (the term for the prison’s civilian food service employees) ticks 
something off on his clipboard.  
Around the corner is the largest room of the food factory, the “sandwich shop.” Its 
walls are yellowing and the gray concrete floor is bisected by two long, narrow tables. 
About 25 prisoners are lined up shoulder-to-shoulder around them, wrapping together all 
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of the elements of that day’s “bag nasties” with plastic wrap. The basic lunch-making 
process was thoroughly deskilled: a prisoner pulls out a long stretch of plastic wrap from 
the box before him, slaps down 4 slices of bread, rolls it once, puts a bag of chips on top 
of that, rolls it once more, then adds two slices of cheese (on days with cheese), two 
cookies, two condiment packets, and (sometimes) a powdered flavored drink packet. These 
wrapped packages are placed on nearby racks in neat, precisely counted rows. The racks 
then go to another crew which adds rolled meat to the bundle and wraps it up into its final 
form before it is eventually stacked and loaded onto trucks to be shipped out to work crews 
and housing units for distribution. This deskilled routine was “zombie work,” according to 
a participant called Stavo. 
In the back corner of the sandwich shop, two aging Latino men softly sing sad 
sounding songs in Spanish while tying tiny baggies of peanut butter. Another holds his 
gloved hands and forearms out before his face—wrapped tightly from wrist to elbow in 
plastic wrap—inspecting them like a surgeon preparing to operate. Satisfied that there are 
no gaps exposing his skin, he dips his arms up to the elbow into a comically large bowl of 
peanut butter, slowly stirring in a blob of jelly by hand. The peanut butter and jelly must 
be pre-mixed, I would learn, so that prisoners could not use the sugary jam to brew 
alcoholic “hooch.” Prisoners in the food factory are not allowed to handle sharp tools, so 
the men stand patiently until CO Byrne, the only correctional staff at the work site, appears 
with a knife to slice open additional bags of grape jelly. “Hurry up and pour that one in!” 
he shouts. When the guys say something quickly to one another in Spanish, he barks: 
“English!” He shakes his head at me as if to say, “Can you believe this?” and marches 
away toward the “tool cage” in his office to return the blade. 
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After securing the tool, CO Byrne peers down at the meat prep station, where 
around 15 prisoners roll slices of slimy meat or feed large blocks of bologna into meat 
slicers. A wet, cold, salty smell pervades. The basic process mirrors that of the sandwich 
shop: pull out a stretch of plastic wrap, slap down two slices of ham (or, depending on the 
day, sliced bologna or turkey ham, known as “t-ham”) onto the plastic, give this a quick 
two or three rolls of plastic, rip the plastic off the roll, and toss the completed product—a 
slick pink cylinder of meat—into a nearby tub. The first time I participated in this task, a 
gangly prisoner called Milo leaned in to offer a tip: “Try wrapping the ends in like a burrito, 
then give it a few more rolls. So it won’t come undone.” Observing Slick, the de facto 
inmate “boss” of this station, I learned that a plastic spork functions well to more cleanly 
slice the plastic after rolling, rather than ripping it off at the end by hand and risking a 
vertical tear. The thin plastic gloves were more ceremonial than functional. Meat juices 
coated them inside and out, making it increasingly difficult to grip the slippery plastic wrap.  
At the neighboring meat prep table, prisoners tied bags containing sliced turkey. 
One man, the curly-haired Baldwin, appeared particularly adept at this. “Dude, I got mad 
baggie skills. I’m fucking good at meat wrapping,” he boasted. “I roll dope, dude. That’s 
why.” An older coworker, Stahl, shook his head. “That’s nothing to brag about, dude. 
That’s why you’re in here in the first place, probably. You gotta knock that shit off or else 
you’ll end right back up in here.” Baldwin did not reply, but his slight grin betrayed him. 
Time crept slowly as we continued these deskilled, monotonous movements until a 15-
minute break at 9:45am.  
At the periphery of the meat prep station sits the “bakery,” a corner station where 
two prisoners knead biscuit batter on large metal pans while another prepares the next batch 
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of dough in an industrial mixer. Unlike most of the stations in the food factory, this is 
labelled a “semiskilled” position. Craig, who readily revealed himself as the “lead baker,” 
leans heavily into a rolling pin and flattened out the edges of the dough on his pan. Pausing, 
he holds up his rolling pin to me—“You see this?” It is not a rolling pin at all, but rather a 
cardboard cylinder salvaged from a spent roll of plastic wrap. They have no handles; 
workers must curve their hands with fingers firmly clasped and push hard to make the 
cardboard roll forward through the dough. With a chuckle, he cocks his head and gives the 
“roller” a sarcastically-inquisitive look. “Can you believe that?” he asks. “Million-dollar 
corporation—million-dollar corporation and they can’t spring for rollers! They can, but 
they won’t.” He shakes his head and leans back into his work.  
The other semiskilled position in the food factory is that of “diet prep cook.” 
Located in a corner of the sandwich shop, three prisoners here prepare bagged lunches for 
men with dietary restrictions. This includes 58 “wasting” meals for dangerously 
underweight prisoners, 11 vegan meals (peanut butter and white bread), 27 “soft” meals 
for those with no teeth, four gluten free meals, 28 low sodium “renal” meals for men on 
dialysis (egg salad and white bread), 20 “allergy” meals (rice, celery, lettuce, and apple 
sauce), and 10 “control” meals (egg salad and wheat bread). Another small crew of diet 
prep cooks prepared 24 kosher meals from a secluded area in the back near the dishwasher, 
in order to protect from cross-contamination with non-kosher meals or ingredients. 
In all, between 80 and 90 prisoners are employed at any given time in two 
overlapping shifts at the food factory. The first crew arrives at 6:30am and works until 
12:30pm (or “oh-six-hundred to twelve-thirty,” in institutional parlance). In the mornings, 
they file in almost silently, shuffle towards their assigned stations, and set up their supplies 
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for the day—large spools of plastic wrap in the sandwich shop and meat prep, plastic aprons 
and metal pans in the bakery, work gloves in the warehouse and freezers. They do all of 
this quietly, without instruction. White and Latino prisoners set up at opposing ends of the 
long middle table in the sandwich shop, clustering in respective groups. A group of black 
prisoners set up at another table off to the side.  
The bus transporting the second shift, who are scheduled to work 7:30am to 1:30pm 
(“oh-seven-thirty to thirteen-thirty”), is often late. The manager, Jerri, would tell me:  
 
It happens sometimes. Could be an [incident] at the yard. Or 
an illness. Could be the CO at the gate is being a 
knucklehead. The inmates get mad if it’s that—if the CO at 
the gate is holding them up. When you work for cents an 
hour, 15 minutes late is a big deal!  
 
When the bus finally arrives, the crew rushes in. Unlike the first group, these men flood 
into the sandwich shop shouting, singing loudly, laughing. They set up their materials 
slowly. Once everyone has entered, the white, black, and Latino groups cluster again with 
their respective cliques. Once spaces at the center tables have filled up, a few white 
prisoners set up at the small table beside the black workers. Shaking his head, CO Byrne 
says, “I put all the slackers on the second shift. That way, when they show up, the rest of 
the group is already working. The good workers get set up fast.”  
One or two civilian “white shirts” oversee each station. They often remain relatively 
fixed in position throughout the day. The CO, on the other hand, marches quickly from the 
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sandwich shop to the meat prep to the freezers to the warehouse, making regular visual 
counts of his full crew through tinted glasses. He is typically heard before he is seen. Even 
in the din of the work day, the quick rhythm of his keys is audible around the corner, their 
weighted jingle cut off with each brisk step. Like many COs, he appears led by his belt—
radio, keys, and pepper spray almost propelling him, shoulders and arms stiffly keeping 
the rest of his body in line. At times, he and a white shirt clash over procedure or rule 
enforcement. Jerri attributed the occasional struggles between COs and civilian staff to 
differences in training. “Officers go through boot camp. Contractors only do nine days of 
simple training, but the officers expect them to respond at the same level if something goes 
down.” As a former CO herself, she often acted as a bridge between white shirts and 
officers. Such conflicts, when they emerged, were relegated to the staff dining area, in the 
“back stage” of the food factory. Outside of this space, however, the combined staff sought 
to present a “unified front” before their prisoner crew. 
 
Fleet services garage 
 
Not far from the food factory stands the fleet services auto garage. Here, a seven-
prisoner crew is tasked with servicing every vehicle in use at the prison, ranging from 
pickup truck to tractor, electric golf cart to hulking transport bus. As one Sergeant would 
put it, “These men work on every vehicle. Every [prison] vehicle comes through here. We 
depend on them.” And, despite being in the shadow cast from the food factory on a sunny 
day, the garage offers quite a different work experience. “The food factory is more like 
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forced labor,” said the Sergeant. “None of those guys really wants to work there. But here, 
these guys want this job.” 
 This site was similar to other skilled positions in that it offered the standard rate of 
pay, an engaging work experience, and relative stability for its skilled workers. 
Incarcerated auto mechanics commonly possessed prior mechanical experience. The “car 
wash” out back, however, employed unskilled workers (more often than not pulled from 
the ranks of foreign nationals). Additionally, a clerk was employed to maintain inventory 
counts and process work order paperwork. In general, the garage was regarded as a fine 
enough place to work, but still, as one mechanic named Danny put it, “Not a lot of people 
seem to want this job.” The frequent exposure to correctional staff of all ranks, who were 
a regular presence as they dropped off and picked up departmental vehicles throughout 
each day, was likely to blame for much of the general disinterest in this program. 
When a vehicle is due for standard maintenance, or when more serious repairs were 
needed, this is where staff members of SSP head. Between the hours of 6:00am and 
1:00pm, a small crew of five imprisoned mechanics populated the two-bay garage. Two 
civilian staff members, employees of the state, tracked incoming and outgoing vehicles 
from a central office. Graham, the man in charge, was often stoic. Though generally patient, 
he did not stand for second-guessing from his prisoner employees—“He’s god around 
here,” as one man put it. Boyle was his second in command. When not completing 
paperwork, he could often be found strolling around the garage, looking in on prisoners’ 
progress and making small talk. In addition, an on-site CO named Peña patrolled the garage 
and the surrounding area in addition to maintaining the inventory of tools from his small 
office in the locked tool room. Over 1,000 tools were in his charge. Every morning, he 
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checked out the standard equipment to mechanics and each afternoon re-catalogued the 
inventory. At SSP, there were two classifications of tools: Class A tools are those that 
might be used to aid in an escape. Things like files or wire cutters fit this classification and 
must be more closely monitored. Class B tools are those deemed not capable of aiding 
escape and include things like screwdrivers, rakes, or, somewhat counterintuitively, 
pickaxes. 
Each day, anywhere between two and 20 vehicles could be dropped off for 
maintenance. When a new vehicle arrived, Graham and Boyle determined what repairs 
were needed and filled out the necessary work orders. This paperwork was then handed 
along with the keys to the vehicle over to a mechanic, who retrieved the vehicle from 
outside, raised it up on the vehicle lift, and got to work.  
The garage was split into two bays, each with its own vehicle lift and toolset. Two 
mechanics in the eastern half of the garage, called Bay B, primarily serviced the complex’s 
cars and trucks. On the west side, two others maintained the vans and shuttle buses on the 
shop’s larger vehicle lift. Though the two halves of the garage were similarly equipped, 
there did appear to exist a status hierarchy based on tenure. “I generally put the guys who 
have worked here a while into Bay A,” said Graham. As the de facto “head mechanic” 
among the incarcerated crew, Gael was in charge of this area. With the longest tenure in 
this work site as well as the most extensive experience as a mechanic on the outs, he seemed 
a natural fit for this role. Graham and Boyle often delegated to him in deciding which 
worker should complete which task, and in which order. Similarly, if workers had questions 
regarding a job, they often approached him before their civilian bosses.  
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Figure 3. Bird’s Eye View of the Auto Garage 
The most common tasks around the garage were “routine service checkups” 
completed for preventative maintenance every 6,000, 18,000, and 36,000 miles. A checklist 
guided prisoners through numerous services, although all but the newest mechanics knew 
the routines by heart. An “A service” entailed a basic oil change and fluid check. “D 
services” were the most involved, requiring an oil change and fluid check, as well as more 
advanced maintenance like filter replacements or transmission tests. The storage area, 
which doubled as the prisoner break room, was well stocked with the necessary motor oil, 
belts, air filters, and other basics for completing these checkups. Non-routine repairs were 
often more difficult to complete, however, because the requisite parts and supplies were 
often in short supply. Boyle was in charge of balancing the garage budget and ordering 
necessary supplies, but financial limitations often kept him from maintaining a surplus. 
“I’m running around like a head with my chicken cut off,” he said in regard to the constant 
inventory juggling act.  
When supplies approached depletion (common near the end of each fiscal quarter), 
mechanics often had to get creative in order to keep the fleet running. One overcast morning 
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I arrived to find Danny mulling over a van’s broken brake booster in front of Bay B. 
Meanwhile, in Bay A, Gael tried to find the source of a leak in another van. With funds 
stretched thin, the office was unable to order new parts to repair either. Instead, the 
prisoners decide to take parts from one vehicle (the brake booster) and put it into the other. 
While one would need to be taken out of commission until the funds came in to fix both of 
its issues, the other now had what it needed to be successfully processed. Peering over 
inventory spreadsheets in the central office, Boyle later told me that this was one of many 
examples of “robbing Paul to pay Peter” to get the vans fixed. To keep the shop running 
smoothly, he documented every movement of parts carefully—in his words, “dotting my 
T’s and crossing my I’s…or, you know what I’m trying to say.”   
In addition to the hierarchy between the Bays, there existed a spatial distinction 
between mechanics, who worked inside the garage, and the car washers, who worked from 
a small paved area outside the building. Raul, a broad shouldered Mexican national who 
wore scratched sunglasses and a tattered straw hat, had worked in the car wash the longest. 
He could often be found sitting in the shade, staring out toward the fences in silence, 
awaiting the arrival of COs with vehicles in need of cleaning. With a nearby hose and long-
handled brushes dipped in a mop bucket of soapy water, he and his partner, the silent 
Nacho, thoroughly scrubbed down cars, vans, trucks, and buses seven hours per day. For 
“full service” washes, they wiped down and vacuumed vehicle interiors—a particularly 
difficult challenge when hair-filled K9 Unit trucks rolled through. Car washers were 
exposed to certain burdens that mechanics were protected from inside the shop. For one, 
they were exposed to the elements. On bad weather days, they could be found leaning 
closely against the outside wall for rain cover. In addition, they were subject to the 
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oversight of every prison staffer who came through, putting them under greater scrutiny 
than those inside the Bays. While mechanics worked safely indoors, overseen by Graham 
and Boyle, car washers would often receive orders from passing COs to perform duties 
outside of their job description, such as clearing the open expanse between the prison 
fences of all trash and debris. With no recourse against commands exceeding his basic job 
description, Raul often had no choice but to comply. Though Graham expressed frustration 
when other staffers give orders to his workers, he had limited authority to stop it from 
happening when he was not present. 
 A major perk of work in the fleet garage was the ability to learn or, more often, 
hone previously-acquired mechanical skills. Yet, as in many work sites at SSP, the garage 
did not rely on or teach truly up-to-date skillsets. Instead, its workers performed an 
increasingly outdated form of auto work that may not be marketable on the outside. 
According to Boyle, the prisoners here might be mechanics, but they were not technicians: 
 
BOYLE:  That’s what we’re called now: ‘techs.’ 
‘Cause auto repair is all tech now—it’s 
working with computers. We’re not 
‘mechanics’ or ‘grease monkeys’ 
anymore! 
RESEARCHER:  Are these guys trained to be technicians? 
BOYLE:  No. Not a lot of tech work coming 
through here. 
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Graham would reiterate the growing need for technical skills in today’s auto garages: “We 
put a man on the moon with crappier computers than what we put in these vehicles 
nowadays.”   
Still, other perks made the garage an enjoyable work space for its small crew. For 
instance, unlike most prisoners, these men occasionally had the opportunity to operate 
vehicles. Every car, van, and truck was driven onto the vehicle lift by a crewmember. Upon 
completion of necessary servicing, each was taken on a short test drive around the building. 
Golf carts were used to transport heavier objects from Bay to Bay, or to transport trash to 
a distant dumpster. The sight of a gleeful prisoner zooming around the corner in a golf cart 
was a daily occurrence in the fleet garage. Another unexpected perk that prisoners 
referenced was access to a “good microwave.” Unlike those available in the prison housing 
units (or “runs”), the microwave in the garage was relatively new and was quickly repaired 
or replaced when broken. “Over in the run, it’s been broken for two months,” Raul 
recounted. “They say, ‘Oh, we’re waiting for back order.’ Ok, sure. But here [in the 
garage]? Graham gets a replacement like that!” In the break room, prisoners maintained a 
coffee pot and, sometimes, a stash of crumbled cookies secured from the nearby food 
factory. Mechanics had frequent access, though car washers were sometimes unable to 
leave their outside station long enough or soon enough to secure a cup of fresh brewed 
coffee. 
 
Call center 
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The SSP call center sells television advertising to businesses across the country. It 
is operated by a private firm with offices across several states. The firm contracts with the 
Department of Corrections for the prisoner labor as well as the on-site office space. 
Between 30 and 35 prisoners were employed here at any given time. The full work shift 
stretched from 5:30am until 5:30pm, though workers had the autonomy to leave earlier if 
they chose. In addition to their standard prison ID cards, call center workers carried special 
work IDs with which to clock in and out each shift and during optional 15-minute breaks 
at 8:00am, 10:00am, and 2:00pm, and a mandatory 30-minute lunch break at 12:00pm. 
During work hours, these men made cold call advertising sales, never revealing their 
identity as prisoners. With the highest hourly wage, this work site starts pay at over $1.00 
per hour, with quarterly wages that exceeded what most positions offered. For these and 
other reasons, this was regularly referred to as “the best job,” though sometimes with the 
caveat “to make money at.” 
The call center was able to offer such high wages because it is privately run and 
managed, excluding it from DOC regulations regarding wage caps for incarcerated 
workers. Private oversight also allowed for a less overbearing environment (although it did 
not guarantee one, as evidenced by the food factory, which was also privately operated). 
Many attested that the office was organized and run more “like a business,” engendering 
the feeling of working in a “real” call center in the free world. Like real call centers, 
however, the prison office required prisoners to meet monthly sales quotas, resulting in 
high early turnover and often creating a stress-filled atmosphere, especially in the days 
before deadlines (resembling the pressures of call center labor in the free world; Sallaz 
2015). Newcomers were required to secure one sale within the first two weeks. After that, 
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each was expected to maintain a $5,000 per month minimum in sales (referred to as “five 
to survive”). Roughly one in five new hires made it to their third month.  
For many, this stress was reportedly made worth it by the pay and by the ability to 
correspond with the free world via phone and email.13 According to one worker, Javi, the 
call center was the “best job by far” because it enabled workers “to exercise your social 
abilities. The money’s not bad either—because that’s the point. [But] it feels like a real 
job.” Another worker, called Ghost, would add that working in the call center helped him 
prepare to “transition back into society” since operating the phones required confidence 
and eased him into “socializing with people on the outside.” The skilled nature attributed 
to call center work also provided an opportunity for prisoners “trying to develop a better 
resume.” Jake, the informal “inmate manager” of the prison call center, attested that “I’m 
learning life skills and I’m making money,” adding that “you need work like this to keep 
your sanity [in prison].” 
 Other perks elevated the status of the call center as well. Being located just across 
from the complex housing units meant that prisoners could walk to work on their own, 
rather than rising early to make the bus on time. Unlike many other working prisoners who 
had to wake as early as 3:30 in order to get dressed, eat, wait for the transport bus, go 
through security, be stripped down and “checked” at the strip shack upon exit, and travel 
to their work sites by 5:30, call center workers often woke up after 5:00am and leisurely 
strolled across the yard to work. At the end of the work day, workers were allowed to head 
to the chow hall ahead of others. They were handed literal “meal tickets”—narrow slips of 
paper with their name and station printed on them by a call center staff member. Showing 
this slip to the COs on chow hall duty secured priority in the meal line over others. 
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The office space of the call center was narrow and crowded. In the middle of the 
office sat a window-lined circular station called “the bubble.” From this central vantage 
point, civilian staff members fielded phone calls, file payment information following 
successful ad sales, and troubleshot phone, computer, pay, or other issues, all while 
maintaining an open line of sight to the incarcerated workers aligned in cubicles throughout 
the office. On its windows were scrawled motivating instructions: “ASK FOR $ EVERY 
SALE” and “STICK TO THE SCRIPT WORD FOR WORD!” Although most call center 
workers maintained positive rapport with staff members here, the inside of the bubble 
remained an off-limits area. If a prisoner needed something from inside, they would first 
ask permission (“Hey, Eduardo, can I grab some more coffee grounds?”), making sure to 
keep their feet planted outside of the open entryway.  
The owner of the ad firm, Dennis, alternated his work days between the prison call 
center and an off-site office where he also oversaw a civilian staff. From there, he was also 
able to monitor the call logs of prisoners, taking note of the time of calls, the location of 
clients, and the overall frequency of calls. He also maintained access to the feed from a 
security camera perched above the bubble, overlooking his captive workforce. Participants 
often referenced that “the boss man is watching,” adding an extra layer of digital 
panopticism to the already heavy security of the prison workplace. One morning, for 
instance, Dennis called at around 5:45am to chide Eduardo because prisoner salesmen had 
not yet started making enough calls—many were instead still checking messages. Eduardo 
shouted to the office, “Hey, get those calls going. Dennis just called about it.” One man 
responded, “Uh-oh, the boss is watchin’!” as he put on his headset. 
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Figure 4. Bird’s Eye View of the Call Center 
 
Despite working within a prison, the civilian staffers made efforts to construct an 
environment that resembled a free world sales office. Posters plastered the walls with 
motivational slogans. Some presented sales platitudes: “On every call a sale is made. Either 
you sell them on yes or they sell you on no. Either way a sale is made.” Others were more 
inspirational: “Early to bed, early to rise. Work like hell and advertise!” Some were 
facetious: “Samson killed a thousand men with the jawbone of an ass. That many sales are 
killed every day with the same weapon.” The basic adage to “NEVER GIVE UP” was 
prominent. In the corner, above the coffee carafe, hung a dry erase board calendar listing 
each salesman’s total (or notable lack of) sales for each day of the current week. Jake 
frequently referenced the board to motivate his coworkers. In his booming voice he would 
shout: “Hey, Smith has over $900 already today! Way to go! Who’s gonna catch up to 
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‘im?” Or, “Hoo boy, Smith, this board is lookin’ a little bare. What happened? You fall off 
this week?” 
Each prisoner sat in a cubicle with a phone, a headset, and computer monitor. Some 
had bottles of water (usually re-used sport drink bottles); virtually all of them had large 
plastic cups filled with coffee. “Coffee is big here,” said Jake. “The most important thing 
in sales is maintaining that buzz, you know?” Each phone was connected to a special box 
allowing calls to be monitored and dialed via the computer system. The computers 
themselves were limited in their access. They could not access the internet except for the 
company website and a short list of other approved pages. They had access to an “email 
server” through which every digital message was filtered for approval by staff. According 
to Dennis, “In my opinion, they do not send emails. What they do is compose emails—they 
enter in the email address of the customer, but when they send it, it goes to my staff.” A 
staff member reviewed every message for any references to prison or other forbidden 
details. Every computer keystroke was recorded—“Whether or not they hit enter, 
everything they type is recorded”—and constant screen captures were logged.  
Prisoners were free to adorn the walls of their cubicles “within reason,” typically 
with a US map, a list of area codes, and a list of different frequent customer phone numbers. 
Everyone had the sales script posted prominently in their line of sight. Some had small 
pictures of their romantic partners or children. A few had mirrors beside their computers 
allowing them to see themselves and perfect the “image” that they wanted to portray 
through their voices. One prisoner, the young Marshall, decorated his mirror with 
permanent markers. Across the top he scrawled “HUSTLE HARD MAKE $” in different 
colors with green dollar signs around the border. On the mirrored glass, he wrote 
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“$PRINKLE$ ARE FOR WINNER$”—a play on the famous line “coffee is for closers” 
from the film Glengarry Glen Ross, oft-quoted around the office. 
 
 
$  HUSTLE HARD MAKE  $ 
$    $ 
$    $ 
$   $PRINKLE$ $ 
$     ARE FOR  $ 
$    WINNER$  $ 
$    $ 
$    $ 
$    $ 
$    $ 
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 
 
 
Call center workers were loosely divided into two primary segments. The north half 
of the office was the “sales side,” where half of the work force—around 15 prisoners—
made outgoing cold calls pursuing “leads,” dialing the business lines of companies culled 
from telephone directories. A speaker in the corner played music from an internet radio 
mix controlled by the civilian staff member in the bubble, streaming a range of genres 
including 90s R&B, contemporary pop hits, and 70s rock. On the phones, salesmen used 
fictive “phone names” or aliases. These are “generic sounding” names like Jonathan Brown 
or George Baker created by one of the civilian staff members by drawing from a list of the 
50 most common first and last names in the US. When a salesman quit or was fired, another 
worker took over their alias until a new hire could fill the gap. One day during fieldwork, 
I overheard a man answer a call from someone looking for “John Evans.” Covering the mic 
on his headset and leaning back, he shouted to the room, “Hey, who’s John Evans now? 
Figure 5. Marshall's Mirror Design 
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Who’s the new John Evans?” Another guy snapped his head around and replied, “Oh, that’s 
me. I’m John Evans now.”  
Salesmen relied heavily on the carefully prepared sales script on their calls. “Stick 
to the script, fellas,” was a commonly heard from Jake as he strolled past new and veteran 
salesmen. “The words are proven to work!” Regular training sessions and a thorough 
training manual provide them with platitudes and sales techniques to employ, such as: “Sell 
the sizzle, not the steak. The ‘sizzle’ is the bestselling argument. It’s the crunch in the 
McNuggets, the tang in the cheese, the whiff in the coffee!” The sound of phone chatter on 
the sales side was constant. Through the overlapping voices, some more powerful than 
others, a variety of talk with customers could be heard: “Ok, let me ask you this—is this 
something you want to move forward on today?” “Can I talk to Janine, please?” “Hello, 
how are you? Good, you sound good!” “The ad that you have on the TV is a 30-second 
still ad. What I would like to do is use about 6 to 10 images to create you a new 30-second 
ad with sound and video.” “We thought your company might be a good fit.” All of this 
chatter was punctuated by phones ringing and keyboards clicking, to a Led Zeppelin or 
Katy Perry soundtrack through the overhead speakers.  
When a sale was made, prisoners quickly transferred their calls to the civilian staff 
member on duty. The rules of the handling of information were strict: any prisoner who 
attempted to handle credit card or other sensitive customer information—beyond a mere 
business phone number and name—would be fired and could receive additional punitive 
sanctions. Violations were rare and prisoners largely self-police. After one successful call, 
for instance, a salesman called Smith interrupted a customer when she unexpectedly began 
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to read a credit card number off to him for payment. “Okay, hold on for one moment ma’am 
and I’ll connect us with my manager who will take all of that information, okay? Great.”  
Although there was often some leniency in the “five to survive” monthly quotas, 
the stress remained palpable near the end of each month on the sales floor. Recent hires 
were often particularly nervous around this time. During his first weeks on the job, the 
outspoken Marshall lamented his slow progress and weighed his options: 
 
This shit is tough. I never sold anything before. Well…I 
never sold anything over the phone. But drugs are easy. They 
sell themselves. This is harder than robbing banks. That’s 
okay. If this doesn’t work out, I can go back to my old job 
[on the highway crew]. That’s a good job. The pay’s not as 
good, but you get out, get to see people.  
 
After making it through his first three months on the job, however, Marshall boasted, “I’m 
the only one who made it from my ‘draft class!’” Grinning, he poured a generous amount 
of powdered creamer into his coffee. “What’s the trick?” I asked. “Just learning on your 
feet,” came his reply. “I look at everything as a competition. I’m trying to be the best!” 
 Connected to the sales floor, the southern half of the office housed the second 
primary work team, known as the “collections department.” The lights were dimmer over 
this part of the room and chatter was more subdued. A row of imprisoned collectors steadily 
made calls to follow up with nonpaying customers. They also acted as “CSRs,” or customer 
service representatives, and always sought to “keep the customers happy,” even when 
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payments were overdue. For instance, a collector named Clay, who was somewhat gruff in 
person, handled his collection calls with great care. I watched and listened one day as he 
contacted a customer who had failed to pay for a still ad ordered earlier in the year: 
 
How are you doing today? I’m actually calling today 
because your file came across my desk for nonpayment. 
They wanted me to send it to a collection agency, but I was 
hoping to get it taken care of now, so it doesn’t have to go to 
them. We don’t want that to happen. … Yes sir, if I can get 
99 dollars from your today, I can keep your account from 
going into the red. … It’s two-ninety-nine total. … Okay, 
let’s do that!  
 
He connected the customer to Eduardo in the bubble who would process his first payment. 
Though their job involved “making sure customers are happy” while also “making sure 
they pay,” collectors were not held to formal quotas like their counterparts in sales. One 
collector, Ghost, told me that, despite this, “There’s expectations. You should be getting 
thirty-five, forty thousand [dollars per month].”  
“But it’s not as rigid as sales?” 
“Nah. But, it’s harder sometimes. If they [salesmen] have a bad call, they just hang 
up and move to the next one. We do customer service and collections, so if we get a bad 
call, we’re stuck with it. We have to stay on the line with them.” 
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In the corner of the collections department sat a small team of workers with their 
own unique tasks. These prisoner “admins” addressed technical issues that arose with the 
display of ads. Javi was the lead admin (he referred to himself and his coworkers as “the 
nerds”). A college-educated man with advanced computer skills, he maintained contact 
with locations where ads were displayed and assisted with any issues that arose with the 
help of his admin coworkers. From the next cubicle, Lang maintained the company’s 
website and updated the software that salesmen used to locate leads and make calls. Beside 
the admins sat the three-person “art department.” They created and edited still and 
slideshow advertisements. The lead “creative,” Emmett, sat in a large desk up against the 
bubble. Across three computer monitors he edited still images and slideshows using the 
full Adobe Suite. He worked through lunch many days, preparing a bowl of ramen noodles 
at his desk, laboring beneath a dim desk lamp, spitting chewing tobacco into a repurposed 
pepper shaker. Though he was sometimes tapped to create ads from scratch, much of the 
production process was outsourced to a design firm in India. Prisoners compiled customer 
names, logos, and other relevant information to forward to Indian designers who typically 
sent back new work within one day. Riz, the proofreader, then looked over the ads. “I don’t 
know all 72 million words in the English language,” Riz would tell me with a grin, “but if 
something looks weird, I check it out!” After, Emmett made any necessary alterations 
before the finished ads were sent to the customer for approval. Finalized works were then 
compiled into sequences for broadcasting. 
 
Sign shop 
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The other job regarded as the “best” on-complex was the sign shop. Workers here 
earned up to nearly double the maximum pay of most prison jobs, at $0.50 to $1.00. Despite 
receiving lower hourly wages than their call center counterparts, the take-home pay of sign 
shop workers was higher in the absence of forced deductions for room and board or 
retention funds. Turnover here was low and positions hard to secure. According to one staff 
overseer, “Most inmates are in here [prison] for five to maybe 12 years before they’re able 
to get [this] job. That’s why there’s such a line to get in. It’s a desirable job.” In addition, 
the work environment around the shop was often said to be more relaxed than elsewhere 
in the institution. The civilian managers were regarded as “fair” and “consistent” bosses. 
They typically accorded the prisoners the autonomy to take meals and smoke breaks at 
their leisure. Unlike in the food factory or other restrictive environments, prisoners were 
allowed to move about the work site freely. The lack of a constant CO presence contributed 
to this. As one worker exclaimed with glee: “There’s no cops!” Some regarded sign shop 
work as a daily “vacation from prison,” in that it felt like working on the outside of the 
prison walls. Ben, a long-time worker here, said: 
 
It’s a real job. I’m not saying those guys out there [in other 
prison jobs] aren’t working—they’re just under the gun. ‘Do 
this! Go there! Don’t go there!’ Here, it’s like a real job. We 
come in, work our 8 hours. If there’s down time, we take it.  
 
There were other perks to sign work as well. The ink, vinyl, and other materials 
around the shop were occasionally used by artistic prisoners to decorate their belongings 
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or adorn their work stations. Those working in the inventory and design/layout stations 
also had access to computers and a copier, with which they could create and disseminate 
custom signs to hang around the shop or print out the current chow hall menu for everyone.  
The sign shop was housed in a large warehouse building with metal siding and high 
ceilings. Five long rows of lights illuminated the workshop from front to back. Open 
loading bay doors at either end of the open space let in natural light and fresh air. Teal signs 
with white, hand-painted lettering demarcate each station: Metal Fabrication, Screen 
Printing, Packing and Shipping, Vinyl/Layout, and Engraving. Tables, counters, and drying 
racks crowded all but the middle stretch of the shop. Shelves of screen-printing screens 
from past orders populated the border between shipping and layout. The smells of ink and 
vinyl filled the shop. Scattered laughter from mobile groups of workers was often heard 
beneath the whirs and thuds of the metal fabrication process or the grinding of engraving. 
Out back was a fenced-in smoking area, complete with a sun shade, a paint-chipped park 
bench, and a wall-mounted cigarette lighter. Incarcerated workers were often found here 
smoking or taking a breather between jobs.  
Three civilian staff members—employees of the state—oversaw this work site. 
From his central office, Mr. Edwards, the shop manager, often sat grimly hunched over his 
desk. He was the “big boss.” On some days he strolled through the shop, overseeing 
production. More often he came out for smoke breaks and returned to his work at his desk 
shortly after. Despite his sometimes-gruff demeanor, a shared respect was apparent 
between him and his prisoner employees. According to Rollins, “I been working for Mr. 
Edwards for over 3 and a half years now. He’s the best boss you could ask for—inside or 
out.” LD praised his treatment of workers: “Mr. Edwards is a perfect fit for this 
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environment. He’ll drop the F-bomb sometimes,” he said with a chuckle. Getting serious 
once more, he continued, “He’ll treat us like people, not like inmates.” In turn, Edwards 
maintained earnest esteem for his workers, saying: “I probably get more respect from these 
people working here than I got from my own employees when I owned my own business.”  
Second to Edwards was Dempsey, a former CO, who now worked as a civilian 
security officer under Edwards. He maintained the tool cage where prisoners checked out 
various tools for use in the sign production process. Finally, Mr. Gale was a graphic 
designer with his own small office. He often split his time between the computer and the 
shop floor.  
The entire sign-making process began in “Metal Fabrication.” In the far corner of 
the shop sat a caged-in, hulking machine: the “sign cutter,” used to stamp out blank metal 
to the necessary dimensions for various street signs. Chicano prisoners Ocho, Charro, and 
Scotty were in charge of this area. When new orders arrived, Dempsey brought it first to 
these men, who measured and cut the appropriate number of metal sheets to the proper 
dimensions. Next, they rounded the edges using a high-powered shearing machine. Then, 
each cut sheet was thoroughly sanded down using electric sanders before being buffed. 
Finally, for things such as speed limit or stop signs, a reflective white vinyl layer is applied 
to the top of the sign. From here, the prepared metal sheets were carted over to either the 
screen printing or the vinyl station. 
Newcomers to the sign shop typically started in the screen-printing station. Here, 
they learned to pull high quality ink over mesh screens to apply text and imagery to street 
signs of all sorts, ranging from basic traffic signs to multi-colored, detailed city emblems. 
In this and every station, the workers largely trained one another, with little to no staff input 
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into the production process. Certain prisoners had high status around the shop. Alberto, 
referred to as the “foreman” by his incarcerated coworkers as well as the civilian bosses, 
took the lead in training newcomers and delegating tasks when new jobs comes through. 
Eli, with the most screen-printing experience, and Jon, eager to develop and demonstrate 
his skills, often took charge on large orders—sometimes printing hundreds of copies of the 
same sign. Much like in the fleet auto garage, prisoners in this station did not learn 
conventional techniques, which rely heavily on computer programming. “See, this li’l shit 
we doin’ wit’ the ink?” a worker called DS asked me rhetorically one day. “It’s obsolete. 
It’s all computers now!”  
 
 
Figure 6. Bird’s Eye View of the Sign Shop 
In the vinyl station, prisoners did in fact learn to design signage digitally. Slim sat 
at his “layout computer” at a low desk and prepared designs to be printed out using a 
massive vinyl printer. (Emmett, now the lead “creative” in the call center, once sat here as 
well.) After they were printed, these large vinyl sheets—like giant, sturdy stickers with 
industrial-strength adhesive on one side—were then “weeded.” Vinyl station workers 
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leaned over a tall work table wielding x-acto knives, with which they deftly plucked up 
excess vinyl from negative space around and within the design, such as the tiny spaces 
between letters like “e” or numbers like “8.” The weeded vinyl is then covered with a large 
sheet of special tape, which is pulled up to reveal the exposed adhesive. This is then sprayed 
with a soapy solution—to render it temporarily non-sticky—and then reapplied to sheets 
of metal cut to the proper dimensions of the sign. With hard plastic scrapers called “hard 
cards,” the men drag the soapy water and bubbles outwards and the vinyl adheres to the 
metal. As the bubbles escape the vinyl sheet, they emit audible bursts of air, which the men 
referred to as “vinyl farts.” The final product was covered in a sheet of clear, protective 
coating, called “graffiti coating,” which made them easier to clean in the event of 
vandalism.  
Across the shop was the inventory office, also called the administration room. This 
was a small rectangular office connected to the staff office. Here, prisoner “admins” sitting 
at a row of computers maintained a full shop inventory. They were prized for their 
computer skills. As Edwards told me, he could not afford to lose them: 
 
I have to take care with the inmates who can work as admins. 
They work on the computers on a system—the system that 
all of [this] runs on, which has no training materials. So, 
they’re very difficult to train. I can’t afford to lose them, so 
I have to make sure they aren’t getting in trouble. They’re 
smart—smart enough to get themselves in a lot of trouble. 
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These workers were able to control the music in their small office—often opting for 
classical music. They also have access to their own coffee machine and comfortable desk 
chairs. These men operated in a secluded, calm workspace, apart from the rest of the 
workers save for during smoke breaks. 
In the northwest corner stood a self-contained engraving shop. Inside, four men 
worked on different tasks all related to the production of engraved plaques and signs. A 
Latino prisoner with gray hair and glasses, Gris, was often found mounting freshly 
engraved metal to the wooden base on a new plaque. These were mainly awards or 
commendations for employees of criminal justice institutions. Luther specialized in name 
plates, operating a small machine which carved out names and room numbers for labelling 
office doors or desks. In the corner, Rhodes and Felix sat at computers designing images 
for fresh orders. Each labored at their own pace on their own tasks. To some, the work in 
the engraving shop was contentious. Luther told me, “Out there [in the shop] you make all 
kinds of things, but in here you only make plaques for officers, judges—all the people who 
put us away, basically.” Gris chimed in: “It’s kind of ironic really, convicts making awards 
for officers and judges. There’s one guy who won’t work in here [engraving] actually. 
Because he won’t make plaques for officers. He refuses. He’ll only work out there.” After, 
I stepped outside of the engraving station and saw Lemmy walk by on his way to the vinyl 
station following a smoke break. He looked down on an array of newly-engraved 
commendation plaques for six different judges. With an agitated grumble, he blurted out, 
“Fuck all the ‘honorable,’ ‘judicious’ buncha—they can all suck my—.” He trailed off and 
let out a quick laugh followed by a groan and walked away.  
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Finally, every sign and plaque that the workers produced was processed through 
the shipping station at the front of the shop. Two prisoners, Maurice and Jose, oversaw 
packaging, labeling, and shipment. Packaged products were bundled in a large metal bin, 
awaiting a mail delivery truck that arrived twice weekly. Despite the seemingly-simple 
nature of their charge, Maurice would inform me that “In this department, we have to know 
every [station]. Cause we gotta know what we’re shipping and what it’s supposed to look 
like. You see?”  
 
 
Discussion: Structure, Stratification, & Sorting 
 
The typical image of penal labor held by many—that the work of prisoners is monolithic, 
that it is utterly rigid and despotically managed, that it is unrecognizable from the realities 
of work in the free world—is not entirely borne out in the contemporary prison. To be sure, 
imprisoned workers are confined to environments of heavy surveillance and limited rights. 
Nevertheless, the world of prison work is, from the point of view of prisoners, stratified. 
Whereas jobs like highway cleanup or the chow line may closely resemble the public 
imaginary, others, like the call center or heavy equipment operators, are perhaps less 
expected. Yet, diverse work offerings are indeed the norm within the nation’s prisons. The 
incarcerated, like the free, face a varied labor market and rely on shared criteria in 
evaluating the work available to them. And, once more reflecting the outside world, these 
sites may entail divergent advantages or struggles for workers.  
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It would be insufficient, however, to conclude this story here, with the revelation 
that there are “good prison jobs” and “bad prison jobs,” and that the former promise 
benefits that the latter cannot. Having documented these realities, new questions emerge. 
How do pay and resource disparities across the prison labor hierarchy affect prisoners’ 
lives and wellbeing behind bars? How do the varied environments of different sites—such 
as the dramatic dissimilarities between the day-to-day realities of the food factory and the 
call center—shape prisoners’ practices, strategies, and outlooks? These questions will be 
addressed in the second half of this dissertation. However, before we can turn to the 
outcomes of penal labor structures, we must first address another question: Amidst a 
heterogenous and competitive system of labor behind bars, how are these jobs actually 
assigned and which individuals or groups are privileged in the pursuit of desirable, 
rewarding prison work?  
Building on the present chapter’s documentation of the expansive prison 
employment system, the following chapter investigates this question by examining the 
sorting processes through which Sunbelt State Penitentiary sorts and sieves its wards into 
different work crews across the facility. I will interrogate the formal and informal processes 
through which penal laborers were assigned to coveted “top-tier” work sites like the sign 
shop and call center, enlisted to labor in “middle-tier” sites like the fleet auto garage, or 
relegated to objectionable “bottom-tier” sites like the food factory. Zooming in to the 
internal workings of these four labor sites, I also explore how workers were sorted into 
different work stations or tasks on the shop floor. Those possessing valued combinations 
of capitals—i.e., work skills, social ties, tacit knowledge, and other “resources that provide 
different forms of power” (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007: 23)—were privileged in this system. 
114 
 
Furthermore, racial and ethnic minorities and foreign nationals face additional hurdles in 
the prison labor market, revealing the continuation of patterns of social inequality and 
ethnoracial dominance observable in the free world. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Capitals & Punishment: 
The Sorting of Working Prisoners 
 
Unskilled laborers were chosen for this work, that is, not craftsmen or 
men versed in any trade. … People came home in the evening tired, 
worn out, and reproached the others all summer with the fact that they 
were doing the hardest work. That, it seems, was their consolation. 
– Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House 
 
 
The prison in the contemporary United States is considered “a major stratifying institution” 
(Wakefield and Uggen 2010: 388)—an “engine of social inequality” and a “significant 
feature on the new landscape of American poverty and race relations” (Western 2006: 198). 
For racial and ethnic minorities, the undereducated, and the poor, imprisonment looms as 
a distinct possibility throughout the life course (Garland 2001a; Pettit and Western 2004). 
Such communities are disproportionately policed, surveilled, and imprisoned (Pettit and 
Western 2004; Wheelock and Uggen 2008); upon release, their members face heightened 
discrimination and worsened labor market prospects (Freeman 2008; Pager 2007; Western 
and Beckett 1999). Consequently, through the containment of disadvantaged minorities 
rejected by the formal wage-labor market (and the subsequent deterioration of future access 
to work in the formal sector), the prison serves to reinforce an ethnoracial economic and 
labor hierarchy (Wacquant 2000).  
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Yet, despite rich empirical research investigating pre- and post-prison inequalities, 
less is known in regard to the role of structures, practice, and experiences within penal 
institutions as they contribute to disparities. Indeed, an enduring question in sociology and 
criminology remains: How does contact with the prison shape inequalities along racial, 
ethnic, and class lines? That is, through what processes are patterns of stratification 
reproduced and maintained within the contemporary U.S. prison? How do structures and 
practices behind bars contribute to the durability of ethnoracial labor hierarchies that are 
observed in the outside world? And, given the differences between top- and bottom-tier 
penal labor assignments at SSP as described in the previous chapter: How are “good” and 
“bad” prison jobs assigned and who or what is privileged in this process? 
Having observed multiple stages in how penal labor is performed, organized, and 
supervised over an extended period, I argue that a series of formal and informal sorting 
mechanisms actively maintain inequities between imprisoned groups. This chapter 
illustrates on-the-ground systems and processes which privilege prisoners already 
possessing marketable skills and capitals while limiting the opportunities of the un-
endowed in the allocation of competitive, higher paying, skilled labor assignments. Though 
disappearing in today’s penal institutions (e.g., Lynch 2010), such desirable work 
opportunities have been cited as a means of addressing apparent deficits in prisoner skills, 
resources, or outlooks, with potentially positive implications for reentry (Seiter and Kadela 
2003; Maruna 2001; Sampson and Laub 1995; Travis and Visher 2005). Given that the 
unskilled and undereducated are more likely to be imprisoned (Arum and LaFree 2008; 
Edin et al. 2008; Hirschfield 2008; Pettit and Western 2004; Western et al. 2001), such 
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imbalance in opportunities for skill and capital development while behind bars may mirror 
and aggravate broader systems of stratification.  
These data reveal that prior work skills, labor market knowledge and education, 
social ties, and demographic features such as nationality, race, and ethnicity are each 
influential in hiring decisions. That is, it is by this logic that the institution sorts and sieves 
them. As a result, particular prisoner groups—often sorted along the lines of class, race, 
and nationality—are privileged in the pursuit of desirable prison jobs and have greater 
mobility between stations within such work sites. Prisoner work and task assignments at 
SSP are ostensibly made on the basis of race-neutral skill or resource requirements, 
obscuring biases along racial and ethnic lines. Furthermore, prisoner racial politics (e.g., 
Skarbek 2014) are at times allowed to influence the work assignment process directly, 
resulting in even more explicit preservation of racial and ethnic barriers. Such disparities 
persist in spite of formal policies designed to limit discrimination. Beyond operating as a 
containment site for populations deemed dangerous and undesirable (e.g., Wacquant 2000), 
the prison is home to internal procedures and practices that contribute to the maintenance 
of a racialized labor and economic order.  
In the end, it is often those prisoners already advantaged in formal labor markets in 
the free world who are privileged in the prison employment system, while those at a deficit 
in outside markets face notable hurdles to success on the inside. The socially reproductive 
nature of this institution affects the nation’s most disadvantaged communities during 
incarceration (see Wakefield and Uggen 2010). In this sense, this research moves beyond 
examining divides separating elites and the masses. Social barriers are here reproduced not 
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between the poor and rich or the incarcerated and free, but within the narrower range of 
social class occupied by the prisoner population.  
 
 
Taking Bourdieu to Prison 
 
The insights of Pierre Bourdieu are useful in understanding the implications of how work—
and hiring practices—behind bars are structured and, more importantly, the ways in which 
certain prisoner groups might benefit or be excluded from access to particular prison 
experiences. Bourdieu’s (1996) notion of the “bureaucratic field,” for instance, has been 
deployed in the examination of the emergence of the carceral state in the neoliberal era 
(Wacquant 2010). Page (2011) draws on a Bourdieusian framework to sketch the broader 
“penal field,” in which agents wrestle over bureaucratic, political, and legal resources and 
influence (see also Goodman, Page, and Phelps 2017). The prison’s functions have 
similarly been unpacked in terms of a “field of power”—the social space in which positions 
of power are situated (Bourdieu 1996, 2005)—with penal policy interpreted as a facet of 
the state’s monopolization of not only physical but symbolic violence in this field 
(Wacquant 2016). And, in this context, the concept of “doxa”—the process through which 
“the natural and social world appears as self-evident” (Bourdieu 1977)—has been drawn 
on to illuminate patterns of broader societal acceptance of punitive ideals as natural and 
valid (Schlosser 2013). In this chapter, I extend from these macro applications of 
Bourdieusian thought to examine more meso-level structures and practices within the 
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modern prison. Namely, I explore the role of the internal penological structures in shaping 
and reproducing the social order.  
In his analysis of another powerful institution, the field of elite schools, Bourdieu 
(1996) reveals that such organizations often rely on recruitment procedures which filter 
applicants, such that only those “already endowed, through their background, with the 
dispositions they require” secure admission and accompanying social benefits (73). The 
prison similarly filters its wards via classification processes underlying mandated labor 
assignments. Extending from Bourdieu’s (1996) work on social boundaries, I identify five 
key sorting mechanisms upon which institutional actors rely in allocating desirable (and 
undesirable) labor assignments. At different stages in the work allocation process, prisoners 
may be sorted in terms of the capitals they possess, i.e., their available “resources that 
provide different forms of power” (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007:23). This includes (1) their 
marketable work skills (often referred to as “human capital,” but here regarded as one form 
of “cultural capital”), (2) their embodied knowledge pertinent to navigating job markets 
and job interviews along accepted norms (another key form of “cultural capital”), (3) their 
“social capital,” or valuable ties to influential prisoners or staffers, (4) their nationality, and 
(5) their race or ethnicity and adherence to informal systems of “racial politics” within the 
institution (Goodman 2014; Skarbek 2014).  
By relying on these criteria to sort prisoners, the carceral institution, like the school, 
acts as a sieve, ranking and classifying social actors (see Stevens et al. 2008). Yet, beyond 
identifying processes of social reproduction at this opposite pole of social class, these data 
also reveal ways in which already disadvantaged individuals are further limited in terms of 
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social mobility. The result is a stratified prison employment system that classifies 
incarcerated workers along the lines of class, race, and ethnicity. 
 
 
Prison, Labor, & Ethnoracial Order 
 
According to Wacquant (2009), the contemporary prison is central to the creation and 
preservation of ethnoracial hierarchy in the United States. By serving to “warehouse the 
precarious and deproletarianized factions of the black working class,” it contains a 
population deemed deviant and dangerous, and actively reinforces caste divisions 
(Wacquant 2000: 385). As such, today’s prisoners are disproportionately “drawn from the 
lowest rungs in society” (Western and Pettit 2010: 8), resulting in facilities which 
overwhelmingly “house the jobless, the poor, the racial minority, and the uneducated, not 
the merely criminal” (Wakefield and Uggen 2010: 393).14 Accordingly, today’s prison acts 
as a labor market institution, containing full swathes of racial and ethnic minorities of 
working age and shaping employment through their removal (Sutton 2002; Western and 
Beckett 1999).  
 Penal labor is ubiquitous in the nation’s prisons, yet the day-to-day realities and 
implications of this institution remain understudied, particularly regarding its role “as a 
modern system of racialized and gendered labor governance” (Hatton Forthcoming: 4). 
The work of prisoners has grown increasingly central to both penal policy and carceral 
experiences in recent decades (Hatton 2017). In response to slimming budgets and shifting 
political agendas, prisoner work has been increasingly leveraged to financially support—
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or at least mitigate the expenses of—overcrowded, economically strained facilities 
(Gottschalk 2010; Wacquant 2009). Understanding how justice system inequalities are 
maintained at the institutional or organizational level requires more closely examining 
prison labor’s role in social reproduction on the ground. 
 
Labor organization as an arena of inequality 
 
Relying on post-release surveys and interviews, some studies suggest that 
participation in skilled, vocational work programming behind bars may have positive 
effects on desistance and job market prospects following incarceration (Gaes et al. 1999; 
Seiter and Kadela 2003; Travis and Vischer 2005). In addition to ostensibly enabling 
imprisoned workers to better hone relevant skills and earn greater pay behind bars, such 
work experiences may help bolster prisoners’ perceptions of self-worth and the 
development of positive narratives about their lives (Maruna 2001; particularly chapter 6). 
Yet, opportunities to acquire skilled or vocational prison work experiences are vanishing 
at a rapid rate following budget crises (Gottschalk 2010; Lynch 2010; Porter 2011). Instead, 
most prisoners today engage in unskilled facility support positions like grounds 
maintenance or food service, or in public works projects like roadway trash collection 
(Stephan 2008). 
As the incarcerated compete for the few skilled and otherwise desirable jobs, 
administrators and ground-level correctional staff take on quasi-managerial roles—
assessing working prisoners and sorting them based on a variety of criteria (e.g., Wakefield 
and Uggen 2010). One metric by which workers the world over are evaluated and ranked 
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is in terms of their marketable skills and resources. That is, managers asses workers’ forms 
of capital, particularly cultural and social capital. The imprisoned are often ill-equipped 
along these lines, yet carceral facilities may nevertheless draw on such criteria in assessing 
them. As Wakefield and Uggen (2010) note:  
 
The correctional system classifies and sorts its clients just as 
schools, hospitals, and other social institutions classify and 
sort their clients. Although many incarcerated men and 
women have experienced some degree of conventional or 
criminal success, prisons tend to house those with the least 
human capital, financial capital, and social capital. (393).  
 
 Research in work and organizations can provide insights into evaluative and 
exclusionary processes at work behind bars. For instance, scholars of work in the free world 
have outlined how racial or gender prejudices at times supersede merit in hiring decisions 
(e.g., Castilla 2008). These biases may be deeply embedded in organizations, such as when 
it is presumed that minorities or women are best suited for certain positions or tasks; yet, 
such perceptions may be hidden beneath discourses which regard work and workers in 
abstract, generalized terms (Acker 1990). Discrimination may also be masked by the 
manner in which different forms of capital are accumulated or valuated. For example, white 
males may be more successful in accumulating social capital—that is, building ties with 
instrumental others such as managers or teachers—in organizations overseen by other 
white males (Royster 2003). Even when institutions are deliberately designed to operate 
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meritocratically, patterns of racial segregation may nevertheless persist and help to “create 
and maintain racially segregated (nonoverlapping) networks among whites and blacks,” 
resulting in imbalances in access to vital opportunities and resources (Royster 2003: 113). 
When lower-status workers do manage to overcome hurdles to desirable work, they may 
still be consigned to less respectable stations or tasks, generating within-job inequality 
(Chan and Anteby 2016; Reskin and Roos 1990).   
In these ways, inequality is maintained not only through macro processes, but via 
meso- and micro-level organizational structures and practice (Reskin 2000). In the 
penological context, gendered and racialized job segregation has been reported in how 
tasks are assigned amongst correctional officers (Britton 2003), and historically amongst 
female prisoners (Grana 2010; Haley 2016). Further, recent survey research reveals 
relationships between prisoners’ race and gender and the type of work they engage in 
behind bars (Crittenden et al. 2018). White men are disproportionately more likely to be 
assigned to skilled, vocational labor assignments than their minority and female 
counterparts, according to this work. However, the mechanisms by which this comes to be 
require further examination. Complementing this research, the remainder of this chapter 
investigates the mechanisms underlying such relationships on the ground level. 
 
 
Access to Prison Programming 
 
Research on the expansion of the U.S. prison system over recent decades has contended 
that American prisons have taken a “punitive turn,” abandoning missions of rehabilitation 
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(Western and Pettit 2010) or “braiding” punitive and rehabilitative features (Hutchinson 
2006). In spite of empirical evidence of rising punitiveness, however, policymakers and 
prison administrators persist in espousing the rehabilitative capacity of the prison and of 
penal labor in particular (as discussed in the Introduction). Such assertions rest on the 
assumption that work programs behind bars in fact offer opportunities for skill training as 
well as work environments conducive to the development of positive outlooks and “work 
ethics.” Though these are vanishing at a rapid rate (Lynch 2010), some potentially-
rehabilitative work experiences (by this definition) yet remain in many penal facilities. 
Whether or not they are accessible by all prisoners, however, remains unexplored. 
The fact that “good prison jobs” were difficult to acquire—and not always equitably 
assigned—was a point of common knowledge within SSP. Some accepted this reality as 
an unfortunate but inevitable facet of punishment: “I’m used to getting jacked around by 
the system,” as one prisoner put it. For others, this perceived injustice contributed to 
frustrations: according to another man, “It’s bullshit and they will work the hell out of you 
[in bad jobs].” In a conversation during work one day with Lemmy, a gray-mustachioed, 
white prisoner employed in the prison sign shop, he muttered: 
 
LEMMY: The state doesn’t rehabilitate, it [just] 
incarcerates. 
RESEARCHER:  What about jobs like this [the sign 
shop]? 
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LEMMY: Sure, but they’re hard to get. I’ve been 
down [incarcerated] eleven years and I 
finally just got one. 
 
Like many others, Lemmy had desired a top-tier job for its higher pay, greater autonomy, 
and other attractive features. Yet, he had failed to acquire one until he was able to develop 
and mobilize beneficial resources. And, once employed, these facilitated a quick transition 
from an entry level station to a more desirable job designing signs digitally. Having worked 
as a skilled craftsman for decades, he already possessed some skills necessary for the 
productive labors of the shop. Beyond that, he added, “To be honest, it’s—a lot of it’s who 
you know. Getting hired on, I knew somebody. And moving within the [work site], I knew 
somebody. And they pulled me along.”  
For every man like Lemmy on the inside, there remained many others less capable 
or fortunate—men who did not possess the skills or resources that might help them navigate 
the prison employment system. This observation informs two core questions: Who gets 
good prison jobs and why? And which skills, resources, or characteristics are privileged in 
this process? Findings revealed that institutional decision-making processes privileged 
those already possessing relevant, marketable work skills and valued forms of cultural and 
social capital. The ability to accumulate and deploy such resources, however, was often 
contingent on race, ethnicity, and nationality.  
 
The formal job assignment process 
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Officially, the job application and assignment process at SSP was straightforward. 
A prisoner had simply to fill out an application indicating their preferences and 
qualifications and wait for an opening in their work site of choice. In the meantime, they 
may be assigned to other available work programs as they await an opening in their desired 
position. In practice, however, this process rarely if ever played out as described. First, 
acquiring a 1-page paper application for work was often easier said than done. As one 
young prisoner told me with a shrug, “You really gotta ask around to get an app. Some 
[housing] bays have CO clerks who might [have blank copies].” To be sure, my own search 
for an application around the yard and work sites took nearly two months. Those who did 
not—or could not—submit an application indicating specific preferences were often 
automatically sent to the food factory or other unpopular facility support jobs. “There’s 
always somebody else to shoot in” to the food factory, said CO Byrne. According to one 
working prisoner, Jake, “Once you’re in their little system, they’ll keep assigning you—to 
the food factory or wherever.” By limiting access to applications, the prison helped ensure 
a steadier supply of labor for such vital but vilified work sites.  
Once an application was submitted, a prisoner could expect to be called in to meet 
with a correctional officer whom I refer to as the Work Program Assignment Officer 
(WPAO). The WPAO’s primary task was to assign men to work or education programs. 
“We have about three-fourths doing something, either working or in classes,” she told me. 
“That’s the best, I think. Just keeping them all busy.” Most of the remaining, unassigned 
prisoners were those who had been deemed physically or psychologically unfit for work, 
or who had been marked “ineligible” for many programs after being labelled a “flight risk” 
(i.e., likely to attempt escape) or raising other security concerns. 
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Even if a prisoner did manage to get assigned to the work program of their choosing, 
the most desirable programs relied on additional steps to vet applicants. Being accepted 
into the prison sign shop, for instance, required completing a short educational assessment. 
The on-site manager of the sign shop, Mr. Edwards, described this as a way to narrow down 
the applicant pool by assessing knowledge of “basic middle school things—shapes, colors, 
et cetera. Things that you and I could do with ease.” Men achieving an adequate score on 
the test were then interviewed by Edwards regarding past work history, skills, and general 
outlooks regarding work and workplace dynamics. Similarly, those applying to the call 
center had to pass a brief computer test—demonstrating their ability to log in to a computer 
and dial a call using the automated system—“because most of what is done here takes place 
on a computer.” Upon successfully completing this, applicants had to follow a provided 
sales script to complete a “mock sales call” to the call center manager, Dennis. When I 
asked one recent hire about the experience, he exclaimed: “It was scary. Real scary. Like, 
I started sweating within 20 seconds. I was dripping sweat!” 
After being assigned, transferring between work programs was often difficult. 
According to Dempsey, a civilian staff member overseeing the sign shop: “Guys put in 
requests to move all the time, but they almost never go through.” Hence, prisoners in many 
sites—especially those employed in the bottom tier of the employment hierarchy—often 
expressed feeling “trapped” in their work assignments.  
As per official policy, SSP adhered to what officers referred to as “racial 
balancing.” This policy dictated that work and education programs should reflect the 
demographic characteristics of the prison unit when possible. In other words, they should 
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seek to proportionately represent each of the primary racial cliques in the prison at each 
site.15 As one high-ranking correctional officer was quick to assert: 
 
Work isn’t segregated. The work crews are racially 
balanced.  So, if the yard is, say, X-percent black, a certain 
percent Mexican, certain percent white, we’ll pull from those 
applications and say ‘Okay, let’s hire that percentage blacks, 
Latinos—like, either one paisa [foreign national] and one 
Mexican-American, or 2 Mexican-Americans—whites, et 
cetera. 
 
Prison decision-makers attempted to adhere to this policy when filling vacant positions. 
While the racial/ethnic demographics of each site rarely directly mirrored the general 
population, racial balancing remained a feature of the work assignment process. Still, 
exceptions to this policy were openly made for certain programs. For instance, the call 
center was exempted, according to the WPAO, because its hiring decisions were made 
solely based on completion of the computer test and the mock sales call. As will be 
discussed below, racial imbalances were apparent in how call center hiring played out. 
Other skilled positions were less balanced for similar reasons—the WPAO tended to allow 
overseers of skilled sites to select or vet their own laborers.  
Exceptions were also made for work in which particular groups refused to 
participate. For instance, white prisoners rejected assignments to work as shoe shines on 
the grounds that such a job entails direct subservience to staff members. Prison 
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administrators allowed this in order to limit conflict with the “heads” of the racial cliques 
(Skarbek [2014] details how prison racial politics may shape administrative practice). 
 Refer to Table 1 (page 39), which depicts approximate racial/ethnic demographics 
of the work programs emphasized in this study. Note that certain sites, here represented by 
the call center and fleet garage, exhibited obvious patterns of imbalanced hiring of white 
prisoners, confirming the findings of Crittenden, Koons-Witt, and Kaminski (2018) that 
skilled penal labor assignments are inequitably awarded along racial lines. Other SSP work 
sites like the sign shop and food factory, however, demonstrated less-clear-cut displays of 
hiring discrimination. Yet, at these sites, other forms of inequity along racial/ethnic lines 
became apparent following observations. They were home to observable forms of station 
or task discrimination within the workplace, as will be detailed below. 
 
 
Capital & Skill in Prison Job Allocation 
 
At Sunbelt State Penitentiary, prisoner work assignments were commonly secured by those 
already possessing marketable capabilities or valuable resources. This section will detail 
the role of work skills, cultural capital, and social capital to this end. In many cases, sorting 
mechanisms that centered on such capitals acted to relegate racial and ethnic minorities to 
undesirable work sites or to low-status stations within skilled programs. 
 
The role of work skills in getting a prison job 
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Early in fieldwork, an aging sign shop worker called Eli told me: “Prisons aren’t 
too particular where they assign you, you see. Unless you have a skill in a certain area.” 
When I inquired after the process of assigning prisoners to desirable work programs, the 
WPAO confirmed Eli’s proclamation, stating that “Past work history is big … [especially] 
for a lot of the skilled positions: automotive, any kind of maintenance, that sort of thing.” 
Indeed, Eli had possessed some experience in manufacturing and printing, which helped 
secure him the position. Another man, called Bass, had operated his own small sign shop 
for 35 years in the free world and considered his time working in the prison shop to be 
“valuable training” to hone his skills and improve his own business upon release. Another, 
Clegg, worked for decades alongside his father producing signs prior to incarceration. “I 
[am] second generation. I mean, yeah, my father was in the sign business,” he told me. 
“That’s how I got into it, working for my dad.” With a slight smile, he added, “My son’s 
in the same business too.” Such experiences were often directly mobilized in the job search. 
According to Clegg, “I've got 25 years in in the sign business, so [Mr. Edwards] hired me 
from that. So, yeah, that's how I got on [to the crew].”  
Many other sign shop workers had not directly “worked signs” before prison, yet 
nevertheless possessed relevant skills acquired from other production experiences. For 
example, Samuél, who had worked in metal fabrication during his pre-prison work history, 
secured a position in the shop’s metal fabricate station. Lemmy, referenced above, was a 
skilled contractor and possessed many skills analogous to parts of the printing process. 
 Like the sign shop, the fleet garage, too, was explicit in its practice of privileging 
applicants with work history in the trade. Noting that most of the crew had prior automotive 
experience, I asked one of the incarcerated mechanics, “Do you think people who already 
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have mechanic experience have a better chance of getting a job here?” Without a pause, he 
snorted and replied, “Oh yeah, definitely.” I would learn that the managers of the garage—
Graham and Boyle—almost exclusively pulled applications from men who had repair and 
maintenance experience and who were referred by current workers. The CO overseeing the 
garage, CO Peña, expressed that, though it might benefit unskilled prisoners to be trained 
from scratch, it was more important that the prison’s vehicles were repaired quickly and 
properly—“And you don’t have that many inmates out there who can do a tear-down of a 
tire or change a transmission.” Upon hiring skilled workers, fleet staff watched them 
closely during a two week “trial period.” Boyle would recount that it was sometimes “a 
roll of the dice” in terms of the experience that prisoners claimed and what they could 
actually do around the shop. With a shrug, he added, “Sometimes it works out, sometimes 
it doesn’t.” 
 
Although transferring from a “bad job” to a “good job” was difficult in prison, there 
were some exceptions. A man named Jared, for example, managed to move from the food 
factory to the sign shop during my fieldwork. He did so, I would learn, by leveraging his 
prior experience. When I commented that he already looked like a “pro” after only a few 
days on the job, he shared that he actually had years of sign-making experience and had in 
fact managed to secure his position by mobilizing these skills as well as his ties to workers 
both within the prison and in sign shops in the free world:  
 
Clegg handed in my application for me, which helped. I also 
used to work signs on the outside and I mentioned that. Mr. 
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Gale [a civilian staffer in the sign shop] asked who I worked 
for and I told him my best friend, who owns his own shop. 
He said ‘Oh! I’ve known [him] for years!’ It was mostly 
those credentials though. I worked signs on the outside. 
 
 In general, skilled prison workers were better able to navigate the prison 
employment system than others. Indeed, on some occasions, they managed to entirely 
circumvent the formal process. In the call center one day, for instance, I was surprised to 
see Lester, who worked as an inventory clerk at the sign shop, walk in and sit down at a 
computer after lunch. He informed me that he left work at the sign shop early so that a 
friend could teach him the ins and outs of the call center’s computer system. Though he 
hadn’t yet been hired at the call center, he was confident that, given his computer skills, he 
would certainly be brought on. Sure enough, he was added to the roster the following week, 
foregoing the interview and entrance test. As one of few prisoners with a college degree 
and verifiable computer literacy, Lester was certainly valued in the carceral labor market. 
“You have to try to hold on to guys who can do computers,” the sign shop manager, 
Edwards, would tell me, “because they’re hard to come by.”  
 In some cases, COs or other staffers overseeing penal work programs actively 
competed with one another to secure or retain skilled workers. CO Peña of the fleet garage 
got into a minor spat with another correctional officer one week over the hiring of a talented 
welder. The prisoner applied to and was hired by the auto garage, only to be put on “hold” 
at his current job before he could transfer. “We tried to hire a welder from [the grounds 
crew],” Peña recounted. “As soon as they found out, they said ‘Nope!’ They cut it off, 
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trapped him there. [The CO] over there said ‘Hell no!’ when he tried to move. ‘I need him 
here—he’s my best welder!’ That’s how it goes.”  
 Staffers justified prioritizing and rewarding skilled workers in different ways. 
According to some, the unskilled workers wound up in bad jobs because they possessed 
other flaws which informed their lack of marketable skill. As one CO would express, 
skilled workers were thought to exhibit dedication to learning, whereas the unskilled were 
unmotivated: 
 
I think some of these guys, they have more integrity. A place 
like the food factory, that’s used as like a punishment. Who 
wants to wrap sandwiches all day? Or grounds crews—most 
of those guys don’t want to work. They hide their rake under 
their bed and go watch TV all day. You gotta chase ‘em 
down. They say, ‘Oh, yeah, I’m sorry, I’ll go work now,’ 
then do the same thing tomorrow. Some people just—I hate 
to say it this way—they just come in here more ghetto. They 
want to go exploit the system, to get over on somebody. But 
if you come in with no skills except pushing a rake, then 
that’s what you do! Whereas these [skilled] guys, they grew 
up working. They like coming here and working. 
 
The imprisoned disproportionately hail from backgrounds of poverty and inopportunity. 
By the above logic, however, unskilled prisoners—perhaps in the majority (Wakefield and 
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Uggen, 2010)—are to be blamed for lacking “integrity.” Unmistakably, such statements 
from COs (and some skilled prisoners) were often couched in racialized rhetoric. As the 
above quote illustrates, those who attempted to resist coercion into deskilled captive labor 
were regarded as “more ghetto” and hence undeserving of desirable work. This highlights 
how purportedly colorblind practices of rewarding particular skillsets belied the 
maintenance of ethnoracial labor hierarchy behind bars. 
 
The role of cultural capital in getting a prison job 
 
Beyond particular work experiences, other forms of embodied knowledge and 
resources were valued in the prison employment system. Such assets may be understood 
as forms of “cultural capital,” or demonstrable “competence in some socially valued area 
of practice” (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007: 23). This may be expressed in various forms, 
including via institutional certifications or via dispositions, preferences, or practices 
(Bourdieu 1984). This section will focus on three forms of cultural capital in particular. 
First, I discuss formal limitations along the lines of prisoners’ educational attainment and 
certifications. Second, I outline the influence of embodied labor market knowledge: the 
know-how to produce a resume and navigate hiring processes in a manner consonant with 
the norms of the job search in the free world. Third, I illustrate the role of prisoners’ 
expressive or self-presentation capabilities—in particular, the ability to exhibit what might 
be referred to as “linguistic cultural capital”: the (inculcated) ability to communicate using 
valued dialects, accents, and other symbolic verbal markers of social standing (Bourdieu 
1993a; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). Linguistic practices in particular are entangled with 
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processes of racialization in the U.S. (Alim et al. 2016). Forms of speech that fall outside 
of so-called standard American English reflect perceptions of race and class, often leading 
to penalties for speech patterns associated with black or Latino culture. 
 One formal barrier to desirable prison employment for many incarcerated men is 
their education level. Official departmental orders at SSP mandated that job applicants 
must possess a high school diploma or GED in order to be eligible for any position in which 
reading and writing skills were deemed necessary—as a bona fide occupational 
qualification. These positions included educational tutors, who assisted teachers in the 
prison classroom; clerks or aides, who often helped prison staffers file paperwork and take 
notes; and the call center, in which workers had to be able to comprehend written sales 
pitch scripts and compose messages to potential customers. Less clear-cut, however, were 
regulations which mandated the same educational requirements for positions like the sign 
shop or outside highway cleanup crews, where such skills were not as overtly required for 
most standard, day-to-day work activities. Nevertheless, such requirements existed, 
leaving a large segment of the prisoner population unable to pursue many work 
opportunities. Indeed, approximately 70% of incarcerated people in the United States do 
not possess a high school degree or equivalent (Wakefield and Uggen 2010). For the 
majority of prisoners, the absence of formal educational certification severely limited their 
access to desirable work programming. 
 To be sure, this educational barrier to mobility acted as a motivator for some. For 
example, while participating in work at the prison food factory one afternoon, I worked 
alongside two men who had been stationed in the food factory sandwich shop for several 
months. While we assembled our sandwich materials—meat, bread, cheese, repeat—the 
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man on the left cast a sideways glance at his coworker, whom he noted was working 
quicker than usual. With a furrowed brow, he blurted, “Hey, why you rolling sandwiches 
so fast!? You ain’t gonna get no special privileges rolling fast like that.” With a slight 
shrug, the man on the right timidly replied: “I’m taking my state requirement [GED] test 
next week. I want to get a good job. If I’m fast and I pass that? I dunno—might be good.” 
The man on the left shook his head as if to signal disbelief and disappointment before 
emitting an exaggerated “Psssshhh, whatever.”  
Beyond formal certification, certain forms of labor market knowledge were 
valuable in pursuing good prison jobs at SSP. Successful prisoners were often those 
experienced in the process of applying for jobs, preparing materials like a resume or cover 
letter, and successfully navigating face-to-face job interviews. This was particularly 
explicit in the hiring process of the sign shop. For example, before having the opportunity 
to pass the educational assessment test, competitive applicants for the sign shop were 
expected to first satisfy the manager’s informal hiring expectations. Mr. Edwards revealed 
his process for narrowing down the applicant pool: 
 
When guys send me applications that say, ‘I’m a good 
worker and a fast learner,’ those go right in the trash. 
Anybody can write that. Anybody can say that. What I want 
is a resume. When a guy sends in a resume or a cover letter 
with ‘I’ve worked this job for X amount of years, this job for 
X amount of years’—those are the men I will interview. 
Those are the men I will hire. 
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During the time of my fieldwork, SSP did not offer any programs or classes aimed at 
training prisoners in drafting resumes or cover letters. This meant that those who had not 
learned these skills prior to incarceration were likely to be unsuccessful in the sign shop 
hiring process.  
Those who did submit acceptable application materials to Edwards were then 
required to complete a one-on-one job interview with the man. Here, they were asked to 
explicate their prior work experience: “When I interview them, I ask them, what jobs have 
they had on the outside,” he told me. Applicants were also expected to demonstrate that 
they would approach the opportunity “with a dedication to do a job and to do it well and 
not just [have an attitude of], ‘I'm here. Pay me.’” Conducting oneself “professionally” in 
these interviews was a must.  
Linguistic capital was highly valued in prison hiring processes. To exhibit linguistic 
capital, one must demonstrate mastery of communication styles valued by a given 
institution or by powerful persons within it. Particular dialects, vocabularies, and accents 
may be deemed “incorrect” or “improper” in many formal settings. Mastering dominant 
dialects is tied to class upbringing and entangled with processes of racialization. “On the 
job market, language-based discrimination intersects with issues of race, ethnicity, class, 
gender, sexuality, and national origin to make it more difficult for qualified applicants with 
an ‘accent’ to receive equal opportunities” (Alim et al. 2016: 27).  
In the penal labor context, linguistic cultural capital was reflected in individuals’ 
ability to recognize and abide by normative speech patterns that were rewarded by 
administrators and correctional staffers. Demonstrating communicative competence—that 
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is, successfully recognizing and adhering to the language norms valued in a given context 
(Hymes 1966)—was particularly important for getting a job in the call center. As in 
knowledge industry work in the free world, the hiring process here required jobseekers to 
“speak like white corporate America,” as demonstrated in part by the “avoidance of slang 
(such as Black English)” (Chapple 2006: 559). To assess workers along these lines, the 
hiring process here involved calling the call center manager, Dennis, over the phone to 
attempt to sell him advertising time in a “mock sales pitch.” On these calls, applicants read 
from pre-printed sales scripts and responded to questions from Dennis posing as an 
interested customer. When I asked which qualities he prioritized during the sales call test, 
Dennis replied that competitive applicants “speak clearly and slowly, come up with logical 
responses to questions, not stutter, don’t sound like they’re from the ghetto, and have 
relatively good English.” Along these lines, he would add, “one-third fail as soon as they 
open their mouth.”  
Paralleling language that CO Peña had used to describe prisoners with limited work 
histories, Dennis drew on perceptions of race and space in describing the qualities of 
(un)desirable applicants. The fact that not speaking like one is “from the ghetto” was 
considered a bona fide occupational qualification highlights the racialized nature of 
linguistic capital requirements. Because of these expectations, many black and Latino 
applicants were immediately excluded on account of dialect or accent. I asked other 
participants why they thought Latinos in particular were underrepresented in the work site. 
One respondent was Eduardo, a Chicano civilian employee hired by Dennis to help oversee 
the call center sales floor. After contemplating the question, he replied, “I think it’s the 
accent. They [Latinos] just don’t do well. Everything today seems like a scam, so when 
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people hear a Mexican accent, they get worried: ‘Oh, some dude in Mexico is scamming 
me!’” Jake, the imprisoned white salesman tasked with training new hires, drew on 
racialized perceptions of conversational and personality styles to explain the lack of ethnic 
diversity: “I been trying to get some éses in here for forever. But, I think, traditionally, 
Mexican guys are more stoic, while us white dudes are more, uh, outgoing, you know? 
We’ll bullshit ya all day. So, they don’t have as much success on the phone.” 
As a result of hiring processes privileging particular styles of self-presentation, the 
call center—the highest-paying and most sought-after prison job—was largely a white job 
(see Table 1). By foregrounding hiring criteria that tended to exclude minority candidates, 
the overseers of this site appeared invested in (or, at best, resigned to) maintaining an 
ethnoracial labor hierarchy behind bars, circumventing formal policies prohibiting 
segregation. 
 
The role of social capital in getting a prison job 
 
Knowing the right person was helpful in the prison job search. Those who could be 
“vouched for” by staff members or by other prisoners working in desirable work sites 
possessed valuable “social capital”: durable ties or networks of relationships individuals 
may draw on to “get ahead” or acquire resources (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Hsung, 
Lin, and Breiger 2009). Unlike in the free world, in which casual, indirect, or “weak” social 
ties may be most fruitful in the job search (Granovetter 1995), in prison, strong personal 
ties appeared necessary for success. Prison racial politics, however, ensured that social 
connections remained wrapped up in racial hierarchy. As a result of these interactional 
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rules, prisoners were limited in their freedom to speak with, touch, eat with, and generally 
interact with members of other racial cliques for fear of enforcement (e.g., Goodman 2014). 
Making strong connections with other prisoners across ethnoracial lines could therefore be 
difficult. Consequently, for some, ties to staffers were invaluable. 
Being on good terms with the Work Program Assignment Officer was helpful in 
avoiding undesirable assignments. One man, called Diamond, proudly told me, “I wouldn’t 
work in the food factory. They’d have to fire me! … Actually, I know somebody in the 
[WPAO office], so I’d never end up over there.” Noting my interest in his ability to 
mobilize this tie, he continued, “Prison is all about who you know. You know the right 
person, you’ll never get stuck in a shitty job.” Ties to other staff members were influential 
as well. According to one man, “COs who see you work will give you more leeway” and 
may even “help you get out” of disagreeable work assignments, such as working as a porter.  
When overseers of prison work programs were reassigned to different sites across 
the institution, they sometimes brought prized workers along with them. For instance, 
before managing the prison sign shop, Mr. Edwards oversaw an agricultural work program 
at Sunbelt State Penitentiary. When the private contract funding that program was 
discontinued, Edwards was reassigned to the sign shop. Ocho, a Chicano worker stationed 
in the sign shop’s metal fabrication station during my fieldwork, was one of several 
working prisoners who had worked under Edwards his old position. When the manager 
was relocated, he promptly hired Ocho at the new site. Of his connection to Edwards, Ocho 
exclaimed “This is like gold!” Like others, he attested to benefiting from this valuable tie 
in material and immaterial ways. Being able to secure a good job in prison, he said, “drives 
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you even more to stay focused and to stay healthy. … And I might get out of here with 
over about $1550 [in savings] and that's going to help me out just fine.” 
In spite of departmental regulations formally limiting the input of prisoners into 
everyday institutional operations, incarcerated men who were already employed in 
desirable work sites were also often able to influence hiring practices and assist others in 
securing skilled, higher-paying positions. According to Mr. Gale, a prison staffer working 
under Edwards in the sign shop, being vouched for by a prisoner already employed in good 
standing at this site was arguably the only way for new applicants to secure a position there. 
“We only take guys who know each other,” he stated. For example, after he had established 
himself in the shop, Ocho was able to recruit individuals that he knew and trusted from the 
prison yard. When a position in the metal fabrication station opened up, he recommended 
Samuél (who was working as a dishwasher in the food factory at the time), who was quickly 
hired on the basis of this referral as well as his relevant work history. 
This manner of hiring was common to the sign shop. Workers actively recruited 
when an opening on the crew emerged. Many recounted keeping a “mental list” of possible 
referrals for just this occurrence. According to one long-standing prison laborer in the shop, 
Felix, “When I’m in the yard recruiting, I only look for guys who we can work with.” 
Recall, too, Jared’s acknowledgement that “Clegg handed in my application for me, which 
helped.” The hiring of only those individuals who have been “recruited” by current sign 
shop workers was justified on the basis that it made the work process smoother. During a 
conversation about how a new vacancy would be filled, LD, a wide-eyed prisoner working 
as a sign shop inventory clerk, and Dempsey, a civilian manager supervising the work site, 
agreed on this point. “It comes through us. With very few exceptions, the guys we hire are 
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all referred by us,” said LD. Dempsey quickly nodded, turned to me, and added, “Yeah. 
And—we don’t want to empower these guys too much—but it works.”  
“If we recommend someone, they’re gonna be on time,” LD went on. “We’re gonna 
make sure of it. Because if they’re not, if they aren’t reliable, then we look bad too.” 
Nodding once more, Dempsey confirmed: “That’s right.” According to LD, not everyone 
on the yard was deserving of a referral, regardless of their social ties. “We sort of vet people 
out, make sure they’re reliable for a while first.” Referred applicants could prove 
“unreliable,” for instance, by being dishonest about disciplinary records. Prisoners that had 
received excessive disciplinary write-ups—or tickets—could expect their transfer to the 
sign shop to be halted by the WPAO. According to LD: 
 
Sometimes a guy might not be forthright with us. He might 
have more tickets than he said. So, the [WPAO] will shut it 
down. I’ve referred one person since I’ve worked here—I 
made certain first that he was shooting straight with me. I 
trusted him, plus he was working as a tram driver, so I knew 
he didn’t have any tickets, to work that job. 
 
The value of social capital was not unique to the sign shop. The fleet auto garage 
also relied on a combination of referrals and work history in making its hiring decisions. 
Here, too, staff members often circumvented the formal hiring process. “They’re [the 
WPAO] usually good about letting me pick my own people,” said Graham, the manager of 
the garage. For instance, when I first met Seth, he expressed that he felt “stuck” in his job 
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wrapping sandwiches at the food factory. A few months later, however, he secured a 
position in fleet following a recommendation from another mechanic, Gael. According to 
Seth, it was his work ethic that enabled him to finally move up in the prison employment 
hierarchy. “If you work hard,” he said, “then Byrne [the CO overseeing the food factory] 
will let you go.” In practice, when a position in fleet became available, Gael told his boss 
that Seth would be a good fit. The boss called the WPAO and requested that Seth be 
transferred over. The WPAO then called CO Byrne to initiate the transfer. A short while 
later, Seth moved into a mechanic position. Once established in his fleet job, he too was in 
a position to refer people just as Gael had referred him. According to Seth, whenever 
positions became available, “we'll go back on the yard and find people, and then give [the 
site managers] their application, and they'll decide if they want to hire them or not. But 
we'll question them on the yard about what they know [about auto repair], and this and 
that.”  
In the call center, imprisoned workers were instrumental in hiring in a different 
way. Here, possessing ties to active salesmen gave one a decided advantage in honing and 
demonstrating the requisite communication skills and succeeding in the “mock sales call” 
test. When a new position on the sales team opened up, current workers often sought out 
friends from the yard and gave them a copy of the sales script. Unlike unconnected 
applicants, who only received the script minutes before they were expected to follow it on 
the phone, these well-connected individuals could benefit from days or even weeks of 
advance notice and time to memorize and perfect the pitch. Jake, an incarcerated salesman 
who oversaw the training of new hires, kept a stack of printouts of the script on hand to 
give to his contacts whenever a new round of hiring was set to commence. One person who 
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benefited from his connection to Jake was Marino, a tattooed man with what he called a 
“back East” accent. Having received the script weeks before his interview date—and doing 
practice runs of the sales call with friends from the call center who “helped him keep at 
it”—he had little trouble succeeding in the interview. Months later, I would watch him 
extend the same assistance to others on the yard. Outside during a smoke break one day, a 
man approached Marino and expressed anxiety at the progress of his “practice.” With a 
reassuring tone, Marino told the man, “Hey, just keep at it. Whenever a commercial comes 
on [TV], take a break and study it. We’ll go over it when I get off. Alright?” After the man 
left, he flicked his cigarette and told me, “He’s studying the script. I’m trying to get him a 
job here.”  
For those employed in the most desirable work sites, the ability to grant or deny a 
referral operated as a form of power in the prison. In this way, some maintained notable 
influence over work programming at SSP. In such an environment, where racial politics 
often dictated the rules of interactions—and limited with whom one could develop strong 
social ties—social capital was intertwined with racial, ethnic, and national divides. 
Ethnoracial hierarchies were created and implicitly maintained in the prison via processes 
rewarding strong connections. Prisoners in prized positions typically referred or assisted 
others from the same racial/ethnic group. Often, white prisoners like Jake held more 
influential positions in work sites, an arrangement that indirectly reified racial barriers to 
desirable jobs or stations. The next section will turn toward more overt patterns of 
discrimination in penal labor sorting mechanisms, which were evident at both ends of the 
hierarchy of prison jobs.  
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Race, Ethnicity, & Nationality in Prison Job Allocation 
 
Like many U.S. prisons, Sunbelt State Penitentiary formally prohibited the use of race, 
ethnicity, nationality and other demographic features in disproportionately assigning work 
duty to prisoners of different groups. The prison’s attempt to “racially balance” work sites 
represented an on-the-ground realization of this prohibition. Nevertheless, such 
characteristics openly shaped the opportunities available to many. This was apparent in 
how prisoners were sorted into work sites as well as into workplace tasks. 
 
The role of race, ethnicity, & nationality in getting a prison job  
 
In order to keep track of each individual prisoner’s current program assignment, the 
WPAO relied on a massive magnetic “program board.” This board, which covered an entire 
wall of her office, contained a grid representing each respective work and education 
program. Each program’s respective space on the board was populated by a set of small 
rectangular magnets bearing individual prisoners’ names, DOC numbers, and photos. To 
keep up with the prison’s policy of “race balancing” each program, the hundreds of 
magnetic prisoner photos were outlined with color-coded borders corresponding to the 
racial or national group that individual prisoners self-reported upon entry to the prison. 
White prisoners had a white border; black prisoners had a blue border; Chicano prisoners 
had a pink border; foreign nationals had a purple border; Native Americans had a green 
border. All other prisoners—regarded as “others” by staff and prisoners alike—received a 
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yellow border. “Those are mostly Asians,” the WPAO stated. With a glance at this board, 
she could quickly ascertain the racial/ethnic makeup of each work site. When necessary, 
this knowledge was used to determine which prisoner to approve for assignment or transfer 
to a given site along the lines of self-reported demographics. 
 Certain exceptions were sometimes made to the policy of “race balancing” work 
sites. In select instances, the leaders of the hierarchical racial cliques in the prison—
referred to as the “heads of the different races”—dictated to members of their own racial 
groups that they were not allowed to accept assignment into particular programs. Often, 
prison administrators allowed these self-imposed restrictions to stand, thereby letting racial 
politics influence formal procedure (see Skarbek 2004). Work programs commonly 
rejected by specific racial groups included those entailing directly “serving” staff members 
in a deferential capacity, repairing or otherwise supporting carceral architecture, or 
frequently interacting one-on-one with staffers. For instance, I learned early that white 
prisoners at SSP had been instructed not to work as shoe shines. When I encountered a 
white prisoner lounging near the shoe shine chair one morning, I asked if he worked at that 
station. He responded with shock. “White guys aren’t allowed to be shoe shines. That’s 
what the heads on the yard decided,” he informed me. “Any other races can, though?” I 
asked. “Yeah,” came his curt reply.  
 Later, I mentioned the interaction to Seth and Gael at the fleet auto garage—who 
identified as white and Chicano, respectively. In addition to whites refusing to work as 
shoe shines, they would inform me that several racial groups refused to work positions like 
staff barber, fence repair crew, and lock welding crew. In several instances, differences 
emerged along national rather than racial lines: 
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SETH:  White boys won’t do shoe shine ‘cause it’s 
degrading to polish up an officer’s boots. 
And the fence crew—we’re not gonna build 
up the walls and fences and the razor wire 
that keeps us in. The white boys and the 
blacks and the, uh, Chicano Mexicans—the 
Mexican-Americans—we won’t do it. Only 
the paisas—the Mexican nationals—will do 
it ‘cause they don’t give a fuck. They do their 
own thing. 
GAEL:  Yeah, like the welders—they [whites, blacks, 
and Chicanos] won’t weld locks, you know, 
to lock us in. They refuse. But the Mexican 
nationals don’t give a fuck what anybody else 
does. It’s basically the Americans who won’t 
do it, pretty much. 
 
I followed up by asking how repairing staff members’ vehicles differed from these other 
jobs since each served the institution. Seth replied, “Yeah, I see what you’re sayin’. 
Because we’re fixin’ their vehicles.” After pausing to think about it for a moment, he 
continued:  
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SETH:  But these [vehicles] are also used to transport 
us around. When we fix ‘em, we can make 
sure our people are safe, you know? 
Anything to do with security—fences, razor 
wire, locks—we don’t fix that because that’s 
what’s keeping us locked in. Why would a 
man build his own prison? But here, a bus 
taking a load of 50 guys statewide? We can 
make sure they’re gonna be safe. I dunno, 
that’s how I think of it. 
 
 When a prisoner opted to go against the directives of the racial hierarchy and 
request a position that they had been instructed to avoid, the “head” of their racial clique 
on the yard often intervened. “They might get a quick talking to,” said CO Peña, raising 
his eyebrows and miming air quotes as if to signal that such interventions could be more 
severe than just harsh words. Because of this, “they typically quit [those jobs] after a month, 
tops,” he suggested. To explain why paisas were willing to work in sites like the fence or 
locks crews when other groups refused, Peña surmised that “it’s because they’re not from 
this country… They don’t have to follow the heads’ rules as much because their leadership 
isn’t based in the U.S.”  
 Formal prison regulations limited job applicants along the lines of nationality as 
well. Foreign nationals at SSP were barred from applying to certain work sites. In 
particular, the two “best” prison jobs, the sign shop and the call center, officially did not 
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accept applications from non-American citizens. The manager of the sign shop, Edwards, 
would confirm this. “Non-American citizens cannot work for [the sign shop]. I hired one 
gentleman once—he was from Cuba. I don’t know how he made it through the system, but 
he was here three weeks [before] they [correctional officers] came in and took him out.” 
Indeed, many Latin American nationals found themselves relegated to food factory 
or other undesirable work. “If you are born here—Chicanos, whites, blacks—then you get 
a good job. Then you make [one dollar] per hour,” said Raul, a Mexican citizen incarcerated 
at SSP. He continued: 
 
If you’re not born in this country, you go to the food factory. 
Or you clean bathrooms—clean shit as a porter on the yard. 
… Most of the Mexicans on the yard, they clean the 
bathrooms. Or they are working over there in the food 
factory. Why are they not working [better jobs]? Because 
they don’t have English [skills]. 
 
For many foreign nationals, restrictions sometimes led to feelings of animosity towards 
Mexican-American prisoners, whom they perceived as not facing the same limitations in 
their prison job searches or life in general. “Chicanos get everything free because they 
speak English well,” said one Mexican prisoner. “They get a job, get a license, get a green 
card. Pshh. For a Mexican, life is hard. It’s hard to be a fucking Mexican in this country.” 
These language limitations may help explain the apparent willingness of foreign nationals 
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to accept assignments that different groups refused, but this question remains beyond the 
scope of the current study. 
 Foreign nationals were also formally barred from assignments that took prisoners 
beyond the prison walls, including highway cleanup, parks maintenance, and other crews 
that operated in the county surrounding the institution. While there existed no official 
justification for the exclusion of these workers from certain positions, many staffers drew 
on the heuristic of “the headline test.” This occupational colloquialism referred to a brief 
thought experiment that COs relied on when making or justifying on-the-ground decisions. 
Essentially, it entailed rhetorically asking: “If I make this decision and it goes wrong, will 
it result in negative newspaper headlines for the prison?” According to this reasoning, COs 
commonly contended that foreign nationals were barred from programs like the outside 
crews because negative occurrences (e.g., an escape) would generate damaging press. 
When I inquired into the lack of foreign nationals employed in certain jobs, one staff 
member virtually mirrored the statement of Raul above, saying: “It must be a regulation. 
There’s no paisas in the sign shop. And they can’t work the [outside] crews because that 
doesn’t pass the headline test. So, they get the food factory. Lot of ‘em work the yard—
porters, grounds crews.”  
  
The role of race, ethnicity, & nationality in within-job mobility 
 
Staff members and prisoners alike made frequent statements suggesting that “racial 
politics” did not inform work dynamics and that racial tensions “get left on the yard.” Of 
the sign shop, for example, a working prisoner named Luisito claimed, “It’s like a real job. 
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And we all work together—all the races.” The shop boss, Edwards, made similar 
statements:  
 
In the housing units, the blacks won’t talk to the whites, the 
whites won’t talk to the Mexicans, the Mexicans won’t talk 
with the blacks. But here, in the shop, everybody works 
together. They have to. But when they go back to their units, 
they’re completely different. They won’t talk to each 
other—other races. … The first question I ask them—ask 
any new applicant—is: ‘Can you work with all the races? 
Can you take orders from a black man? Can you give orders 
to a black man?’ They’ll tell you.  
 
To be sure, different degrees interactions and friendships across racial lines were 
observable in many work sites. Nevertheless, race, ethnicity, and nationality were not 
without power in these contexts. Though most crews were “balanced” and members of 
different races “all work together,” demographic characteristics nevertheless frequently 
factored into the assignment of prisoners to different stations or jobs within work sites. 
 Many expressed concerns over task segregation directly. “It’s very cliquish on the 
yard— the different races,” said Jared a white prisoner who had recently settled into his 
position at the sign shop. Referring to the dominant discourse that racial differences are not 
a factor at work, I asked, “Is it tough to go from that environment—the racial cliquishness 
[of the yard]—to here?” A slight smirk appeared on his lips at my question. “Oh, in here 
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I’d say it’s even more cliquish,” came his reply. “How so?” I asked. “Well,” he began, 
thinking over his words carefully. “Everyone’s been here so long. Like those guys over 
there?” He gestured towards the vinyl layout station where four white prisoners were hard 
at work. “[All] white. It’s so cliquish. The black dudes,” he continued, gesturing towards 
the screen-printing station where five black prisoners cleaned their work stations following 
completion of a large sign order. “They treat me more like a human than anyone else in 
prison. That’s why I roll with the blacks over there when I can, at work.”  
 Jared’s allusion to the “cliquish” nature of the shop along racial lines, as well as his 
explanation that “everyone’s been here so long,” highlights recurring patterns in station 
assignment. Just as sign shop workers “recruited” and referred their social connections 
when a new position opened up in the shop, they also had a say in who got assigned to their 
station. In most instances, new hires began their sign shop careers in the screen-printing 
station. From here, they learned the basics of the labor process. Then, when a position in 
another of the primary stations—vinyl layout or metal fabrication—opened up, the 
prisoners currently assigned to that station once more recruited from amongst the more 
recent hires. Typically, workers sought to hire friends. One worker, Ship, put it explicitly: 
 
We’re in charge of [work station assignments]. Let’s say you 
worked in screens and you wanted to work over on 
computers. But you can’t because it’s full up. When there is 
an opening, they already got somebody lined up for the 
position. You see. So maybe you get frustrated cause you 
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wanna learn the computers! … You see who’s working on 
the computers, don’t ya? They [whites] keep they own.  
 
According to Ship and Jared, white prisoners tended to dominate the vinyl layout 
station, where they designed signage on computers and produced their creations using a 
large vinyl printer. Through the use of digital design capabilities, this station resembled the 
way that sign production is accomplished in the outside world today. The screen-printing 
station, on the other hand, relied on an outmoded process—mixing and spreading colored 
ink over large screen stencils to transfer images. Though once the dominant method in the 
industry, screen printing is no longer utilized in outside shops. Many workers expressed 
interest in working with vinyl, but black workers often faced difficultly transferring out of 
screens, resulting in limited opportunity to learn or develop these more marketable skills. 
Tensions sometimes rose when individuals felt their mobility restricted. D.S., an 
older black prisoner, was hired at the sign shop and, like most, was first stationed in screen 
printing. Recognizing that this was where new workers often began, he was initially 
hopeful that he would soon be able to transfer to more modern tasks once he had mastered 
the traditional screen-printing process. During his first week on the job, he shared his plan: 
“See, this shit we doin’ with the ink? It’s obsolete. It’s all [done with] computers now. 
That’s why I’m trying to get over there to design.” After a month, however, D.S. had still 
not managed to transfer, despite seeing other recent hires move to other stations. Visibly 
frustrated one day, he waived me over and said:  
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Hey, Mr. G? When you’re doing your interviews, have you 
learned about the criteria for working out here? Like, they 
ask us, ‘Are you okay working with everyone—different 
races? You gotta be okay with everyone!’ Okay? Well, you 
see how it is for real—you pick up on that? How the 
Europeans all over there [vinyl], Mexicans over there [metal 
fabrication], and we’re over here [screens]. Now ain’t that 
some shit? 
 
He pointed to each respective station, signaling the racial divides amongst the men 
working. At that moment, a cluster of white men crowded around the large table in the 
vinyl layout station, three Mexican-Americans cut and sanded metal sheets in the metal 
fabrication station, and a small group of black workers prepped materials in the screen-
printing area alongside D.S. Shaking his head, he turned back to his work mixing fresh ink, 
resigned to his station for the time being. 
 
While the sorting of workers into different stations within the sign shop was driven 
by prisoners themselves—as a result of the relatively greater degree of autonomy that these 
workers were afforded—such divisions were not unique to “good prison jobs.” For 
instance, the food factory, which was commonly derided as the “worst prison job” and a 
“prison within the prison,” resembled the sign shop in terms of these patterns of task 
segregation. However, prisoners there had no input into the job assignment process. 
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 The three largest stations within the food factory were the warehouse, where 
prisoners shelved and inventoried dry food goods; the sandwich shop, where workers 
compiled sandwich ingredients; and the meat prep station, where men wrapped slices of 
lunch meat in plastic. Participants oft referred to meat prep as a “Mexican job” because it 
was populated almost entirely with “paisas.” Barba, a Mexican-American man who worked 
for the private firm managing food operations, was in charge of populating this crew. He 
hired foreign nationals more often than not. Barba’s hiring practices were not appreciated 
by some working prisoners. One white participant, frustrated at not being able to secure a 
job as a meat slicer on the crew, angrily referred to him as a “racist bastard” who “only 
hires Mexicans.” Barba, however, would defend his actions as the result of a “colorblind” 
approach to hiring. When a DOC representative instructed that work stations be “mixed”—
i.e., desegregated—Barba informed me that he did not “pay attention to the race” of his 
workers. Instead, he refused to alter the composition of his station, insisting that he sees all 
prisoners as the same: “I only see orange.”  
 Not all staffers agreed with Barba’s practices. A more recently-hired man, Davis, 
grew angry with Barba after his entire Mexican crew skipped work one day: “This is what 
happens when you hire only one race to a job, dude.” When Barba shrugged off the 
comment, Davis vented to me: “He only hired Mexican guys to work meat. They decided 
to skip work yesterday, so—tsk.” With a shrug he added, “That’s what happens when you 
don’t mix it up!” Months later, Davis would be assigned to oversee the meat prep station. 
Despite his earlier protestations over Barba’s hiring practices, he too refused to “mix it up.” 
Acquiescing to this now-standard practice, Davis justified the continuation of primarily 
hiring foreign nationals as “being consistent.” This, he said, was key “because you don't 
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want to start anything new in there [as it may] make them work less hard than they are.” 
Since the other major food factory stations remained largely “racially balanced,” he 
expressed that he had some leeway in maintaining his single-race crew. “Everybody starts 
in the sandwich shop—it's mixed race all in [that station]. It's black, white. It's just [not 
like that] in my area—it can kind of be the Mexican area.”  
 
 
Discussion: Teaching Rocks to Sink 
 
Labor stratification pervaded Sunbelt State Penitentiary. This chapter has discussed the 
ways in which working prisoners were sorted into labor assignments within a diverse, 
hierarchal prison employment system via various formal and informal sorting mechanisms. 
In this process, the prison did not approach work as a means to transfer skills and outlooks 
that prisoners lacked, despite claims to this effect from policymakers (e.g., Benns 2015; 
Brown and Severson 2011). Instead, ethnographic data reveal that the contemporary penal 
facility sorts imprisoned men into work sites for which they already possess the requisite 
abilities or resources—adhering to a racialized market logic in the allocation of labor 
assignments. Few behind bars possess marketable job skills, valued certifications, 
privileged self-presentation styles, knowledge regarding formal market procedures, or 
advantageous social ties to assist in the job search (Arum and LaFree 2008; Pettit and 
Western 2004; Wakefield and Uggen 2010). Nevertheless, these and other forms of capital 
were regularly necessary for success in the internal prison employment system. The prison, 
already operating at the “lowest rungs” of society (Western and Pettit 2010), sieves and 
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categorizes social actors in a manner which further stratifies this already vulnerable 
population. As in the free world, it was the combination of prisoners’ capitals which often 
facilitated success within the local field. Particular forms of capital often overlapped or 
interacted. Race and social capital, for instance, were directly linked via prison racial 
politics. What’s more, prisoners possessing a broad variety of valued capitals—e.g., work 
skills and ties to connected others—tended to thrive.  
Most prominently, these findings demonstrate that imprisoned minorities face 
continual hurdles to higher-status work site and task assignments, revealing underlying 
racialized patterns of exclusion. It is through these processes that ethnoracial economic and 
labor hierarchies are maintained behind bars. In addition to compounding disadvantages 
through the warehousing of minority populations as outlined by Wacquant (2000) and 
others (e.g., Smith and Hattery 2008), the prison reflects and aggravates inequalities at the 
organizational level through internal structures and practices. Racialized perceptions of 
work and workers often shaped official procedures at SSP. In the pursuit of high-paying 
work in the call center, for instance, cultural and social capital requirements masked racial 
barriers to prisoner mobility. Minority applicants were often penalized for “sounding 
ghetto” or exhibiting an accent over the phone. Whether purposefully or not, this program 
virtually excluded black and Latino prisoners by prizing conventionally white, middle-
class styles of speech (see Alim et al. 2016).  
Similarly, within work sites, non-white workers were often limited in their ability 
to secure desirable task assignments because they lacked the resources necessary to move 
between stations. Social ties were particularly valuable to this end. Although race shapes 
personal and professional networks in the free world (e.g., Royster 2003), social capital 
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appeared even more racialized in the carceral context in keeping with pervasive systems of 
racial politics. These norms and codes limited whether, when, and in what capacity 
prisoners of different races could interact and could be enforced through violence. As such, 
it was oftentimes difficult for minority actors to establish strong connections with 
potentially better-connected whites. This was exemplified, for example, by the black 
prisoners relegated to the outmoded screen-printing station in the sign shop as white 
prisoners acted as gatekeepers to the more modern vinyl printing station. Here as at other 
points in the prison employment system, racial politics and institutional structure were 
intertwined. 
These findings align with Bourdieu’s illustration of the role of key institutions in 
the reification of social categories. Bourdieu (1996) proffers that, by privileging those 
already endowed with the skills and dispositions that they are said to transfer, key social 
institutions may function to consecrate “sacred” groups through “rite of institution,” 
fueling the production of a nobility. They do so, in part, by employing “recruitment 
procedures [which] are so obviously designed to guarantee them students already endowed, 
through their background, with the dispositions they require that we have to wonder 
whether, as the Romans used to say, they aren’t merely ‘teaching fish to swim’” (Bourdieu 
1996: 73). Like prestigious educational institutions at the top of the social hierarchy, the 
prison—which instead operates at the “lowest rungs” of society (Western and Pettit 
2010)—acts as a sieve, filtering and categorizing social actors. Inverting the function of the 
school, however, the prison instead signifies the profane, producing and reproducing an 
underclass (see Irwin 1985). Put another way, if elite schools simply “teach fish to swim,” 
then the prison employment system may be said to “teach rocks to sink.” As such, it is not 
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merely the case that society prepares some for school while priming others for prison 
(Goffman 2015). Rather, this highlights the prison’s role as part of a larger tapestry of 
social reproduction. The mechanisms underlying the reification of social barriers between 
the poor and rich—as between the incarcerated and free—also act to exacerbate disparities 
within the narrower range of social class representing the prisoner population.  
The costs of incarceration are shifted to the incarcerated in many ways (e.g., 
Gibson-Light 2018). In an era of slimming prison budgets (Gottschalk 2010) and 
persistently high rates of imprisonment (Garland 2001a), this institution draws on the labor 
power of the incarcerated to financially support—or at least mitigate the expenses of—
overcrowded, economically strained facilities. The expansive scale of this labor, the 
manner in which prisoners are assigned to work, and the processes through which such 
labor is extracted are not experienced by all prisoners in the same way. Disparities in work 
opportunities and experiences pose considerable consequences for incarcerated workers. 
The next two chapters examine variation in working prisoners’ carceral experiences, both 
in terms of subjectivities and the pursuit of personal dignity, as well as materially in terms 
of access and power in formal and informal prison economies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Dignity of Working Inmates: 
Prisoner Strategies and Workplace Games 
 
Every man, whoever he may be and however humiliated, still requires 
…respect for his human dignity. The prisoner himself knows that he is 
a prisoner, an outcast, and he knows his place before his superior; but 
no brands, no fetters will make him forget that he is a human being. 
– Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House 
 
 
Carceral labor, a core facet of punishment in the contemporary American prison (Hatton 
2017), shapes how prisoners experience and understand their time behind bars. During 
observations and interviews with working prisoners at Sunbelt State Penitentiary (SSP), a 
sense of pride in one’s work and the pursuit of dignity were central to participants’ “penal 
subjectivities”—that is, the ways in which they oriented to and made meaning of 
punishment (Sexton 2015). Yet, worker dignity is oft perceived as only tangentially related 
to organizational agendas (Hodson 2001) and the dignity of prisoners has waned as a 
priority of the nation’s penal institutions (Simon 2014). For the prisoner, as for the free 
citizen, “life demands dignity and meaningful work is essential for dignity” (Hodson 2001: 
3). Seeking or “safeguarding” personal dignity is a primary motivation of worker action in 
general (e.g., Lamont 2002; Thompson and Newsome 2016). The present research reveals, 
however, that working prisoners are not all able to engage in such pursuits equally. Rather 
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than representing a cohesive group or caste facing a singular “prison experience,” the 
incarcerated encounter and understand punishment in a variety of ways, resulting in 
different outcomes for different individuals or groups (see Kruttschnitt et al. 2013). At SSP, 
where one was assigned to work directly shaped their day-to-day experience of 
incarceration. Different labor assignments fostered divergent penal environments and 
facilitated distinctive forms of prisoner action.  
In this chapter, I turn toward one consequence of the penal employment system 
operating as a sieve. Namely, I examine differences in participants’ carceral experiences 
and senses of self-worth along the lines of prisoners’ approaches to dignity. Prisoner 
strategies and practices to these ends were constrained by labor context. Those who 
succeeded in acquiring “good prison jobs” at SSP were afforded more opportunities to 
inject dignity back into their lives through their work. Their counterparts working low- or 
mid-tier prison jobs, however, were often more occupied with strategies to tolerate or defy 
indignity—engaging in resisting negative perceptions, with fewer outlets to actively pursue 
positive self-images. 
The structure of the prison workplace is fraught with hurdles to the acquisition of 
dignity for incarcerated laborers. Indeed, the contemporary American prison—and the state 
prison system in particular—often approaches human dignity as directly opposed to the 
agendas of prison bureaucracies (Simon 2017), which increasingly prioritize budgetary 
concerns and incapacitation over rehabilitation (e.g., Gottschalk 2010). Nevertheless, 
working prisoners in my study strategized against indignity in creative ways. Although the 
sorting systems through which prisoners were assigned to jobs greatly limited the mobility 
of many (as detailed in Chapter 2), the men of SSP were far from mere objects of 
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manipulation or abstractions lacking agency. They enacted such expressions of the 
“ubiquitous resistance of everyday life” (Burawoy 1979: 77) through social games played 
on the prison shop floor.  
In what follows, I approach working prisoners’ practices and strategies as different 
forms of “work games” (Burawoy 1979), which enabled them to work together to tolerate 
and defy many indignities of prison life. An emerging literature has explored the role of 
prisoner dignity in administrative and legislative approaches to prison operations (e.g., van 
Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009; Whitman 2003). To compliment these top-down approaches, 
I investigate the on-the-ground perceptions and practices of prisoners in such pursuits. To 
this end, I illustrate patterns of strategic action through which participants expressed their 
identities and sought or professed self-worth.  
Different work environments facilitated distinct forms of worker action, in turn 
differentially enabling or limiting prisoners’ quests for dignity. I unpack three forms of 
collective work games observed on the prison shop floor. Each represents a different 
approach to challenges to dignity. First, I outline prisoner “coping games”—ritualized 
distractions from formal work routines aimed at breaking up the “long day’s grind” (Roy 
1959)—which offered playful diversions that helped participants tolerate indignity. 
Although they took different shapes, such games were observed amongst all prisoner 
crews, each facing various challenges germane to prison life. Next, I describe prisoner 
“resistance games” (Burawoy 1979; Sallaz 2015), through which workers in low-tier, 
undesirable work sites butted heads with overseers over despotic labor processes and staff 
expressions of arbitrary authority. These involved more forceful assertions of agency, 
enabling workers to express collective discontent and overtly defy indignity. Lastly, in 
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upper-tier work programs, which were desired in part for their less-driven working 
environments and more “businesslike” management, participants engaged in what I refer 
to as a “professionalism game.” Through this, they sought overseer approval as well as 
distinction from “lower tier” prisoners by adopting and performing the role of professional 
workers—contemporaries of workers in their fields in the outside world. Through 
processes of “mock professionalization”—i.e., emulating professional status in a context 
in which they could not formally be classified as such—these working prisoners actively 
sought to reclaim or reinject dignity into their daily lives and labors. 
Incarcerated workers at SSP experienced and understood self-worth (and 
punishment more broadly) in markedly different ways that mapped on to differences in 
their work environments and corresponding opportunities for action. However, the 
prevalence of “wage work [behind bars] enhances the likelihood of group cohesion and 
collective action … but it will also create a powerful discipline, an investment in 
conformity, as it were” (Weiss 2001: 278). As such, the social games in which they engaged 
also served to engender consent to overarching penal labor structures and reify divisions 
between prisoner groups. 
 
 
Work Games & the Pursuit of Dignity 
 
A work game may be conceptualized as a set of collectively adopted strategies and norms 
through which workers alter, maneuver, or otherwise endure the labor process by drawing 
“from a repertoire of skills and accumulated knowledge” towards desired outcomes (Halpin 
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2013: 311; see also, Mollick and Rothbard 2014). Such games help laborers the world over 
endure the rigors of work (for early treatments, see Roy 1959; Whyte 1955). According to 
Sharone (2014), “games may arise in virtually any area of social life where social structures 
generate uncertainty over obtaining a desired outcome and where agents have some 
discretion to engage in strategic actions in an attempt to achieve this outcome” (190). For 
the nation’s many working prisoners, addressing the issues of their limited autonomy, 
marginal remuneration, and poor treatment—i.e., the indignities of penal labor—is a 
priority (Hatton 2017). Work games offer an outlet through which to tolerate, defy, or 
reframe these conditions. 
The concept of “dignity” has not traditionally been a concrete one. Indeed, its 
definition has shifted both colloquially and in legislation over the years (Simon 2017). In 
assessing various usages throughout legal history, Henry (2010) identifies five key, 
overlapping components of dignity. These are: “institutional status,” “equality,” “liberty,” 
“personal integrity,” and “collective virtue.” In a more general sense, we may understand 
dignity to represent a basic sense of belonging or participation in the social world (Pugh 
2009). Although many international courts recognize prisoner rights to dignity along these 
lines (Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009; Waldron 2009) , the incarcerated are systematically 
stripped of such entitlements in the U.S. (Demleitner 2014; Snacken 2015; Whitman 2003), 
despite frequent Supreme Court references to dignity (Henry 2010). To be sure, the 
deprivation of the basics of personhood is a central feature of U.S. penal punishment. Upon 
entering this institution, “the individual’s picture of himself as a person of value…begins 
to waver and grow dim” (Sykes 1958: 79).  
165 
 
In the absence of equitable access to resources and outlets for expression (Goffman 
1961), the nation’s prisoners turn instead to local “economies of dignity” (Pugh 2009)—
that is, local meanings systems through which they may ascertain which characteristics are 
privileged, assert value, and maintain positive self-images. Rhodes (2004), in a rare 
qualitative examination of supermax security penal facilities, illustrates that prisoners 
remain driven by a desire for respect and to have their humanity or personal “being” 
recognized. In one exchange reported between a prisoner and his psychiatrist, the man’s 
work history as a carpenter and his identity as someone who “like[s] to work with my 
hands” provided a critical therapeutic anchor in working through trauma resulting from 
dehumanizing carceral experiences (Rhodes 2004: 109). This illustration highlights that, 
in prison as in the free world, the nature of one’s work identity endures as a feature central 
to perceptions of worth (see Hodson 2001; Lamont 2002). 
Participating in work games may offer further material and psychological rewards 
that map on to features of dignity that prisoners seek. Collective games may serve to raise 
status and earnings, pass time and fight boredom, assert shared demands and challenge 
inequities, demonstrate or reproduce group norms and values, or establish and reify 
boundaries (Burawoy 1979). They “emerge historically out of struggle and bargaining, but 
they are played within limits” set by the labor process and workplace structure (Burawoy 
1979: 80). To be sure, workers may benefit from the act of participation in as well as the 
outcomes of work games; yet, because they must be played within the rules and norms set 
by management, to participate in these social games is to implicitly consent to the 
conditions surrounding their emergence and enforcement (Bourdieu 1996; Burawoy 1982). 
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Along these lines, overseers in the free world often allow—or even facilitate—such games 
to the extent that they do not threaten the organization’s overarching objectives. 
Despite the prevalence of prisoner labor historically in the United States, scholars 
of labor and the labor process have paid limited attention to the micro- and meso-level 
structure, nature, and practice of work behind bars, especially as it relates to penal 
subjectivities. What few insights have been made into the on-the-ground dynamics of 
prison work experiences, strategies, competition, and other facets of carceral labor often 
emerge as tangential remarks supplementing other agendas (for instance, see Jacobs 1977: 
46-49). To the extent that prison scholars have emphasized work, they have often focused 
on abstract questions of morality and exploitation (Thompson 2011). Perhaps ironically, 
this literature has overlooked the actual practices through which incarcerated workers try—
and succeed, and fail—to rise above exploitation and achieve dignity, status, and positive 
self-image. This chapter seeks to emphasize these processes by mobilizing the labor 
process paradigm literature from the sociology of labor, which has been utilized to address 
similar questions in the free world. 
Traditionally, the labor process paradigm approaches worker games as situated in 
particular eras of political-economic development. For instance, under the pre-Fordist 
regimes of the 19th and early 20th centuries, worker coping and resistance games thrived 
in response to standardization, deskilling, and despotic control in non-prison contexts (e.g., 
Braverman 1974; Roy 1959). The Fordist era of the mid-20th-Century saw the emergence 
of different forms of worker action, such as “learning games” and “reward games,” through 
which employees gamified training processes to counter automation and systems of 
indirect control (Burawoy 1979). In the post-Fordist era, with the rise of the service sector 
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and precarious employment, work games continue to evolve as workers seek security and 
self-worth in an uncertain world of work (Lopez 2007; Sallaz 2015).  
In spite of these transitions in economic production, the US prison system operates 
in a sort of virtual bubble, largely untouched by traditional labor legislation ensuring 
worker protections. Although the contemporary prison contributes to or participates in 
consumer markets via goods and services produced through penal labor (Bair 2008; Pryor 
2005; Scott and Derrick 2006), it is not held to the same standards in terms of worker rights 
or safeguards (Thompson 2011; Zatz 2009). That is, “prisons do not need to adhere to a 
number of federal and state standards for the workplace, such as the Fair Standards Labor 
Act” (Pryor 2005:10). Because of this, trends in the organization of penal labor do not 
directly mirror those in the outside world. Large-scale production programs deskill work 
tasks and drive workers in ways reminiscent of pre-Fordist regimes, drawing from large, 
captive pools of unskilled labor to address turnover. However, evoking more recent 
approaches to management, skilled penal work sites may adopt more obscured or 
hegemonic systems to control workers, diminishing turnover of their skilled workers and, 
more importantly (since such workers are less common in the prison system and harder to 
replace) fostering an internal sense of dedication and productivity (Edwards 2011). In turn, 
workers in this unique labor-legal site employ forms of strategic action befitting each 
respective labor process and managerial style that they may encounter. 
Though conditions vary between work sites, prison institutions nevertheless dictate 
whether, when, and where individuals must work, provide limited opportunities for 
personal development or expressions of individuality, and exercise seemingly arbitrary 
power in hiring, firing, and workplace punishment (Sykes 1958; Irwin 2005). At SSP, 
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working prisoners’ daily lives were strictly regimented by the institution. Nevertheless, 
prisoners managed to exercise small degrees of autonomy (often in brief windows) to 
engage in strategic action—or forms of “secondary adjustments” (Goffman 1961)—against 
the tensions of the prison labor system, challenges of the labor process, and indignities of 
prison life. 
 
 
Indignity at Sunbelt State Penitentiary 
 
Despite historical efforts to become recognized as such, working prisoners are not 
categorized as formal employees (Thompson 2011; Zatz 2009). Lacking formal status, 
penal laborers are denied many employment guarantees and protections (Pryor 2005) and 
the question of their dignity is not prioritized by institutional administrations nor by 
frontline employees (Simon 2017). In lower-status work sites within the prison 
employment system, these challenges were often exacerbated. For instance, prisoners 
working less stable, more despotically managed jobs had little recourse against imbalanced 
and nontransparent hiring practices (see Chapter 2). Additionally, workers faced opaque 
firing practices. As one staff member put it, “[we] don’t have to have a paper trail to fire 
somebody.” This was especially apparent in the food factory, where turnover was very 
high. Demotions occurred regularly, often without explanation. One participant expressed 
discontent when moved from the freezer section, which he enjoyed, to meat prep, an entry-
level position which he despised. “That bitch [manager] fired me,” he shouted when I 
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commented on the move. When asked why, he responded: “I dunno—she wouldn’t tell me. 
Fucking bullshit!”  
Prisoner pay is also unreliable. Working prisoners nationwide may be denied wages 
or receive compensation much below wage minimums. Despite attempts to increase pay 
over the years (e.g., Zatz 2009), most state and federal prisoners today are estimated to 
make less than $1.00 per hour (Pryor 2005). The average minimum pay for state prisoners 
is approximately $0.89 per hour; the average minimum wage for federal prisoners is even 
lower, at approximately $0.23 per hour (ibid.). At SSP, many could expect to earn between 
$0.05 to $0.50, which corresponded to around $4.00 per week for most after deductions for 
various prison fees. This weekly wage was roughly equivalent, for instance, to six 3oz 
packs of ramen noodle soup or one tube of toothpaste in the prison commissary (formal 
and informal prison economies are detailed in Chapter 4). Participants frequently 
complained about take-home pay. As one worker, Rich, expressed: “I’m not happy about 
the pay. If anything, I barely get by. I’m not talking about wants, I’m talking about needs!” 
he exclaimed. “It’s not enough.”  
If injured on the job or ill, prisoners missed out on other protections. One working 
prisoner lamented the lack of worker’s compensation, for instance: 
 
We get no workman’s comp. If we get hurt on the job, we have to 
go to medical in the yard—and we still get charged the four-dollar 
medical fee just for the visit. That’s several days’ pay right there! 
Plus, to go to medical, you have to miss work and you don’t get paid 
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for that. So that’s at least a week’s wages right there just for getting 
injured at your own damn job. 
 
Many reported skipping medical appointments to afford other expenses. On one occasion, 
I witnessed one man castigating another for having visited the nurse instead of purchasing 
additional food: 
 
That’s four dollars. Four dollars could’a bought two packets of squeeze 
cheese, a can of chili with beans, and tortillas. That’s a burrito—three 
burritos each! We could’a been eating good, but instead, you decided 
to go to the doctor. We could be eatin’, but you blew it on the doc. 
Don’t be goin’ to the doctor.  
 
Another challenge faced by incarcerated laborers was that they lacked reliable 
grievance systems and trusted advocates. As Calavita and Jenness (2015) reveal, prison 
grievance systems are often convoluted, slow, and outmoded, with prisoners reporting 
feelings of powerlessness and frustration when attempting to make their voices heard. At 
SSP, low-tier workers reported particularly little certainty with regards to these processes. 
Responding to the suggestion that he approach his food factory managers with concerns, 
one participant scoffed: “One of them? No way! … They don’t care about grievances unless 
it comes from the warden.” When asked if appealing to the warden was effective, he 
shrugged: “Not that I’ve ever seen.” Writing a letter to the warden’s office was a slow 
process, reliant on the internal mail system, removed from the actual workplace. What’s 
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more, appealing to higher-ranking prison officials such as this entailed risk, since it 
required prisoners to link their names to criticisms via the letter.  
Instead of finding a dependable outlet to whom to express concerns, prisoners 
sometimes faced overt disrespect and dehumanization from many work site overseers. 
When failing to recall a particular prisoner’s name, for instance, one manager remarked 
with a laugh: “There’s only one of me, but I don’t know how many of you I’ve seen in the 
past 24 hours!” Expressions of arbitrary authority were also common. While one 
incarcerated worker transported a wheeled, top-heavy cart of supply boxes one day, a 
correctional officer appeared and immediately chided him for his untucked shirt: 
 
CO:  Tuck your shirt in. 
PRISONER:  What? 
CO:  You deaf? 
PRISONER:  No. How am I supposed to do that while I’m pushing 
a-hundred-eighty-five pounds? 
CO:  Improvise! 
 
The CO marched around the corner while the worker struggled to tuck his shirt in with one 
hand and steer with the other. The cart swerved a bit, nearly toppling, but he managed to 
stuff in his shirt without a spill. Groaning in agitation, he put two hands back on the handles 
and pushed on. 
 Unannounced security checks, which brought work to a halt, often involved 
additional expressions of arbitrary authority. On a semi-regular basis, CO K9 units 
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performed sweeps of different workplaces. This occurred during one particularly busy 
afternoon in the sign shop. To the surprise of the prisoners as well as the shop managers, 
two COs strolled in leading two dark German Shepherds by short ropes. Despite being 
enmeshed in a large work order, when the dogs arrived, every participant was immediately 
ordered to cease working. One officer ordered all of the workers to step outside with a 
jarring bark: “Everybody out! Now!” After the men had all filed out the rear exit, the officer 
counted them twice and announced to his partner, “I count 30!” He then turned in the 
direction of the men and, peering through his mirrored sunglasses, instructed them to 
“Listen up! Stand up straight, backs to the fence.” The prisoners lined up, shoulder-to-
shoulder along a nearby chain-link fence, as the second officer walked his dog around to 
the other side. The first officer continued: “Do no lean against the fence! Do not stick your 
fingers through the fence. He [the dog] will eat them! I promise you that.” The men 
stiffened up. Some darted their eyes to the side to try and monitor their K9 examiner. 
Meanwhile, the dog’s handler led him on a first pass behind the men, allowing the dog to 
sniff each prisoner individually. The first officer then shouted: “Alright, squat down!” The 
men, no strangers to this procedure, crouched down in near unison. The dog walked behind 
them for a second time, making a close inspection of each man’s backside while emitting 
rapid, hoarse snorts.  
Following a positive nod from his partner, the lead CO turned and announced, 
“Okay. Everybody stay here.” The two officers clutched the taut leashes and led the dogs 
into the shop, where they zig-zagged from front-to-back, sniffing every table, material, and 
piece of equipment in sight. Afterwards, the second officer exited unceremoniously 
through the front shop door—having never spoken a word—and the first officer held a 
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quiet conversation with Dempsey, one of the sign shop managers. Neither acknowledged 
the men in orange, still standing near the chain-link fence outside. After waiting several 
minutes with no instruction, one worker, Jon, slowly approached the CO. “Can I go back 
in there, sir?” he asked apprehensively. “I need to finish [cleaning] up the bathrooms.” 
Snapping his head towards Jon, the officer sharply replied, “Yeah. It’s all clear!” Jon 
shrugged towards his fellow prisoners, scooped up his nearby bucket and rag, and walked 
back into the shop. The others, cautiously assuming that this meant they too could get back 
to work, slowly shuffled toward their stations. Some eyed the CO, anticipating some 
additional utterance or instruction, but the officer seemed to ignore their presence. 
In addition to challenges within the workplace, participants also described 
indignities when trying to get to work. Securing reliable clothing and other goods was a 
constant struggle (discussed more in Chapter 4). Boots represented a particular challenge. 
Without them, prisoners were not allowed to work and would be turned away at the gate 
before the morning bus. The institution was required to provide adequate footwear but 
supply of decent boots often ran low. Many waited weeks or sometimes months for new 
footwear to arrive. In the meantime, they were unable to work and many lost desirable 
positions after being unable to attend for lengths of time. When new boots were available, 
acquiring them was sometimes a frustrating process. Soto, a diligent worker from the food 
factory, recounted one such struggle: 
 
SOTO:  I went to get new boots yesterday because mine 
were wasted. There was one sergeant and two 
officers in there and they was like, ‘What’s 
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wrong with your boots?’ Sayin' like, ‘The guys 
who work outside have worse boots than these!’ 
Trying to shame me, bro. So, I was like ‘Shit, 
whatever. I just won’t go to work tomorrow, 
then.’ They’re like ‘Get back here—you know 
you getting new boots.’ 
RESEARCHER:  So, they gave them to you? 
SOTO:  Yeah, eventually. I don’t know why they gotta 
shame me like that, though. I’m constantly on my 
feet—walking in the moisture and shit in those 
coolers. My boots get wasted like every two or 
three months, but they keep giving out these 
cheap shitty boots. 
 
 Beyond equipment challenges, the actual trek to work was dehumanizing for many. 
Any who worked off of the yard—that is, those who had to be transported to a secondary 
site within or without the prison, such as the sign shop, food factory, auto garage, highway 
cleanup crews, etc.—had to pass through the strip shack before and after each work day. 
Here, they were stripped naked in groups and inspected for hidden contraband. Lemmy, 
from the sign shop, described it: 
 
They strip you butt-ass naked, seven guys at a time. ‘Spread your 
cheeks, lift your sack’—that sort of thing. That’s for anybody that 
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leaves the yard. Lotta guys don’t like leaving the yard and dealing 
with that. Once you master that hurdle though, you can start looking 
for better jobs outside the yard. But it’s a pain in the ass. [pausing] 
Sometimes literally. 
 
With the exception of the call center, most of the jobs that were located on the housing 
yard and thus free from the strip shack were low-paying, deskilled, and undesirable. This 
included such positions as “rake pusher,” “cigarette butt collector,” grounds crew, or trash 
collector. To seek a higher-tier job, then, was to endure the twice-daily mortification of the 
strip search. 
 
These factors culminated in a general sense of indignity towards incarcerated 
workers. Many dreaded coming to work. According to one man, “I feel better as soon as I 
get home. But when I’m here I don’t feel well.” Shaking his head with a distressed look on 
his face, he continued. “As soon as the bus pulls up to take me here—‘Ughhh.’ It wears me 
down.” These men faced criticisms and harsh treatments on a regular basis. To be sure, 
many staff members regarded carceral labor as merely a facet of punishment, rejecting 
workers’ assertions of legitimacy. Work, according to one CO, was important for the 
management of the prison population: “Otherwise, they sit in the yard all day, getting in 
trouble.” Such outlooks toward carceral labor are by no means unique to Sunbelt State.  
Jacobs (1977), for instance, recounts similar trends at Illinois’ Stateville Penitentiary in the 
mid-20th-Century, noting that officials relied on carceral labor to “coerce the inmate into 
a conformity that would ultimately produce a respect for the rules” as well as “reinforce 
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control by keeping inmates busy rather than providing job training,” all while publicly 
framing penal labor as a rehabilitative institution (p. 46-47).  
At SSP, prisoners resented such treatment, stating that: “They’re just trying to 
punish us. They show authority instead of showing gratitude for us working here.” Another 
complained, “They call work a ‘privilege,’ but we’re required to do it. … If work is a 
privilege, then why do we get in trouble if we decide not to do it?” One exclaimed, “There’s 
no appreciation for what we do in here.” 
All prisoners face processes of mortification and the pains of imprisonment (Sykes 
1958). Working prisoners across sites at SSP engaged in work games in order to tolerate 
the indignities that they faced. Yet, variation in the structure and management of different 
workplaces lead to these games taking different forms (with different goals and 
consequences). In addition, certain workplaces were home to multiple social games, 
representing overlapping prisoner responses to indignity. In less desirable positions, 
participants faced compound struggles—being subjected to overt systems of surveillance 
and direct control from overseers in addition to deskilling and monotony. The next section 
will detail the work games that emerged in response to these varied conditions. To begin, 
all working prisoners engaged in coping games, through which they endeavored to tolerate 
the indignities of prison life and endure each work day. 
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Coping Games 
 
The practices of many working prisoners at SSP sometimes paralleled those recounted in 
traditional studies of worker action. For instance, where working prisoners were subject to 
direct control from overseers, or in the face of long hours and boredom, they drew on 
“coping games” to better tolerate undignified work and break up periods of monotony (e.g., 
Roy 1959)—common under systems of direct control (Sallaz 2015). In the prison context, 
however, such conditions were magnified, as were the stakes of prisoners’ work games. 
Prisoner time is strictly regimented (Clemmer 1940; Goffman 1961) and getting through 
the length of a prison sentence often requires effort and creativity (Guilbaud 2010). Control 
and surveillance, too, are necessarily heightened behind bars, where institutional 
architecture has been honed to increasingly monitor and restrict (Foucault 1977; Irwin 
2005). What’s more, punishments may be severe—any perceived misstep or 
insubordination could result in loss of privileges, extended sentencing, or transfer to a 
higher custody prison yard. Knowing the risks and working around surveillance and 
oversight structures, penal laborers strategically engaged in agentic play. 
Coping games were readily apparent in the food factory, where working prisoners 
were subject to intense oversight in the performance of deskilled, monotonous work tasks. 
These games were often relatively simple in nature and took such forms as prisoners 
impersonating the gruff shouts of the CO when he barked announcements such as 
“LUNCH!!” or “COUNT TIME!!” through the window of his security post. The men 
would mimic his gravelly voice, shouting “Count tiiiiiime!!” or grunting harshly in no 
particular direction, gradually “one-upping” each other in volume in a sort of vocal “hot 
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potato” game. Other call-and-response games arose when the men grew restless. Slick, a 
sharp-eyed white prisoner in his early 30s who operated as an informal “inmate manager” 
of the meat prep station, was notorious for initiating such moments. During a lull in bologna 
rolling one day, he hopped up and down briskly. Suddenly, in a high-pitched voice, he 
yelled out, “Can I get a whoop, whoop!” A few scattered “whoops” came in response from 
different stations throughout the food factory. Unsatisfied, he continued, “I said: Whoop! 
WHOOP!” The calls came back louder until CO Byrne emerged from his security office to 
quell the noise and Slick strolled away with a guilty grin on his face. Slick was also known 
to spontaneously blurt out seemingly random, sexually- and racially-stylized phrases (such 
as “Ghost ride the dick! Yeah, put ya stunner shades on!”) or recite freestyle rap verses to 
lighten the mood at the work site. One rhyme that scored a particularly positive prisoner 
reaction was: “Ain’t no studio / This here’s a prison cell / They ask who I’m rollin’ with / 
But I won’t never tell!” The prize of these shouting and noise games came in the form of 
shared amusement at the CO’s expressions of frustration when he inevitably yelled “Be 
quiet,” prompting snickering from the crew. 
The monotonous grind of the food factory work day elicited other forms of play as 
well. For instance, the baking crew in this site was officially considered “semi-skilled” and 
indeed performed more varied tasks than the majority of workers. However, on days with 
particularly large orders for cakes or biscuits, they were driven by management to perform 
quicker and more efficiently—demands that unskilled laborers faced daily. On such days, 
they resorted to assembly-line style production techniques: aligned in a row, bakers 
mechanically prepared batter in the industrial mixer, poured it into large baking sheets, 
rolled wheeled racks of completed trays into the large oven, flipped fully-baked cakes 
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upside down onto new trays, sliced each into a grid of even pieces, and wrapped individual 
cakes in clear plastic trash bags for storage. All the while, a manager shouted occasional 
orders to “Come on, come on, let’s go!”  
To cope with the repetitive nature of the work and the overbearing nature of 
management on these days, bakers would seek out small bits of “break time” between 
major tasks. When possible—that is, when not in the direct sightlines of the CO or civilian 
managers—bakers sometimes used these breaks to craft “bread bullets”: small balls of 
excess dough the size of marbles that were “fired” at unsuspecting coworkers across the 
room in the meat prep or sandwich shop stations. After helping load the final rack of trays 
into the oven one day, I returned to find one baker, Baxter, surreptitiously preparing two 
bread bullets. Cupping them carefully in his hand, he rounded the corner toward the 
sandwich shop with a sly grin. Quietly, he shared, “I got fresh bullets,” opening his palm 
to reveal his arsenal. He craned his neck into the sandwich shop work station to scope out 
his target, Rich, who stood facing the other direction, unaware of the impending attack. 
Waiting until the on-site manager, Margaret, looked away, Baxter expertly flung his 
throwing arm upwards, lightly tossing one bullet into the air. It floated across the room in 
a smooth arc, curved downwards, and bounced squarely off the crown of Rich’s hair-netted 
head. Retreating a few steps back, Baxter ducked out of sight of Rich’s gaze as he scanned 
the room, rubbing his head with one eyebrow raised. The others near him looked around 
as well. Margaret marched over near Rich to see what the distraction was but gave up after 
the man shrugged and went back to work. Baxter emerged victorious from his hiding spot, 
chuckling as he approached Rich. “I knew it was you,” Rich exclaimed with a grin. Quickly 
patting him on the shoulder, Baxter backed away to return to his work station, lest he risk 
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the wrath of Margaret for lingering in the sandwich shop. Unbeknownst to him, however, 
Rich had secreted the dough ball in his hand. Sneaking a glance at Margaret, he blasted it 
back at Baxter who let out a surprised “Oof!” as it bounced with a muffled thud off his 
chest. With a laugh, he turned and lightly jogged back to the bakery, saving his second 
bread bullet for another battle. 
 Though food factory workers like Baxter attempted to avoid the attention of prison 
staff members, their antics did not go unnoticed. CO Byrne suggested that he maintained 
awareness of every prisoner work game. “Whenever I walk around a corner, they fuck 
around,” he told me. “I know that.” As long as they did not get too “rowdy,” however, he 
often chose not to intervene. Still, he sought to make sure that they knew he was alert: 
“Sometimes I stop and watch [instead of walking away] and they freak out. ‘Shit! Did he 
see me? Did he see me??’ It’s a big game we play here.” It was not uncommon to see him 
halt abruptly in his tracks and stare down a group of prisoners—“They’re staring right back 
at me,” he once commented before speeding away again down the hall. 
 While the CO maintained a watchful eye on coping games around the food factory, 
other staff members sought to facilitate prisoner play towards more productive ends. In the 
meat prep station, prisoners spent their entire work days standing in place, rolling slices of 
bologna or ham into plastic-wrapped bundles. Not surprisingly, the pace often slowed 
down, and participants regularly grumbled about the work. In an effort to keep the men on 
task, managers in this station sometimes induced “meat rolling races” between groups of 
prisoners. Slick, the de facto “inmate manager” of the station, was usually open to the idea 
of a race. One afternoon, the meat prep staff overseer, Barba, stood tall at the end of the 
long steel meat rolling table and attempted to goad Slick into a race with another prisoner: 
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a heavyset Latino man called Pun, who, like Slick, was known to be a particularly fast 
roller when he wanted to be. “Uh-oh,” Barba said to Slick, gesturing toward Pun, “Your 
competition is picking up speed.” Slick, continuing to roll, shot a sideways glance towards 
Pun’s progress. “He’s feeling the pressure,” another man chimed in. “Okay,” Slick 
conceded, “Let’s go, son!” With a half grin, Pun accepted: “Let’s do this shit.”  
Almost in sync, each man grabbed two slices of bologna from the tray of meat 
between them, slapped them down, spun them up in a section of plastic wrap, and tossed 
the finished product with extra force into the nearby bin, as if to signal with each thud: 
“Done! Done again!” To speed his wrapping, Slick grasped a plastic spork with which he 
could more efficiently rip off each sheet of plastic. When one of his plastic gloves began 
to slip off from the spread of meaty juices, he swiftly tore off a small square of cardboard 
from the plastic wrap box, put it in the band of his loose glove, and rolled it up around it 
(like a t-shirt sleeve around a pack of cigarettes) to tighten the wrist. The men did not speak 
while racing, but each could be seen casting furtive glances at the other’s technique. I and 
the other prisoners at the table joined in as well, trying to meet the pace of Slick and Pun, 
though most came up short. The game continued for close to 10 minutes as Barba looked 
on. The unexpected end-of-game buzzer came as CO Byrne shouted, “Count time!” to 
signal that it was time to cease work and line up to be counted. The two piles of rolled 
meats were too close to declare a sure winner. Making eye contact, the men quickly nodded 
to one another (a silent commendation of “Good game”) and shuffled toward the CO station 
to be accounted for.  
The racial politics of the prison barred these men—one white, one Latino—from 
engaging in many activities together, such as sharing food or bunk space (Goodman 2014). 
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Like the monotony and indignity to which they offered brief reprieve, however, prison 
work games spanned racial and ethnic boundaries. These restrictive norms, it would seem, 
did not prohibit Slick and Pun from participating in strategic play together. Though clearly 
orchestrated by management, the meat race in particular functioned to temporarily override 
boundaries between racial cliques, highlighting their shared status as incarcerated laborers.  
 
The strategic action of copings games was not exclusive to the food factory. In the 
prison call center, prisoners labored in a very different work environment, yet nevertheless 
still engaged in forms of coping games to persist amidst the challenges of the workplace 
and the prison. Much like the meat races described above, prisoners here turned their work 
duties into a form of competition in order to liven up what were often boring or 
demoralizing tasks: making repeated cold-call (that is, unsolicited) attempts to sell 
television advertising time while being surveilled by civilian staff members as well as 
correctional officers who occasionally entered the office.  
Each worker remained acutely aware of their current sales totals and those of others. 
Modeled after traditional call centers on the outside, workers’ successful sales were tallied, 
regarded as a measure of effort and skill. Two dry erase boards in opposite corners of the 
long room tracked each salesman’s weekly progress. On the windows of the “bubble”—
the Plexiglas-walled circular desk space in the middle of the office from which the on-site 
staff member maintained sight of the entire workforce—were scrawled the current totals 
in dollars of each month’s top seller. Whenever a new sale was made, Jake, the towering, 
tattooed man with a bellowing voice who operated as the informal “inmate manager” of 
the sales crew, would produce a dry erase marker to update the totals, often announcing 
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the update and shouting out words of encouragement to the room. In an effort to bolster 
morale and spur productivity, he was also known to issue challenges to prisoners or initiate 
sales contests between them. The owner of the call center firm, Dennis, encouraged this 
and aimed to facilitate it by dividing the crew up into four permanent teams who selected 
their own team names and competed for bragging rights.  
Individualized forms of competition were also quite effective at maintaining 
productivity. When a young man called Marshall managed to get his name on the list of 
the top four salesmen one month, he boastfully called out “Oh yeah, that is how I do!” Jake, 
who noticed Marshall’s display while updating the numbers on the front glass panel of the 
bubble, slyly replied: “Hey, Marshall, you gonna stay at the bottom of this glass all day?” 
“What!?” Marshall shouted back, eyebrows high. “I mean, it’s great that you’re on 
the glass, but you’re stuck on the bottom of this list,” Jake replied. Prodding him further, 
he added, “Nobody wants to be a bottom guy.” The obvious sexual implication of Jake’s 
comment appeared to energize Marshall who stood up and said, “Yo, is that a challenge?”  
“I’m thinking it might be.” 
“Ohhh, okay. Let’s do this then. Let’s get it!” Marshall adjusted his headset, 
cracked his knuckles, and returned to his seat, leaning forward toward his computer screen. 
This performance and his intent look signaled that he was “getting down to business” once 
more. Jake laughed quietly and continued updating the sales numbers. 
In addition to prodding along others to improve performance, Jake himself was not 
opposed to competing. Noticing that his pal Taxi had been having a slow sales day one 
afternoon, for instance, Jake challenged him to a race. “Yo, Taxi,” he called across the 
floor, “You and me—sell-off!” Half-turning in his chair, Taxi asked: “What? Now?”  
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“Yup. I’m going for the title of ‘best salesman ever…between me and you!’” As 
Taxi chuckled, Jake continued, “Hey, how ‘bout first one to make a sale, the other one does 
a ‘pretty princess’?” This particular wager was a common one throughout SSP. To “do a 
pretty princess” meant to stand on one leg, put a pointed finger atop one’s head like a ballet 
dancer, and spin around while shouting the words “I’m a pretty princess! I’m a pretty 
princess!” A similar performance with which prisoners often challenged one another was 
to “do a dead dog.” This entailed dropping instantly onto one’s back, raising the hands and 
feet up to resemble paws, and rolling back and forth while howling like a dog. Both 
involved the voluntary mortification of the loser of the bet, with the “pretty princess” in 
particular (much like Jake’s insinuation to Marshall that he was “a bottom guy”) drawing 
on prisoner norms of masculinity (see Jewkes 2005).  
Sealing the bet with a nod, the men turned back to their computer terminals and got 
to work. They each made repeated calls for some time. After nearly two hours, Taxi’s arms 
shot into the air, victorious. Knowing immediately that he had lost, Jake leaned 
dramatically back in his seat and exhaled. “Ahhh, no!” With a shake of his head, he stood 
up and held out his arms to signal that he was preparing to make an announcement: “Hey, 
everyone. I’m a pretty princess.” As he spun around, he raised his voice and added: “I’m a 
pretty princess! Taxi is the best salesman ever!” Men at nearby cubicles stopped to watch 
and chuckled. Grinning, Jake took his seat and pointed to his opponent, saying, “Nice job, 
Taxi. You earned it!”  
Another way that incarcerated call center workers coped with their work—which, 
in addition to being tedious, could be demoralizing when one hit a “slow streak” or was 
forced to interact with hostile customers at the other end of the line—was through a form 
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of cathartic joking. After completing a call with a particularly challenging individual or 
being hung up on, the men would often pretend that the call was ongoing, spouting quiet 
insults into the dead phone line. When one man was hung up on, he pretended to close a 
fictional sale, modifying the wording of the closing script: “So, just to confirm, sir, you 
wear girdles and dresses and high heeled shoes? Okay, sir.” Struggling through the end of 
a call with a “rude woman,” another man maintained decorum before shifting dramatically 
once she had hung up the phone: “Ok, ma’am, well thank you for your time and enjoy the 
rest of your day. Okay. Go shit yourself, bitch.” The game of this involved maintaining a 
professional tone even through the harshest of insults, such that staff members would be 
unlikely to note the quip, but nearby coworkers might overhear and collude in the 
frustration and release. On rarer occasions, prisoners would voluntarily re-engage with 
especially abrasive customers, or set them up to receive future calls. Rather than marking 
them as “not interested, do not call back” in the computer system, some would instead 
indicate them as “very interested, pursue,” leaving their files open for others to call. 
Fulfilling these small acts of revenge operated as an inside joke amongst prisoners. 
Smoking cigarettes during designated breaks—as a form of “weak culture” (Schultz and 
Breiger 2010)—seemed to especially elicit venting about these irritations. At these times, 
the men shared horror stories and laughed over customer insults as a means to persist in 
the face of long hours, heavy surveillance, and stress of sales work in the prison context. 
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Resistance Games 
 
Work-related social identity may be precarious and regularly tested or rejected (Leidner 
2016). Beyond merely tolerating workplace and prison challenges, workers often 
responded to such rejections by engaging in collective struggles to actively push back 
against indignity. Resistance games (Burawoy 1979)—or “individual grievances 
transformed into collective action” (Sallaz 2015: 4)—are one means of accomplishing this. 
“Resistance occurs across a wide range of workplaces, but it can be expected to be most 
common in workplaces where anomic conditions prevail,” as well as “in situations 
characterized by overwork and exploitation” (Hodson 2001: 60). Workplace resistance 
games (or “war games” [Roy 1959]) blossomed in the least desirable work sites at SSP for 
this reason. Within the varied prison employment system, the food factory most exhibited 
these characteristics and, as such, workers here frequently participated in collective 
violation of institutional regulations, rendering transgressions into assertions of autonomy 
amidst arbitrary authority (this may also be conceptualized as “friction” [Rubin 2015]). 
A snacking game was a central component of worker resistance in the food factory. 
In the contemporary prison, prisoners increasingly express autonomy and power through 
food activities and practices, or “foodways” (Smoyer 2016b; Ugelvik 2011). Secreting, 
hoarding, or preparing food against institutional regulations are common to such struggles 
(Earle and Phillips 2012; Smoyer 2016a; Smoyer and Lopes 2017). Though prisoner 
resistance strategies took many forms, the snacking game assigned food practices a central 
role in conflicts at SSP. In the food factory, workers were forbidden from partaking in the 
food they prepared, a policy which many regarded as a denial of “perks.” Risking expulsion 
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or demotion, participants pocketed bites of cookies, bread, bologna, and other snacks while 
on the job, frequently in close proximity to prison staff. Prisoner conspirators monitored 
the comings and goings of staffers in order to secrete fistfuls of food or hide away items 
for later. Men from different stations made “hand-offs” to one another—e.g., passing slices 
of lunch meat in exchange for a baggie of peanut butter. A smiling worker with cheeks full 
of food was a common sight. The challenge of the game—highlighting an underlying 
current of resistance—was to direct these smiles at staff. 
Given the shortage of nutritious or satisfying food options, fruits and vegetables 
quickly became targets whenever they appeared in the warehouse. The events of what came 
to be known as the “blueberry incident” revealed how readily prisoners sought out these 
foods (and flaunted it to staff), as well as how determined staff members were to protect 
these less common, more expensive goods. While the warehouse crew stacked boxes of 
dry foods onto towering metal shelves, a man from the freezer section approached to spread 
the word that the food factory manager, Dolores, was “already asking who ate the 
blueberries.” Apparently, an order of frozen blueberries had arrived for use in a cake and 
someone had promptly dipped into the box and devoured several handfuls. Dolores rushed 
up and down the halls, asking nearby prisoners if they had any information. One man 
bluntly replied, “I got 12 years in the system and I never once saw a blueberry.” With a 
confused expression, Baxter asked, “What the fuck is a blue berry?” It was not clear 
whether or not he was serious.  
Leaning on a box of dried beans, Travis shouted down the hallway to Dolores: “Just 
look for whoever has blue hands! Hahaha, blue fucking teeth! That shit stains.” Dolores 
furrowed her brow and disappeared into the meat prep station to conduct more inquiries. 
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Then, pointing to a few blueberries scattered down the hallway, Travis called out, “Hey! 
Just follow the trail!” Three or four loose berries were spread along the walkway leading 
up to the freezer section where they had been held. As we followed the berry trail down 
the hallway with our eyes, Dean appeared with a push broom, rapidly sweeping them up. 
As he passed, he flashed a quick smile, revealing a row of blue-stained teeth. Closing his 
lips in a tight grin, he continued pushing his broom down the hall, taking a sharp turn into 
the sandwich shop, in the opposite direction of Dolores. 
Prisoners of all tenures engaged in these food-centered resistance games. The rules 
of the game were passed down from veterans. For instance, one morning, while his 
coworkers filed out to lunch, one newcomer remained behind to ask permission to take an 
extra bag of chips with his meal. “You’re not supposed to ask me that!” the staff member 
shouted. Overseers often remained complicit when prisoners snuck bites of common items 
like chips or cookies, so long as they retained plausible deniability and workers remained 
relatively productive. By asking directly for permission to violate the formal rules, 
however, the novice risked revealing this system. Another prisoner intervened. “You’re 
supposed to sneak it,” he told the new worker. “Like this!” He mimed folding up his orange 
apron as if concealing a snack underneath. “Oh,” came the timid reply, “I just didn’t want 
to break the rules. I don’t want a [disciplinary] ticket.” Leading the man out to lunch, the 
veteran instructed him with a paternal tone: “Next time just take it.”  
The food factory staff members and on-site CO occasionally shared frustrations 
with one another regarding workers’ eating habits; yet, the formal rules prohibiting 
snacking on the job were only selectively enforced. When one staff member spotted a 
prisoner stuffing a small stack of cookies into his pockets, she uttered with a shrug, “That’s 
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okay, it isn’t my station you’re stealing from, so.” Prisoners were aware of this selective 
enforcement. According to one man, “They gotta expect we’re gonna eat. I don’t make 
enough to buy food from this job.” To be sure, “Sometimes managers expect workers to 
ignore official rules, despite public pronouncements to the contrary” (Lopez 2007: 226). 
Nevertheless, such violations still represented a form of resistance in that they expressed 
dissatisfaction with formal regulations and asserted worker agency amidst strict control.  
Although they voiced annoyance at prisoner behaviors, staffers recounted that they 
allowed a small degree of snacking expressly to preclude harsher acts of resistance that 
might more substantially interfere with production. If a staff member did decide to 
reprimand a prisoner for snacking, the culprit and his compatriots often responded by 
engaging in soldiering or goldbricking—that is, collective foot-dragging to slow down 
production—or outright sabotaging the labor process. When a newly hired manager started 
tenaciously checking prisoners for extra food before lunch one morning, the entire 
workforce grew upset. Gloves and other necessary tools and materials began to turn up 
missing that afternoon, slowing down work considerably. According to a long-time staff 
member, “These guys—they’re used to certain things. … When you take that away, they’re 
gonna kick your ass. They’re pissed and they’re gonna rob us blind. They’re going to 
sabotage us. Throw things away.” To avoid this, he often “looked the other way” when he 
spotted workers sampling foods. 
 
A variation on the snacking game was also observed at the prison auto garage. 
Though this was a skilled labor position, as a mid-tier work program at SSP it shared some 
features with low-tier sites like the food factory. These included a level of pay below that 
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of top-tier jobs as well as constant surveillance and scrutiny from a permanently on-site 
correctional officer. Because of the garage’s proximity to the food factory, incarcerated 
workers there often attempted to secure contraband food from contacts next door. The 
officer stationed within the shop, CO Peña, remained vigilant to workers’ snacking 
attempts; though, like his counterparts in the food factory, he was selective in his 
enforcement. He allowed auto workers to consume cookies from next door, so long as they 
were provided directly from a staff member. Unsatisfied workers, however, often 
attempted to sneak over to the food factory to score larger supplies of different foods from 
friends at the other site.  
One day during a smoke break, a man in orange shouted over from a gated area 
outside the food factory: “Hey, Larry, here it is!” With a wave, he hurled a plastic trash 
bag over the 10-foot, razor-wired fence. It landed with a thud in the back of a dump truck 
parked nearby. Larry, employed as an unskilled car washer at the garage, waved back but 
left the prize secured in the rear of the truck until he could retrieve it when the correctional 
officer was away. An hour later, when CO Peña left to perform his regular checks of the 
surrounding grounds, Larry hurried out to secure his prize, only to find that the dump truck 
was gone! “Where the fuck is the dump truck!?” he cried. After he complained to his 
coworkers about it, we heard the familiar rumble of the vehicle returning. A prison grounds 
crew worker parked it back near the food factory and Larry and a coworker jogged away 
towards it. The other working prisoners chuckled at their hustle across the dirt road. The 
tone changed, however, when CO Peña returned and marched in the direction of the guys. 
“Oh shit, it’s Peña. He sees ‘em! He caught ‘em,” whispered one worker, turning so as not 
to make eye contact with the officer. 
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 Later, the CO would ask me: “Hey, they didn’t ask you to go get food for them, 
did they?” I shook my head no and he continued. “Been having some trouble with the food 
factory food. They’ve been spoiled getting cookies and stuff from over there.” Not one to 
take a scolding lightly, Larry soon emerged to dispute Peña’s ruling on the confiscated bag 
of food: 
 
LARRY:  So, what, like, are we just not allowed to get any food 
anymore or what? 
PEÑA:  Look, if you’re going to ask again about that, don’t 
waste your breath. It has to stop. 
LARRY:  It’s not stealing food. It’s extra! It’s stuff that’s 
getting thrown away! 
PEÑA:  It don’t matter. You get food from the white shirts 
[civilian staff members], that’s okay. Otherwise, no 
more. That’s it. Okay, that’s all! 
 
Larry walked away with a slump and CO Peña shook his head. “One of the perks of my 
job. Sheesh,” he sighed. “There’s rules to be followed. That’s my job—to enforce them. If 
I don’t, then why even come to work, you know?” In the coming weeks, Larry would be 
fired from his position after once again being caught collaborating to smuggle food into 
the garage. 
As prisoners collectively participated in snacking resistance games, looking out for 
and trading food with one another, they generated discourses regarding work and prison 
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conditions surrounding these practices. According to worker narratives—which often 
emerged unprompted by the researcher, typically in response to successful smuggling or 
consumption—snacking represented resistance to the withholding of perks, bound to more 
general complaints of despotism and disrespect. “I don’t look at it as stealing,” one man 
said, “I look at it as making the pay right.” Declarations that “they should pay us more and 
treat us better” were germane to the game yet revealed deeper resentments on the part of 
working prisoners. “We’re human beings too. We need to be treated like we’re supposed 
to be treated.” Or, as another man said:  
 
You can make more money just sitting at home [in your bunk] 
playing cards … but for those of us who are out here trying to 
improve our lives—out here working—we get treated like shit. It 
ain’t right. It’s supposed to be corrections! They’re supposed to be 
teaching us ways to improve ourselves for the outside!  
 
Motivated by these concerns, resistance games responded to and fostered collective 
attitudes of defiance against management and officers whom prisoners deemed unjust or 
domineering. Through practices like the snacking game, they resisted indignity in 
oppressive work environments. 
Work conditions, the dynamics of the labor process, and worker and managerial 
practices intertwine to shape patterns of resistance, transforming grievances into collective 
action (Mulholland 2004). Alongside fiscal hardships (e.g., inadequate pay), prisoners’ 
collective identities were regularly challenged (culminating in feeling “treated like shit”). 
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In the absence of skill training, equitable pay, interesting and engaging work tasks, or 
regular breaks, workers in low-status positions faced compounded difficulties. Indeed, the 
majority of overt rule violations or outright challenges to authority that I observed during 
my time at SSP took place within the less-desirable work sites. They also tended to be 
related to food. The food factory was the site of daily disturbances and challenges to staff. 
The auto garage housed fewer incidents overall but was nevertheless plagued with food-
related violations. Though men in top-tier work sites faced numerous challenges behind 
bars, their work environments differed greatly. For the most part, higher-status workers’ 
desired to overtly resist managerial authority appeared supplanted with other agendas. 
 
 
Professionalism Game 
 
The top spots in the hierarchical prison employment system at SSP were occupied by the 
prison sign shop and call center—higher paying, skilled work sites in which working 
prisoners experienced greater degrees of autonomy and input into the labor process, 
relatively speaking (see Chapter 1 for more detailed descriptions of each). Despite the 
perks, workers in these sought-after sites nevertheless faced indignities of prison, including 
regular surveillance, denial of personal space, drudging time, and reduced capacity for self-
expression (Goffman 1961; Guilbaud 2010; Sykes 1958). Yet, unlike their counterparts 
working low- or mid-tier prison jobs, who primarily pursued strategies to tolerate or defy 
indignity, these men sought to inject dignity into their work. That is, they sought to 
“transform jobs with insufficient meaning into jobs that are more worthy of their personal 
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stature, time and effort” (Hodson 2001: 45). To help retain skilled penal laborers, overseers 
encouraged and facilitated their pursuits of dignity. The self-image of ‘dedicated worker’ 
was wedded to such activities, to the benefit of productivity levels on the shop floor. 
Toward these ends, workers in the sign shop and call center engaged in what I call a 
professionalism game. Through strategic rhetoric and practice, they sought to reframe their 
work program as a “business” or “company” in which they held stake.  
Appeals to the normative value of professionalism are common in the world of 
work. Indeed, a traditional line of questioning in the study of work and occupations asks: 
“What are the circumstances in which the people in an occupation attempt to turn … 
themselves into professional people” and “What are the steps by which they attempt to 
bring about identification with their valued model?” (Hughes [1951] 1994: 59). Feelings 
of professional competency and value are often privileged (Sharone 2004) and may be 
drawn on by employers to control the workforce and engender effort (Sallaz 2015). Loyalty 
may be secured by fostering identity with the worksite or company (Kunda 1992). Workers 
in turn may seek recognition as professionals (Sallaz 2010), asserting distinction between 
themselves and others (often those in lower status positions or non-workers) along the lines 
of competency, morality, and authority (Sherman 2005). Classification as professional 
bears more status than that of mere worker and professionalism may come to be viewed as 
a superior value or virtue (Barley and Kunda 2006). The label has rhetorical or moral power 
that laborers and managers alike may draw on. Indeed, workers often seek professional 
status (e.g., correctional officers claiming specialized authority in the 19th-Century [Rubin 
2018] or hotel workers today leveraging to be regarded as “service professionals” [Sallaz 
2010; Sherman 2005]) and many firms or fields contribute to these processes, even in 
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instances when formal professionalization is not applicable (see Abbott [1988] 2014). 
Hence, even “mock professionalization” holds value.  
Incarcerated workers do not operate within the true professions in that they do not 
possess formal status, certification, nor control over the knowledge base of their trades 
(Thompson 2011). Indeed, in the sign shop, much of the workers’ trade knowledge was 
outdated in the field. Nevertheless, the ideal of professional status retained value in the 
world of prison work, speaking to participants’ quests for legitimacy and tied to perceived 
future work prospects. By self-identifying/framing as professional, prisoners secured self-
worth in the present and sought to establish a trajectory for the future. This identity was 
tied to skill acquisition and a particular outlook which valued work ethic and discipline. 
The importance of skill building was often stressed, as when one call center worker attested 
that his job allowed him to “hone a skill that felons can use for work,” so that “when I get 
out, I’ve got something set up for me.” That workers in these positions received higher 
wages was alleged to reflect the very value of their skills, demonstrating that they could 
rely on their capabilities for sustenance (Barley and Kunda 2006). 
Prisoners engaging in the professionalism game regarded themselves as 
professionals in their respective fields—pro craftsmen in the sign shop and pro salesmen 
in the call center. According to Jon, a sign shop worker, the interests of the “business” must 
take precedent over individual agendas or issues: 
 
People forget—this ain’t no [typical prison] job. This is a business. 
If you don’t like somebody, you gotta set aside your differences. 
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You gotta do that for the company. When you get back on the yard, 
you don’t gotta say hello. But for this business, you gotta set it aside.  
 
Javi expressed similar sentiments when describing the call center: “It feels like a real job. 
A professional atmosphere. … You’re representing your company.” Referring to fellow 
prisoner salesmen as well as the management, another incarcerated salesman stressed, “We 
are a team!” Reframed as professionals, men in these work sites regarded the quality of 
their products or services as central to the “company’s success.” They, in turn, behaved as 
beneficiaries of efficiency and profit. In addition to the reward of the often-muted praise 
of managers (usually a quick grunt and a mumbled “That’s good.”), these men sought to 
affirm self-worth and identity through embodying the role of disciplined, dedicated worker 
(Lamont 2002). 
A focal component of the professionalism game at SSP was the espousing of strong 
“work ethics” for the good of the company. Jon, for instance, asserted that, despite 
challenges, while at work “I keep a smile on my face. Maintainin’ and no complainin’!” 
Assertions of dedication to quality production were constant. Practically, the game 
involved training new hires in the proper procedures and expectations of the job, followed 
by normative self-policing of quality. It was common for participants—especially long-
time workers in these sites—to correct others or give “tips” for improving their work in 
authoritative tones.  
Engaging in the professionalism game allowed prisoners a temporary reprieve from 
prison. “We know we’re locked up, but it feels like a business,” said Luther of the sign 
shop. “You feel like you’re at a company, in society. Until you hear that [officer’s] radio! 
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But it’s peaceful—not like on the yard, in those [housing] bays.” In a figurative sense, men 
playing the professionalism game managed to escape the feelings of confinement and 
indignities of institutional realities. In addition, it made the prison work experience more 
bearable, especially in contrast to the “hectic” nature of the prison yard amongst the 
nonworking prisoners or those from unskilled positions, according to participants.  
Many expressed appreciation and even admiration for their jobs: “I never imagined 
when I got sentenced the opportunity that would have been bestowed on me,” one man 
attested. Such dedication to the work site played a role in prisoner boundary work and 
distinction processes as well. By asserting the identity of professional, these prisoners 
sought to distinguish themselves from those in other sites as well as from non-working 
prisoners. Doing so also helped justify the higher pay and other perks that they received. 
According to Franklin, “We’re professional men. We appreciate our job. Not like these 
‘street thugs.’” Non-working or “undisciplined” prisoners were also referred to as “cell 
warriors,” “neck runners,” “goofballs,” and “youngsters” (regardless of biological age or 
institutional tenure). “Most motherfuckers don’t wanna work,” said one man. “They just 
want to sit on the yard all day. Fucking bums.” Older or more educated prisoners sometimes 
expressed that these others “must like prison, or think it’s a joke.”  
The professionalism game was facilitated and in fact encouraged by sign shop and 
call center management, as well as via the structure of these work sites. In the call center, 
for instance, regular training sessions helped foster images of professionalism. Each month, 
a civilian salesman named Maguire entered the prison to instruct prisoners in the techniques 
and rhetoric of the field. In wingtip shoes and a power tie, he evoked the quintessential 
image of a professional salesman from film or television. As he spouted sales tips and 
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lingo, prisoners took feverish notes. “‘Going for the no,’ as a selling strategy,” Maguire 
instructed one day, “is if I do everything I can and do everything right and they don’t say 
‘no’ outright, then I may actually have a sale! Now, the ‘law of large numbers’ says there’s 
going to be a lot of calls, a lot of sells, a lot of hang-ups—to the point that the phone starts 
to weigh 300 pounds.” After miming holding a great weight in his right hand, he went on: 
“But if you need to call 100 people to get one sale, how many people do you have to call 
to get—”  
“100 more,” Jake blurted, cutting him off. “That’s right,” Maguire continued. “100 
more calls to get the next one. But, following the ‘fertile market,’ you keep making those 
calls. You keep going!” Prisoners were energized by these sessions. When I asked the 
young salesman Marshall his thoughts on training one afternoon, he exclaimed, “It was bad 
ass! You can tell he’s good—he’s made a good business out of it.” The sales jargon 
acquired in these meetings—e.g., “going for the no,” the “law of large numbers,” the 
“fertile market”—would be noted and later recited by salesmen matter-of-factly when 
discussing work with one another or coaching new hires in the tricks of the trade. A stack 
of sales manuals in the office further reinforced this knowledge which was important to the 
professional image that each sought to craft. 
Staff managers also reinforced the idea of the prison call center as “business” or 
“company,” generating enthusiasm among workers. Dennis, the civilian businessman who 
introduced the call center to the prison and oversaw the work site, did just this in a 
“company meeting” one morning. Standing in the center of the office, he chastised certain 
unnamed prisoners for their technique in pursuing payment from customers: 
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We need more consistency with how the collectors are going about 
it. This isn’t the wild, wild west. If we got someone who’s coming 
in too aggressive, that person needs to be gone. Because that’s not 
consistent with our company, with the company that we’re trying to 
build here. 
 
His allusion to firing uncooperative prisoners was linked to advancing the image of the 
prison work site as a business with incarcerated workers as integral staff involved in 
building “our company.” Prisoners adopted this language, referring to “where we’re headed 
as a company” when discussing concerns or strategies. One civilian staff member, a young 
man named Eduardo, stated that this type of rhetoric was useful for managing the prisoners 
under his supervision. While seated at his computer in the “bubble” one day, he explained, 
“If you treat ‘em good, they’ll work for you. If you don’t make ‘em feel like they’re in 
prison, they’ll work hard. They come to work to be treated different.” 
Prisoners enforced the professional demeanor when teaching new hires the ins and 
outs of the job. Jake, the de facto “inmate manager” of the sales center, tasked with 
motivating his fellow working prisoners and supervising sales calls, was also involved in 
introducing new arrivals to the sales process through one-on-one training. Flipping through 
the pages of the training manual during one such session, he outlined the need for 
professional behavior: 
 
The new phones, if they got the volume down right, they won’t pick 
up any background noise. But still, no cursing or dirty jokes in the 
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office. Out here [in the yard] is one thing, but in there [at work], act 
like we’re in the real world. Cause we are, far as I’m concerned. It’s 
a business, okay.  
 
Sometime later, while training another new recruit, Jake asserted: “When we’re in here—
[despite] wearing orange—working in a telemarketing place, we’re telemarketers in our 
mind.” 
The professionalism game helped ensure that conflicts or competition remained 
directed at other prisoners, rather than at managerial or administrative staff—a central 
feature of work games (Burawoy 1979). At each site, one or multiple informal “inmate 
managers” was assigned, imposing a hierarchical structure resembling firms in the outside 
world and helping to further distance the image of the work program from its prison setting 
while providing a buffer between management and incarcerated laborers. When prisoners 
clearly demonstrated the outlooks privileged by the professionalism game—such as work 
ethic, self-discipline, and dedication to the quality of the work—they were openly lauded 
by their coworkers. For instance, during a particularly slow day in the sign shop with no 
new orders, Lemmy opted used his spare time to practice his screen-printing skills. Eli, a 
veteran of the shop, walked over. “This sort of stuff [working during down time], the boss 
likes seeing this,” he said. “He’ll remember this when an important job comes through, 
y’know’mean.”  
Though they offered praise to others who demonstrated professionalism, working 
prisoners were also quick to self-police and criticize those who failed to conform. This 
norm was transferred to new hires early on. When Jon smilingly chided Jimmy for not 
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properly cleaning off his screen-printing materials, Rogers, a recent sign shop hire still in 
training, chuckled and added, “Yeah, c’mon, Jimmy!” Jon encouraged him: “My man, 
Rogers.” 
Newer workers who were perceived as failing to participate in the game often faced 
disdain from their coworkers. Working in the sign shop one day I observed as several men 
discussed concerns about an uncooperative coworker. As we prepared the screen-printing 
setup for a new run of street signs, Willie came around to collect waste from a nearby 
hazardous materials bin and, noticing a rag that was supposed to be in a different bin, shook 
his head and said, “It was probably Alec.” Alec had recently joined the sign shop crew but 
was failing to demonstrate strong work ethic and professionalism to his coworkers. Briskly 
stirring fresh red ink with a paint stirrer, Lemmy replied: 
 
LEMMY:  It probably was. He’s lazy, man. Lazy and 
stubborn—he wants to do it his own way. I saw that 
from day two. 
JON:  He’s gonna fuck around and get himself asked to not 
come back. 
LEMMY:  He’s never run a real order too—no 10-sign order. 
He’ll have to conform if he’s going to be able to do 
that. 
JON:  He have to conform. 
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Much of the derision that Alec faced revolved around the fact that he often spent time 
drawing while at work, making use of the shop’s resources. Although most prisoners 
occupied themselves with games or other distractions during slow days, Alec had a 
tendency to seek out any spare moment to do so. His focus on his artwork seemed to 
generate greater contempt than others faced. Several weeks later, he was indeed fired from 
the sign shop. When he later secured a position in another popular work program, his 
former coworkers were surprised but unsupportive. Sammy told me assuredly, “He won’t 
cut it.” Lemmy added, “He doesn’t want to work! He has absolutely no ambition. It’s why 
he didn’t last here.” 
When men like Alec were fired from top-tier prison work sites, their supposed lack 
of “discipline” or “dedication” was often mobilized as motivation for other workers. In a 
different instance, after another uncooperative man had been fired, Eli educated the man’s 
newly-hired replacement about why his predecessor had been let go:  
 
He would rather talk—he wanted to walk around, talk about women, 
talk about football. ‘Okay,’ I told him, ‘when you come in here off 
that bus, you put your hard hat on, holding your lunch pail.’ You 
see, he needs to come in a work mentality. … Good work habits lead 
to professionalism. I don’t care if you breaking rocks or cleaning 
shitters, developing positive work habits has—hm, how you say 
it?—it has dividends. It’ll pay off for you once you’re out there 
looking for work.  
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The call center was also home to such rhetoric. Turnover there was much higher—
several men were let go each month for not reaching quotas, while others often quit after 
deciding that the high pay was not worth the stress of sales. Quitters were often met with a 
shake of the head and a disappointed look. After several salesmen quit in one week, Jake 
attested that “they weren’t really in it for the right reasons,” i.e., for the good of the 
company. Eduardo, the civilian staffer, estimated that about half of the current workers 
demonstrated the characteristics of professionalism, while the other half worked too slowly 
or failed to demonstrate dedication: 
 
Half of them are here just for the money. [The other] half of them 
are here to make their time better and learn to do this work. Those 
people are going hard. But pretty soon [the boss] is gonna start 
letting people go. 
 
For many, succeeding at the professionalism game also represented an investment 
in the future. When release dates neared, prisoners expressed plans to pursue careers in 
their adopted prison professions. Jake shared his strategy to maintain his current standing 
in the institution while preparing for the future: 
 
JAKE:  I’m just trying to make myself invaluable. I want 
it to be more of a problem to let me go than to 
keep me on, you know? 
RESEARCHER:  It seems like you’ve already achieved that. 
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JAKE:  And I’m gonna keep it that way. I’m in this for 
the long-term goals. … This is an opportunity 
that I don’t really see anywhere else. They won’t 
really give me a chance anywhere else as a felon, 
but in sales they don’t care about that. 
 
The outcomes of the professionalism game were perceived to benefit the 
incarcerated as well as prison staff. Prisoners attained a degree of status otherwise out of 
reach behind bars. According to Franklin, sign shop work was more “humanized” than 
other jobs. More than pay, he expressed that the best thing about the job was the sense of 
“worth”—“It makes you feel like a regular person.” Indeed, because prisoners are denied 
formal protections such as wage minimums (Thompson 2011), economic measurements of 
success may be difficult to attain. Instead, participants in the professionalism game 
established self-worth through forging identities as disciplined, dedicated workers (much 
like the working-class men studied by Lamont [2002]). And, as these prisoners-as-
employees came to extract personal value by approaching the worksite as a business in 
which they held emotional (if not material) stake, site managers benefited from improved 
productivity and efficiency.  
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Discussion: Games, Dignity, & Consent 
 
In Chapter 1, I unpacked the different characteristics that participants at Sunbelt State 
Penitentiary valued in work sites, outlining an informal, tiered prisoner ranking system 
comprised of “good,” “fine,” and “bad” prison jobs. Building on that, this chapter has 
explored how some of these desired or undesired workplace features facilitated different 
forms of strategic workplace action, or work games. Participants sought to tolerate or defy 
indignity, or to actively inject dignity into their work and prison lives by drawing on 
various collective practices shaped in part by the allowances or limitations of each site. 
Work is central to assessments and assertions of self-worth (Hodson 2001; Lamont 2002) 
and work games were an integral feature of working prisoners’ pursuit of dignity.  
All prisoners, regardless of work status or position, are subject to the mortification 
processes of prison life (Goffman 1961) and some degree of indignity at the workplace 
(Hodson 2001). Each SSP prisoner was stripped of resources and autonomy with limited 
opportunities for identity expression. All, too, were exposed to surveillance and 
authoritative control, albeit at different rates of frequency. Even the highest paid prisoner 
made only a fraction of federal minimum wage and none received basic worker protections 
like workers’ compensation. As such, all prison work crews developed some form of 
coping game aimed at tolerating the negative features of penal labor and extracting some 
enjoyment, however brief, from the work day. Often, these entailed turning the labor 
process itself into some sort of competition, such as food factory “meat races” or call center 
sales competitions.  
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In addition to the general rigors of the prison experience, many participants were 
employed in “bad prison jobs” like the food factory, in which many of the above challenges 
were exacerbated by strict control over the labor processes, overbearing surveillance and 
scrutiny, arbitrary expressions of managerial authority, heavily restricted movement, 
deskilling, lower pay, and other undesirable features. The lack of autonomy and input that 
these workers experienced reflects despotic forms of labor control of the early 20th-
Century (Burawoy 1985). Coupled with other prison-specific features that amplify many 
despotic features—and housed within this institution in which many of the political 
advances of labor have not taken hold—these workplaces may be framed as sites of a 
particular form of despotic regime: “carceral labor despotism.”  
 
Table 4. Prison Work Games 
 Work Sites Where 
Played 
Labor Process 
Context 
Objective of  
Game 
Approach to 
Indignity 
Coping Game All sites Varied 
Seek distraction from 
rigors of prison and 
work life 
Tolerate indignity 
Resistance Game Low-tier, mid-tier 
Carceral labor 
despotism 
Push back against 
arbitrary authority and 
surveillance 
Defy indignity 
Professionalism 
Game 
Mid-tier, upper-
tier 
Carceral labor 
hegemony 
Reframe work program 
as "business," prisoner 
as professional 
Reinject dignity 
 
Responding to and limited by the structure and management of these sites, these 
men engaged in resistance games. Players of these games defied indignity by actively and 
strategically flouting workplace regulations that they deemed unjust. Resistance games 
could also be observed in some mid-tier prison work sites, as was the case in the auto 
garage, which shared certain characteristics with the food factory, including the constant 
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presence of a correctional officer and the ensuing heavy surveillance and frequent 
expressions of institutional authority. In defiance of regulations deemed unreasonable, the 
men of both sites turned sneaking snacks into an act of resistance and expression of 
autonomy—drawing on “prison foodways” to assert agency (Smoyer 2016b). 
At the other end of the prison work hierarchy, desirable work programs—or, “good 
prison jobs”—offered relatively greater autonomy and freedom of movement, input into 
the labor process, and skilled, engaging work tasks. The call center and sign shop, the most 
highly regarded positions in the institution, were each managed by civilian staff members 
and, although the possibility of a random sweep was always possible, neither had a 
correctional officer regularly stationed inside the workplace. These factors made for work 
environments that participants described as typically more “relaxed” and “like a real job,” 
in which they could escape prison “in their mind.” In terms of labor process, these sites 
could be said to resemble more “hegemonic” regimes in action (Burawoy 1985). Although 
these incarcerated workers lacked the formalized bargaining protections that defined the 
hegemonic regimes of monopoly capitalism, nor did they benefit from any greater 
protections than their counterparts in more despotically-managed sites, they were 
nevertheless allowed greater degrees of autonomy and input by their civilian overseers. 
That is, shop-floor compromises remained prevalent. As above, however, many workplace 
features were indeed prison-specific, reflecting a special form of “carceral labor 
hegemony.”  
Rather than merely tolerate or defy indignity, the men here were free to attempt to 
reinject some dignity into their daily lives through the playing of a professionalism game. 
Participants sought to reframe their workplaces as a “company” or “business” and 
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themselves as professional employees. They self-policed one another’s “work ethics” and 
sought to distinguish themselves from non-working prisoners or those in unskilled or 
undesirable positions, whom they deemed less dedicated or professional.  
These games represent expressions of worker agency in the face of indignity, 
molded by the limitations and allowances of each respective site. As with games in free 
world workplaces, however, prisoner work games did not only reward the workers. Prison 
administrators and work site management dictated the overarching policies with which 
prisoners had little choice but to comply, in effect establishing the rules of the games. By 
selectively enforcing these policies and encouraging particular forms of game play, 
institutional actors drew on prison work games to further the productive or service goals 
of each site and manage the working prisoner population. Although prisons may compel 
the incarcerated to work as a facet of punishment (following the 13th Amendment), these 
practices helped ensure that prisoners continued to work hard.  
Through coping games, workers discerned ways to make work more engaging, 
tolerating the undignified nature of disagreeable tasks or despotic oversight; yet, many of 
these games rewarded efficient production or service. Meat races and sales competitions, 
for instance, encouraged prisoners to increase productivity in the food factory and call 
center, respectively. Benefiting from this, work site overseers facilitated such games. 
Similarly, prisoner resistance games allowed participants to actively defy institutional 
regulations. Through the snacking game, prisoners helped one another smuggle and secrete 
small stashes of food—often flaunting it to staff members—despite formal rules restricting 
consumption. Managers often turned the other way in the face of this game, however, 
allowing prisoners this particular outlet (while maintaining the authority to impose 
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restrictions as desired) in place of more obstructive forms of resistance like sabotage. 
Finally, through the professionalism game, prisoners reframed the prison work site as a 
“business” and themselves as “professional workers” within it. Benefiting from increased 
efficiency and quality resulting from this game, management encouraged it by themselves 
referring to the workplace and workers in the same terms, reinforcing these outlooks 
through regular training sessions.  
In various work sites, management appointed informal “inmate managers” to help 
handle work crews. It is notable that the two examples of this discussed above—Slick, who 
managed the meat prep crews in the food factory, and Jake, who oversaw the sales crew in 
the call center—were heavily involved in the work games of these programs. Though they 
held no formal authority, these de facto managers also functioned to buffer actual prison 
staff from incarcerated workers in the event of grievances. When concerns, complaints, or 
confusions emerged, participants commonly turned to Slick and Jake, who often 
approached the bosses on workers’ behalf. 
 
Participation in social games inherently represents consent to the conditions 
surrounding their play and serves to reproduce their underlying structures (Bourdieu 1990; 
Burawoy 1979). Because games in prison must be played within the bounds of rules set by 
management, institutional administrators, and penal policymakers, engaging in prison 
work games entails the reification of the broader structures of carceral labor as well as the 
local prison employment system. Such games dampen direct forms of worker resistance to 
labor exploitation while transforming conflicts between workers and management into 
competition between workers and one another. At Sunbelt State Penitentiary, the 
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professionalism game in particular served to reproduce divisions between prisoner groups, 
advancing a wedge between populations already divided along the lines of race and 
nationality (Walker 2016), further limiting the possibilities of collective action. Through 
this game, prisoners enacted distinction processes and boundary maintenance, reframing 
themselves as professionals, but also reframing others as undeserving or unmotivated. 
Franklin illustrated this when he said, “There are some of us—the more mature men—we 
want to work. We don’t want the drama of the yard. It gives you something to do, gives 
you integrity. That’s what we strive for.” In claiming dignity in this way, participants 
denied it to others, assuming that they “want” drama over integrity. And, through these 
rhetorics, workers in fact reified the structures which relegated them into punitive labor. 
That is, by espousing the belief that some—other—prisoners were lacking in work ethic or 
discipline and that it was these shortcomings which explained their lower positions in the 
employment system, participants in the professionalism game espoused the very outlooks 
which are often drawn on to justify the use of punitive labor in the first place. Furthermore, 
by adopting this lens, workers in top-tier positions misrecognized the work skills and 
resources with which they entered the employment system—the very capitals which 
enabled them to secure their increased status in the hierarchical prison labor market (see 
Chapter 2)—as drive, work ethic, and professionalism.16 
The process and reward structures of prison work games may have implications for 
the purported rehabilitative capacities (e.g., Pryor 2005) of penal labor. Workers playing 
the professionalism game may possess or develop positive outlooks towards work as their 
prison labor assignments offer reprieve from the drama and stress of the yard and less 
desirable work assignments. However, the opposite may be true for workers in sites which 
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foster work resistance games. The conditions or labor processes of low-tier positions may 
make it difficult to play “professional.” Instead of an escape, work here is understood as 
another facet of punishment against which prisoners struggle. Workers in turn risk 
developing negative outlooks towards work as they grapple, often hopelessly, to acquire 
sufficient wages for sustenance, develop work skills, or find meaning in labor.  
 
Institutions cultivate and reward certain dispositions which benefit them (Bourdieu 
1996). Chapter 2 examined how the penal institution sorts and sieves workers with 
marketable skills or resources into desirable jobs. In the current chapter, I have unpacked 
another process through which this occurs—via the reproduction of boundaries stratifying 
prisoner groups and through the generation of consent through work games. In the next 
chapter, I turn toward another set of outcomes of this institutional sieve for the reproduction 
of inequality between prisoners. As I will illustrate, the imbalanced nature of the prison 
employment system has significant formal and informal economic effects for prisoners and 
their families. And, in the context of pay disparities and limited access to formal and 
informal prison markets, the outcomes of labor stratification in prison has notable 
implications for how these men prepare for release. 
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CHAPTER 4 
I Owe My Soul to the Commissary Store: 
Labor Stratification Outcomes on the Inside 
 
Money…was of terribly great importance and power in prison. I can 
say positively that a convict who had at least some money in hard labor 
suffered ten times less than one who did not have any. 
– Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House 
 
 
Research into the impacts of incarceration for individual prisoners, families, and 
communities highlights myriad negative outcomes of doing time. From reduced job search 
prospects (Freeman 1992; Holzer 2009; Pager et al. 2009; Western and Beckett 1999) to 
slashed earnings (Pettit and Lyons 2009; Sutton 2002; Western 2002), volatile family 
formation and instability (Apel et al. 2010; Comfort 2008; Edin 2001; Lopoo and Western 
2005; Western and Wildeman 2009) to stifled civic engagement (Manza and Uggen 2006), 
and a variety of physical and mental health challenges (Massoglia 2008; Patterson 2010; 
Schnittker and John 2007; Spaulding et al. 2011), scholars across decades have 
documented widespread negative effects of imprisonment. Some have even examined the 
effects of access to skilled labor programming while behind bars in shaping prospects after 
release (Seiter and Kadela 2003; Travis and Vischer 2005). For many of the incarcerated, 
however, prison sentences are long and grueling, with reentry a distant thought. Amongst 
the men of Sunbelt State Penitentiary, numerous participants had many years left ahead of 
213 
 
them. Some were serving second, third, or fourth sentences. Whether returning to prison 
for the commission of a new crime, or upon violation of probation or parole following a 
prior release, many had spent more time behind bars than outside them over recent decades. 
For these men and others, the conditions behind bars were pressing concerns that often 
eclipsed planning for their lives outside.  
 With this in mind, the final empirical chapter of my dissertation examines economic 
outcomes of penal labor stratification on the inside. It unpacks prisoner wage disparities—
which find some men earning approximately $0.05 hourly while others earn over $1.00—
and how this pay gap differentially shapes the lives of the incarcerated. In other words, it 
explores the material outcomes of the penal labor sorting and sieving process. It unpacks 
how labor market outcomes impact carceral experiences in terms of access to goods and 
services (moving beyond the implications of labor stratification for prisoner agency and 
the pursuit of dignity discussed in the previous chapter). As cost-shifting practices continue 
to expand behind bars (e.g., Levenson and Gordon 2007), prisoners themselves have grown 
more reliant on wages to supplement core prison services through formal or informal 
markets. 
The formal prison economy refers to the institutional outlets where prisoners spend 
their wages. Here, they may purchase commissary items, medical services, and mail or 
telephone access. A prisoner’s job and rate of pay often determines their ability to purchase 
vital foods and hygiene products, “nonessential” entertainment goods, and even access to 
doctor visits. The incarcerated have limited access to consumer goods and various services. 
Like the company stores of some isolated mining towns in the early 20th-Century (Green 
2010), the prison commissary represents the only store where working prisoners can spend 
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their hard-earned wages. Prisoners’ families may also be impacted by these disparities as 
wages are also necessary to afford access to the telephone and mail services facilitating 
communication with family and support networks in the free world. In addition, the quality 
of a prison work assignment can shape outcomes in the informal prison economy. In this 
illicit marketplace, prisoners able to acquire ramen noodles—the de facto informal 
currency in today’s prison (Gibson-Light 2018)—can purchase smuggled fruits and 
vegetables or other goods not available through formal channels, as well as black market 
services provided by other prisoners, including laundry, bunk cleaning, clothing or 
personal belonging repairs and maintenance, private security details, and more.  
Prisoners at SSP faced imbalanced exposure to risk as a result of pay disparities. 
Those who were less able to afford necessary goods in the formal or informal market could 
be driven to provide illicit services in the underground economy or pilfer goods in order to 
make money through shadow labor. Lacking sufficient wages to spend on commissary, 
many were also driven to purchase goods from informal “inmate stores,” which were 
prohibited by DOC policy. By purchasing or possessing black market goods or by 
providing illicit services, these individuals risked additional exposure to the security 
apparatus of the prison, which sought to curb prisoner engagement in such activities. If 
caught, these men risked additional prison time, relocation to a higher security facility, or 
other sanctions.  
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Another Day, Another Dollar: Prisoner Pay 
 
Pay for penal labor was distributed via an institutional pay system sometimes referred to 
as an “inmate checking account.” To have funds in one’s account was to “have money on 
the books” that could only be used in the formal prison economy. Most prisoners at SSP 
started their carceral labor careers at around $0.05 per hour. The standard maximum pay 
cap was approximately $0.50. Three positions were made exceptions to this cap: the outside 
work crews, which paid a flat $0.50 hourly, the sign shop, which paid between $0.50 to 
$1.00, and the call center, which paid upwards of $1.00 per hour. At the national level, the 
meager wages that these men received are in fact relatively high. In states where prisoners 
are paid for their labors, wages may vary from under $0.05 to over $5.00 per hour (Sawyer 
2017).17 
In most positions at SSP, workers were eligible for a pay raise every six months, 
following a performance evaluation. They may be graded an E for “exceeds expectations,” 
S for “satisfactory,” U for “unsatisfactory,” or N for “no rating.” Prisoners received no 
rating for failure to attend mandatory work assignments. Typically, failure to attend 
brought additional sanctions, such as disciplinary tickets or termination.  
 
No money, more problems: Prisoners’ economic concerns 
 
 In general, wages of any amount are important for navigating a prison sentence. As 
Alexey stated matter-of-factly, “You need money in prison.” A small subset of participants 
reported receiving regular financial assistance from family or friends in the free world. For 
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instance, Jim, a middle-aged prisoner working in the food factory warehouse department, 
shared that his mother put money on his books each month. With this steady source of 
income from the outside, he had little problem making ends meet during his prison stay. 
Few of his incarcerated counterparts could claim similar support, however. Jim was 
cognizant of the advantages that he had. “I’m a rare inmate,” he told me. “I don’t need to 
work—I don’t need to do anything. I just do this [work] to pass the time.”  
Jim’s situation was indeed rare. According to Eli, “Jobs are important in here 
because money is scarce. A lot of people don’t have family on the outside supporting 
them.” To be sure, the incarcerated are disproportionately drawn from the poor (Wakefield 
and Uggen 2010) and external support was far from guaranteed for the overwhelming 
majority. As such, wages from penal labor were vital for most to afford basic wants and 
needs behind bars. It was often repeated that these wages were necessary to get through a 
prison sentence. One man outlined the potential severity of the issue: “If you don’t have 
[commissary money], you go hungry.” For the lowest paid workers at SSP, a full day’s 
work yielded just enough to purchase one pack of ramen from the commissary. One man, 
Stahl, was even more graphic about financial conditions and the need to labor: “If you’re 
on that yard [not working], you’re gonna starve.”  
The state of prisoner pay was a common source of anxiety. When asked about his 
experiences with carceral labor more broadly, Rich quickly brought up his wages. “Of 
course, I’m not happy about the pay,” he uttered. “If anything, I barely get by. I’m not 
talking about wants; I’m talking about needs! I’m completely on my own in here and it’s 
not enough.” The fact that work was mandated only made issues worse. “Not only are we 
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forced to work,” proffered one food factory meat roller, “but if we don’t work, we get 
punished. It’s a sweatshop! A full day’s work might [pay enough to] get you a soup.”  
Sometimes, frustrations over wages begat conflict. One day, I witnessed a brief 
quarrel between two food prep workers and a civilian staff member. The staffer threatened 
to fire one of the men, nicknamed Solar, for sitting down for too long. Solar’s coworker 
chimed in, “You know we get paid less than slaves?” The staff member seemed taken 
aback. “That’s not even true. They only worked for food,” he said. With eyebrows raised, 
the prisoner retorted, “Well, we don’t even get food!” A grin appeared on Solar’s face and 
he produced a torn piece of cardboard from a nearby trashcan and quickly scrawled 
something on it. He clutched his creation, a cardboard panhandling sign, between 
outstretched fists. It read: 
 
Please Help 
Homeless & Broke 
Will Work 
For Food 
 
The staff member read his sign and waved him off: “Yeah, yeah.” The men laughed, and 
the tension was dispelled for the moment, but frustrations over pay and meals remained 
unaddressed. 
The highest paid prisoners—those working in the sign shop and call center—had 
notably different experiences with money. Others often referred to them as “prison CEOs” 
for the very evident disparity in pay from which they benefitted. “The assumption on the 
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yard is that call center workers are rich,” stated one incarcerated salesman. “In here, we’re 
the lucky ones,” said Jake. “We’re rich in here compared to everyone else. [Over one 
dollar] an hour might as well be CEOs in here. I don’t know why they don’t have more 
jobs like this.” Amidst a scarcity of higher-paying jobs, a notable pay disparity persisted 
between the lowest and highest-paid SSP prisoners. As a result, the abilities of these men 
to purchase essential goods and services often varied drastically depending on their 
standing in the penal labor hierarchy. In what follows, I outline some of these material 
disparities as they emerged in both the formal and informal prison economies. 
 
 
The Formal Prison Economy 
 
Few items or services were provided without charge to the incarcerated. The contemporary 
state prison like SSP—though regarded as a public institution—is home to numerous 
private firms that operate things like the commissary store, the kitchens, medical care, 
telephone services, and more. As such, prisoners were required to pay from their 
institutional accounts if they wished to benefit from most of these offerings. 
 
Prison purchases and the commissary store 
 
The commissary store was the main site of prisoner spending. Estimates suggest 
that commissary sales nationwide amount to over $1.6 billion annually (Raher 2016); more 
recent examinations suggest that this industry may be even higher-grossing than this. 
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According to one study, sampled prisoners spent more in the commissary than they 
typically earned through prison jobs; most of those purchases were for food or hygiene 
products (Raher 2018). 
At SSP, Wednesday was “commissary day,” the day when individuals could pick 
up the items that they had ordered the previous week. For most behind bars, commissary 
day represented the highlight of the week. Even the most morose participants of my study 
were likely to perk up when it came time to pick up their goods. While crossing the yard 
one day, for instance, I spotted ten familiar faces from the sign shop. They were arranged 
in a loosely structured line leading up to an open door and small window. Several of the 
men waved as I approached. Felix pointed excitedly to the commissary and gave me a 
thumbs up. Lemmy, the self-described “Mr. Negative” of the crew, even offered a slight 
smile toward the open door. He was next in line. 
 Inside of the small, stark white room the walls were lined with metal shelving units 
crowded with clear plastic trash bags filled with varieties of ramen, chips, toothpaste, and 
other goods. Some bulged with items; others appeared deflated, holding few goods. Each 
bag was labeled with the name of a different prisoner. A plain-clothes staff member that 
worked for the private firm running the store leaned on a counter, closely inspecting a slip 
of paper that one prisoner, Denaun from the sign shop, had just handed her. Without fully 
turning her head, she called out his last name to her assistant, a tall prisoner adorned in a 
long-sleeve orange shirt with neck tattoos creeping up from the collar. The man quickly 
spun on one foot, scanned the shelves, and pulled one of the larger bags, with Denaun’s 
name on it. Before leaving, Denaun inspected its contents through the transparent plastic, 
pushing things aside to count each item. With a satisfied smile, he told me, “Got all my 
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stuff this week.” When he exited, Lemmy entered and said, “What’s up.” After handing 
over his slip and receiving his large bag, he glanced inside (with much less intent than 
Denaun) and nodded. Hiking it up on his shoulder, victorious, he exclaimed to me, “This 
is what we work for!” As he marched out, Sammy entered next, grinning upon site of the 
bag-lined shelves. 
 Most commissary bags were filled primarily with food items. According to 
prisoners and correctional staff alike, the food provided by the state in the chow line was 
not enough on its own to sustain an adult. Regular complaints contended that the meals 
contained too many starches, too little protein, and shrinking portion sizes. As one food 
factory worker put it, “The chow is really bad. They give you little kid meals, like that’s 
enough calories for a grown man.” DS, who had once worked as a server on the chow line 
for some time, reported that, “The white shirts [staffers] encourage you to stay low on 
portions—it’s not enough for a man to eat.” To supplement these sparse offerings, men 
relied on food available through the commissary. A man’s financial standing could often 
be assessed by what he ate for lunch: purely state chow or commissary offerings. During 
lunch in the sign shop one day, Clegg added some chips that he had purchased in the 
commissary to the inside of his state-provided bologna sandwich in order to fill it up. As 
he brought it to his mouth he uttered, “You pretty much—if you don’t have store 
[commissary credit], you go hungry.” Snorting, his coworker, the young Bryson, added: 
“Or you learn to love bread.” Figure 7 depicts a state lunch from one particularly generous 
day (when cheese was provided). 
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Figure 7. A state-provided “bag nasty” with extra cheese added (author photo) 
Those who could afford to do so often declined state-provided lunches altogether, 
relying entirely on commissary purchases. Jimmy, for instance, had concocted what he 
called the “perfect lunch” in terms of price as well as calorie and protein intake: prison 
quesadillas. Each lunch break in the sign shop, he could be found setting up his items 
meticulously beside the microwave. In a small bowl, he mixed a portion of powdered 
refried beans in water and microwaved them. The bean mix was spread in a thick layer 
onto a single flour tortilla, which was then topped with a zig-zag squeeze from a packet of 
spicy cheese spread and folded in half. In total, Jimmy assessed his lunch at $0.49 per 
meal—$1.45 for a bag of powdered beans, which made seven servings at $0.21 each; $0.30 
for a packet of jalapeno squeeze cheese, which provided two servings at $0.15 each; and a 
pack of six tortillas for $0.78 or $0.13 each. Securing one’s own sustenance in the face of 
deprivation was easier from a higher-paying, desirable job. With his above-average hourly 
wage from the sign shop, Jimmy assured me that he could afford these supplies and still 
have enough left to purchase other items for dinner and necessary hygiene products, even 
accounting for the deducted prison fees each pay period. “In order for us to eat healthy, 
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you have to have a job. Otherwise, it’s not good,” one man said. As another put it, “These 
[higher paying] jobs are the only ones where you can survive in here—you can afford food 
and hygiene. Otherwise you’re relying on the state.”  
 In addition to food, the incarcerated could acquire a variety of other goods from the 
commissary. Necessary hygiene products like toilet paper or denture cream were not 
generally provided but could be purchased. Expensive entertainment goods, such as 
portable CD players or televisions (with transparent plastic casing), were also available, 
but were prohibitively expensive for most at $40 and $195 respectively. In addition to the 
commissary cost, possession of electronic appliances like this also brought with it a $2.00 
monthly electricity fee for the incarcerated. Only those with steady incomes could afford 
such luxuries behind bars. 
 Clothing items were especially popular in the store. While the state provided newly 
admitted prisoners with a set of orange shirts, pants, undergarments, and flimsy boots upon 
admission, the men of SSP were standardly expected to purchase their own replacements 
or upgrades as needed. This was a source of frustration for many, especially those in low-
paying jobs. According to the aging Samuél, when I first met him in the food factory, “We 
ruin our clothes working, but yet they won’t replace ‘em and we can’t afford new ones.” 
Indeed, the conditions of many prison jobs did result in clothing being quickly worn down. 
Many a warehouse worker sported stained orange sweatshirts with tattered sleeves or bits 
of old fabric hanging down like fringe. Working in the food factory one day, Dean pulled 
me aside and said, “Hey, hey, check this out.” Lifting his left foot, he revealed that the sole 
of his state-issued boot had nearly peeled fully off. He kicked his foot slightly and the 
hanging sole flapped like a gaping mouth. Unable to afford new, sturdier boots, he had 
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been stuck with these ones for some time. With an exaggerated shrug he pointed down and 
sighed, “I mean, really?” 
Often, even when prisoners could afford new items, supplies of new goods were 
quickly depleted, leaving only used goods, if any. Jon expressed frustrations at work one 
day after being unable to purchase a new pair of underwear. He told his coworkers that the 
only thing available to him, according to the commissary store clerk, were used “shitty 
drawers.” Visibly upset at being denied unused products, he shouted, “Where’s the money 
goin’? The tax money that’s s’posed to be paying for [necessities like] these clothes—
where’s that goin’??”  
 
Formal prison services 
 
 In addition to purchasing goods from the prison commissary, the men of SSP were 
also expected to pay for numerous services available to them. Chief among these was the 
mandatory fee for visiting the doctor’s office. Most states charge prisoners these medical 
fees; the national average is $3.47 per visit (Schwartzapfel 2018). Visiting the doctor at 
SSP cost $4.00. To many, this cost was unacceptable, especially in light of other expenses, 
such as food. Recall, for instance, when one prisoner chastised another for paying for a 
doctor visit instead of purchasing burrito ingredients (in Chapter 3): “We could be eatin’, 
but you blew it on the doc. Don’t be goin’ to the doctor.”  
 Throughout the prison, the quality of medical care was infamous. When discussing 
the services available in the institution, one correctional officer overseeing a housing run 
declared, “The company that does the medical is—” he paused for a moment and shook his 
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head before continuing with emphasis, “bad.” A group of nearby prisoners affirmed almost 
in unison: “Yup.” For prisoners in poor health, or with more serious conditions or injuries, 
this was particularly troubling. After missing a day of work in the food factory, the sturdy 
Armando stomped off the bus the next morning clutching his hand. One of his fingernails 
was completely blackened, the result of a heavy metal meat pan falling on it during his last 
work shift. While setting up his work station, he told me that his entire arm was terribly 
sore the night of the accident, resulting in a restless night. He overslept the next morning, 
missed the bus to work, and was put on formal report for failure to appear. Although his 
injury was still painful, he said that he could not afford to visit the doctor. “Four dollars is 
half my check for fifteen days,” he said. Plus, he continued, “They don’t do nothing 
anyways. The only thing they do is they say to us, ‘Drink a lot of water,’ and that’s it.”  
 The white-haired Samuél, shared a related experience. Clutching his back one 
afternoon between rounds of dishwashing, he shared that he suffered from “chronic back 
pain.” Water dripped down the front of his red rubber dish apron as he stretched weakly. 
Before prison, he received disability benefits. Inside, however, he was required to work 
and risked disciplinary tickets if he skipped a day to rest his body. After his last four-dollar 
doctor’s visit, he was prescribed Advil, which he had to purchase from the commissary. At 
less than $0.50 per hour, he often struggled to afford the painkiller and expressed that he 
had no plans to scrape together the money for another examination. Men who were required 
to make recurring or follow-up visits were often still charged the fee. As one man 
complained:  
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They got me listed down in Chronic Care and everything 
else. But then they call [me for] my medical, they charge me 
four dollars! So, you figure you get twenty cents an hour—
that’s six dollars a week? You know what I mean? But then 
they take that out… What do you have left, if you have 
anything left?  
 
 Another service that prisoners must pay for was the use of telephones to call home. 
Over time, the prices of use had increased steadily, as has become the norm in U.S. penal 
facilities (Jackson 2007). At SSP, prisoners were charged over $0.10 per minute to make 
local calls through the contracted phone services provider. This price nearly doubled for 
long-distance calls. Although the FCC has capped the rate that prisoners can be charged 
for out-of-state calls, they still remain prohibitively costly for the poor (Sawyer 2019). The 
money amassed from these charges was said to go toward the development and support of 
new prison programming. “But,” claimed Maurice, “nobody ever sees that money” and 
more programs seemed to have been cut than introduced in recent years. Still, as the 
primary means of maintaining contact with family and others in the free world, the phones 
saw constant use. Every time I visited the yard, I observed a tight cluster of men standing 
around each wall-mounted phone or lined up in a row beside it, waiting for their turn.  
Telephone access was often leveraged as a means of disciplining the prisoner 
population. If a prisoner received enough infractions, they would often have phone 
privileges revoked as one of their first sanctions. This authority was often wielded 
arbitrarily, according to the incarcerated. One man recounted getting punished for stepping 
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his foot too far onto a yellow boundary line painted around the periphery of the recreational 
yard: “You have one foot over that thing … Bam, you get a ticket. They take your store 
away for two weeks. No phone calls, no nothing—for that.” This sanction could put strain 
on personal relationships. The man continued: 
 
I mean, that's two weeks not calling your wife or your 
girlfriend. Imagine if you just got cut off? Your cell phone, 
your family, your work, everything, for two weeks. And then 
you're waiting, like, ‘Damn, man, I've got five more days. 
Four more days left.’ And then when you [finally] call, it’s 
just like they just took two weeks of your freedom. … Your 
outside life. 
 
For some, the maintenance of this “outside life” through the payphones was a 
primary motivation to work. According to one food factory worker, his wages, though 
minimal, helped him access the phones during periods when his mother was unable to help 
him financially. “I wanted a job quick because I don’t have any outside money. My mom 
wasn’t helping me. After a couple months she started putting money on my books. I'd buy 
phone time with it mostly.” Prisoners in higher-paying positions were better able to afford 
“putting money on their phones.” According to one call center salesman, one of the biggest 
perks of his higher pay cap was:  
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Being able to put money on the phone ourselves so that they 
[family] don’t have to pay for it. You know what I mean? I 
remember whenever I first put money on the phone and my 
old lady [girlfriend] answered, and [the recording] said, 
‘You have a call at no expense to you.’ She felt tripped. 
‘What the hell? I ain’t paying for this?’ And this makes them 
feel good. 
 
 Telephone access was especially critical for men approaching release. They relied 
on this access in order to arrange housing and other amenities after prison. It was important 
to schedule transportation as well. “I mean we need to make phone calls,” one man shared 
during the weeks leading up to his freedom. “Like, I'm 30 days to the gate [to release] and 
I need to get some things lined up, and if I don't have that… They're going to drop me off 
at a bus station.”  
 
Savings and preparations 
 
In addition to making reentry plans and preparations via the phones, the potential 
to save wages was also vital in the lead-up to release. For some, these concerns started 
early. Franklin told me matter-of-factly that, “Once you’ve got two years left, that’s 
important [the pay].” For most, setting funds aside was difficult at best. Seth, working in 
the fleet auto garage, expressed frustrations to this end. To him, willingly participating in 
work was something that ought to be rewarded. Instead, he said, “They don’t make it easy 
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for us in here. I mean, I know it’s not s’posed to be [easy], but the guys out there doing 
jobs that they would have to pay ten, twenty dollars an hour for? They could at least pay 
us a [full] dollar an hour so we can get by—actually have some money to get started when 
we’re released.” 
Some prisoners, however, were better able to amass savings. Those able to avoid 
spending all of their earnings—that is, the rare few with the highest-paying jobs—
sometimes framed their penal labor assignments as a means of preparing for reentry. The 
prison call center, as the highest-paying work site, was home to many workers with this in 
mind. When asked about the qualities of the job, the newly-hired Rico said, “The pay’s 
alright. I’m doing it for my old lady. To have something for when I get out.” The sign shop 
was the other such position. On the day of my interview with Ocho, who had worked in 
the shop for 22 months, he was excited about his imminent return home in 30 days (referred 
to as “29 and a wakeup”). “I have over fifteen-hundred [saved] in my fund,” he shared with 
enthusiasm. “It’ll help me get on my feet.” Despite his ability to amass this amount, he 
remained cognizant of the percentages that the institution had garnished from his checks 
each week. “I did the math on my pay. They took over 891 dollars from me for room and 
board. And they still charged me two dollars for electricity!” With a sideways glance and 
a chuckle, he added: “The bastards.”  
The highest-paid men even reported sending remittances home, allowing them to 
maintain a form of “breadwinner” status and thereby preserve some degree of household 
“normalcy” (e.g., Anderson 2017) to which they might return after incarceration. 
According to Clay, a call center worker, “We’ve got our families out there. Still have 
mortgages. Still have car payments. … So, having that money [means] being able to send 
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it out to buy our kids school supplies or Christmas presents, maybe help with the mortgage 
each month.” 
 
 
The Informal Prison Economy 
 
While the formal prison economy was organized around prisoner wages through “inmate 
checking accounts,” the informal market relied on its own currency. Informal monies 
operate outside of standard systems of exchange (Zelizer 2001) and may develop alongside 
or in place of formal cash or other currency (Carruthers 2005). They are typically relegated 
to constrained “circuits of commerce”—i.e., bounded economic spheres with shared 
understandings of value and money (Zelizer 2010). A prison monetary token in particular 
is typically “a durable, portable, and highly demanded commodity that can be 
comparatively easily obtained” (Karpova 2013: 15) and which is reducible to a common 
scale (Gray 2001; Reed 2007). Though relegated to limited markets, these goods are 
nevertheless treated as currency—as “the prison equivalent of cash providing exchange for 
goods (such as food and drugs) and to pay debts” (Richmond et al. 2009: 178) or to 
compensate fellow prisoners for services like personal laundry or cleaning (Lankenau 
2001). An item that seems commonplace in the “free world” may thus take on a new life 
within prison as “a high value good…because it is a ticket to the black market. Each of 
these goods can be sold, traded and gambled because each item is inherently money” 
(Karpova 2013: 4). 
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 The de facto informal currency of choice in today’s prisons is cheap, durable foods 
like packets of ramen noodles. Denied nutritious or filling food through the chow hall 
(Gottschalk 2006) and expected to supplement the costs of food and other services 
involuntarily consumed (Aviram 2015), contemporary prisoners have adopted a form of 
currency reflecting the politics of consumption that have grown increasingly salient amidst 
tensions with the authorities. Food practices and meanings, or “foodways,” represent a key 
platform through which prisoners may reclaim control over daily routines and resist 
deprivations (Smoyer 2016a). The seemingly mundane effort to control what and when one 
eats actively defies penal structures which otherwise repress prisoner identities and agency 
(Ugelvik 2011). “Choices of any kind around food,” says Camplin (2017), “re-appropriate 
selfhood for inmates” (57). Eating ramen—in contrast to state-provided chow—provides 
an opportunity to “defin[e] one’s self” in the face of strict limitations (Camplin 2017; 
Godderis 2006). Having risen to the role of currency behind bars, the ramen soup packet 
derives worth in part from its role as an expressive good or “ritual supply” (Goffman 1961) 
that maps on to prisoner struggles and evolving insecurities. (For an examination of the 
transition from tobacco products to ramen as the leading prison currency, see Gibson-Light 
[2018].) 
 
The structure of the prison ramen market and ‘inmate stores’ 
 
During my first several months of fieldwork at SSP, I heard many references to 
“soups” (i.e., ramen) used as payment in the underground economy. Participants paid for 
different goods (e.g., smuggled vegetables, toothpaste) and services (e.g., bunk cleaning, 
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laundry), or gambled using ramen soups. A single packet cost $0.59 through the prison 
commissary and even those who did not eat the salty treat regularly stocked up for use as 
currency. On one visit to the prison housing unit, I observed as one prisoner approached 
another’s bunk to collect on a debt. “You got what you owe me?” he asked casually. “On 
the counter there,” replied the second man, gesturing toward two packets of ramen noodles. 
A nearby correctional officer appeared not to register the exchange. I asked other prisoners 
and staff members about informal economic practices at SSP. In many accounts across 
several months, all prisoners reported using ramen to pay for goods or services from other 
prisoners, with many stating that they primarily purchased essential goods like other food 
or denture cream with ramen via the black market. News reports affirm that other prisoner 
populations across the nation have adopted ramen or other food products as a primary unit 
of exchange in recent years (Collins and Alvarez 2015; Harwell 2010; NPR Staff 2015; 
Paynter 2011; Scheck 2008; Yglesias 2008).  
 “Soup is money in here. It’s sad but true,” said one man. According to Alec, 
“Ramen is the best money in here because it can be traded for anything else. I can go next 
door and trade ramen for a bag of coffee or whatever.” As another participant asserted, 
“you can get a lot with soups.” Another went further to state that “a soup is everything” 
and many will trade anything they own to get one. He explained: 
 
It’s ‘cause people are hungry. You can tell how good a man’s 
doing [financially] by how many soups he’s got in his locker. 
‘20 soups? Oh, that guy’s doing good!’ … People will pay 
more for an envelope when they need to write home to get 
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more soups! Prison is like the streets—you use currency for 
everything. In here, it’s soups. 
 
Soups represent an ideal medium of exchange in the prison context for several reasons. 
They are inherently valuable as affordable, easily-prepared “hunger killers” (Errington et 
al. 2012), while also exhibiting certain characteristics of money. A ramen packet, like a 
dollar bill, stores value over long periods of time, can operate as a standardized unit of 
account, and can be readily exchanged between parties (see Asmundson and Oner 2012; 
Ingham 1996).  
 
Table 5. Prices in the SSP Prison Ramen Black Market 
Good to be 
Traded 
Commissary 
Price  
(in dollars) 
Black Market 
Price  
(in ramen packs) 
Black Market 
Price in Dollars 
(packs x $0.59) 
Ramen instant 
noodle pack 
0.59 1 0.59 
Fresh fruit or 
vegetable 
unavailable in 
commissary 
1 or 2 
(by type) 
0.59 or 1.18 
Pouch of coffee 5.47 4 2.36 
Loose tobacco 
3.13 or 4.29  
(by brand) 
6 3.54 
Five "tailor-
made" cigarettes 
2.00 
(approximately) 
1 0.59 
Envelope 0.02 1 0.59 
Thermals (top 
and bottom) 
11.30 6 3.54 
Sweatshirt 10.81 2 1.18 
Denture adhesive 2.57 1 0.59 
 
Table 5 depicts black market and commissary costs of several popular goods at 
SSP. Commissary prices were acquired from official listings (see Camplin [2017] for 
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example commissary store lists from other institutions). They are not static yet did not 
change over my time in the facility. Ramen prices were derived from many prisoner 
accounts across times and settings. There were no major discrepancies in reported prices.  
Fresh produce was particularly sought-after. “Fresh veggies are like lobster in 
here,” said one man, biting into what he called a “black market zucchini” on his lunch 
break. Depending on the quality and type, a smuggled vegetable or fruit was valued at one 
or two packets of ramen in the underground market. Onions and bell peppers were 
particularly popular and were staples in prisoners’ “homemade” cuisine. Higher-paid 
prisoners were better able to afford such products. As one staffer overseeing the call center 
said with a grin, “These fools make enough money that they can buy all the [smuggled] 
food coming out of the kitchens.” In addition, one soup could be traded for an envelope. 
Two bought a sweatshirt. Six bought a complete pair of thermal undershirt and bottoms (a 
“pretty good deal,” according to one man). Approximately four soups could be traded for 
a smuggled bag of coffee. One could be traded for denture adhesive. Six bought a bag of 
loose tobacco for rolling cigarettes (the commissary offered two brands at different prices, 
each fetching the same black-market price). And, even though “tailor-made” (i.e., 
packaged) cigarettes cost far more than soups in the commissary store, a single soup could 
be traded for five cigarettes. A pack of one popular cigarette brand cost approximately 
$8.00 ($0.40 per cigarette) at the SSP commissary, meaning that a $0.59 soup could fetch 
$2.00 worth of cigarettes, speaking to the value of cheap food over tobacco products in the 
informal economy.  
On some occasions, participants referred to the commissary cost of goods that they 
purchased in the black market, but this was uncommon. It typically occurred when 
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discussing disputes over price markups, which sometimes arose in exchanges across 
racial/ethnic lines. For instance, during a lunch break one day, a Mexican-American man 
in the sign shop told his friends about a piece of fruit he attempted to buy from a white 
prisoner on the yard. Looking up from his meal, he said, “One guy had a green apple 
yesterday. But he wanted three soups for it!” The others appeared shocked: “What? Shit,” 
the second man exclaimed. “Is that a high price?” I asked. “That’s a buck eighty,” replied 
the third, “That’s three meals in here, man.” Taking another bite, the original man uttered, 
“That’s a lot.” Shaking his head, he continued, “I really wanted it, but damn, I can’t afford 
that.” His friends nodded in understanding. 
This reference to the rounded-up $1.80 commissary store cost for three packs of 
soups suggests that these men remained aware of dollar costs of the ramen economy, even 
if they did not always convert directly to black market values. Additionally, this conflict 
over pricing between members of different racial/ethnic groups is indicative of the tense 
nature of prison food practices. The rules of prison “racial politics” standardly prevent 
prisoners from sharing food across racial lines (Goodman 2014; Valentine and Longstaff 
1998). Prisoner peddlers are often willing to trade with buyers of other groups, but often at 
increased prices. 
Many such exchanges were made through inmate stores: black market shops 
operated by enterprising individuals out of their prison bunks (Irwin 2005). Many prisoners 
purchased goods from such stores frequently. Unlike the prison commissary, which was 
only open for orders one day per week, inmate stores remained almost constantly 
accessible. Additionally, some goods—especially clothing—were regularly out of stock in 
the commissary, but many hungry men would literally sell the clothes off their backs for 
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some soups. Maurice illustrated just this when he showed off a recent purchase one day at 
work: “I bought my new thermals—top and bottom—[for] 6 soups.” Some housing units 
were home to specialized enterprises that solely sold tobacco products. They offered 
individual “tailor-made” cigarettes taken from full packs, as well as the bagged pipe 
tobacco that prisoners relied on to hand roll their own smokes. Additionally, they stocked 
up on rolling papers, which were sometimes hard to come by. Said one prisoner: “Rolling 
papers are like gold!” Cigarette stores were especially profitable early in the week, when 
many addicted men grew more desperate if their tobacco supplies went dry before 
Wednesday, when the commissary opened.  
Not just anyone was permitted to operate a store out of their bunks. To do so, one 
had to be officially endorsed by the “head” of their respective racial clique on the yard. If 
allowed to work this particular hustle, store runners were expected to pay a “tax” on all 
sales to this racialized hierarchy. To fail to do so or to operate without approval was to risk 
violent retaliation. Even with this taxation, however, incarcerated shopkeepers could 
expect to earn more than they might from a prison work assignment. To be successful, they 
often sought to avoid placement into a work program—or aimed to get fired upon 
assignment—so that they might instead operate their store 24/7. When I asked one 
participant, Larry, what his plans were during the final 120 days of his sentence, he replied, 
“I’ll just try to keep out of the food factory. I run my own store here, so I can make more 
if I stay around here [on the yard].”  
 Debts were common amongst prisoners reliant on black market purchases. Many 
owed back payments of ramen to the operators of personal stores, which often operated on 
systems of credit (another potential benefit over the commissary for prisoners low on 
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funds). Those who repaid debts quickly might be granted higher credit limits. They could 
even refinance debts with goods acquired on credit from different black-market stores. One 
participant outlined how it worked:  
 
[When a prisoner] owes somebody store, he’ll go and get it 
from somebody else’s store. Then he got good credit at that 
[first] store [because he paid the debt]. So, then he get more 
from that store. It’s a cycle—that bill keep going up and up! 
 
Maintaining good credit and paying debts was important. Those who failed to do so risked 
becoming targets of reprisal. “We men—our word is our bond,” I was told. “That’s the one 
thing we gotta hold on to in here. But some people, they word ain’t bond. Come to find 
out, they ain’t shit.” Another reported: “I’ve seen fights over ramen. Who the fuck gonna 
fight about ramen noodles?? That’s fifteen cents on the outs!” he exclaimed with 
frustration. As one man attested, “People get killed over soup, y‘know ‘mean?” Dramatic 
displays of aggression were part of life on the yard. In warehouse prisons like SSP, “there 
is still considerable intergroup hostility, but overall, there is a general détente among hostile 
groups” (Irwin 2005: 111). Accordingly, the ramen economy tended to operate relatively 
smoothly day-to-day, despite some friction. 
 
Black market services and shadow labor 
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To acquire ramen for use in the informal market, many prisoners simply purchased 
them from the commissary whenever able. Most men, however, earned too little from their 
penal labor assignments to maintain a steady flow of ramen while still being able to make 
other necessary purchases. And, while the price of ramen noodles had increased in the 
commissary over the last decade, prisoner wages had not risen. As one man put it, wages 
had not kept pace with ramen noodle inflation: “They’re sixty cents in here. They were 
twenty, thirty cents 10 years ago. And we’re still getting the same pay. So, every time I 
look at the price sheet I have, it goes up a penny here, three cents there, where it’s been 
accumulating throughout these years and no pay has been going up. … That's one of the 
issues in here.” 
To account for this inflation and supplement their formal wages, many turned to 
shadow work, or “compensatory subsistence strategies that are fashioned or pursued in the 
shadow of more conventional work…because participation in those markets fails to 
provide a living wage” (Snow 1993: 146). In prison, this was referred to as having a 
“hustle.” Even amongst those with steady work assignments, a common mantra at SSP was 
“you gotta have a hustle to survive.” In other words, absent a steady flow of money from 
family or friends on the outside, many prisoners relied on illicit trade or services to afford 
food and other goods. For many, this was second nature as they had maintained illicit or 
informal hustles before prison. According to the sagacious Alberto, “I learned both ways 
[to work]—legal and illegal. The illegal is survival. Put it this way: if a nuclear bomb 
dropped today, the people who know survival are the ones who will make it.” Many 
different hustles could be observed at SSP. One food factory worker outlined them as such: 
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Some people clean houses or some people—you just got to 
find a hustle, man. If you know how to draw, you draw. If 
all you know how to do is sell drugs, then you sell drugs. 
That simple. Me, when I don't have enough money, I don’t 
go clean houses or none of that. Sometimes I’ll make a phone 
call for somebody [who lost phone privileges] or whatever, 
that’s some money right there, but I don’t do that that much. 
But people gamble and all that stuff. I mean, there’s all kinds 
of things you could do. 
 
One quickly apparent hustle was stealing food goods to trade in the black market. 
Theft (or “boosting”) was common in the kitchens and food prep programs. Some even 
regarded it as a standard perk of these positions. One man said, “I don’t look at it as 
stealing. I look at it as making the pay right.” Another attested, “I don’t make enough to 
buy food from this job.” Dean justified these practices with a sarcastic wit: “They pay us 
[under fifty] cents an hour, don’t feed us enough at meals, and jack up the prices of 
everything in commissary. Big surprise that people are stealing fresh vegetables.” A 
prisoner called Santos working in the meat prep station of the food factory was particularly 
boastful of his past pilfering accomplishments during an interview. “I know what it takes 
to be a booster,” he proclaimed. When asked for clarification, he said: 
 
SANTOS:  I can get away with certain things that 
people always [ask], ‘How'd you do 
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that?’ ‘I don't know.’ … I surprise myself 
sometimes. 
RESEARCHER:  Can you give me an example? 
SANTOS:  Yeah, I can give you an example. When 
we were doing turkey, I took 25 pounds 
back to the yard. 
RESEARCHER:  25 pounds? 
SANTOS:  Back to the yard. … Yeah. 
RESEARCHER:  But they pat you down? 
SANTOS:  Yeah, they do pat us down. You always 
have to be on your Ps and Qs; you have 
to learn how to do it. And I was 
successful. I was one of the lucky ones 
that got away [that day]. Some people got 
caught. 
RESEARCHER:  When [staffers] catch you doing that, 
what do they do? 
SANTOS:  When you get caught doing that, it’s a 
major [offense]. You get a ticket, you get 
sent to the yard, you’re fired here from 
the food factory depending on what it is. 
And then you get restitution—you got to 
pay back whatever you took. 
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Despite this risk, boosting items like the desirable turkey meat was a reliable way to make 
money on the prison yard:  
 
RESEARCHER:  So, when you get things like [that] back 
to the yard, how much can you trade it 
for? 
SANTOS:  It all depends. On that, I made 35 bucks 
on what I took. 
 
Aside from food smuggling, prisoners sold various services. Some cleaned others’ 
bunks for one soup per week. For one to two soups (depending on the amount of clothes 
and linens), some washed others’ laundry. Others gambled for soup. At one work site, I 
observed prisoners placing bets in a workplace football pool. Each bet a single soup on 
their picks over several games. The eventual winner was awarded the pot (around 15 
soups). Some made most of their living gambling, relying on winnings for day-to-day 
sustenance. According to one working prisoner, Rogers: 
 
ROGERS:  One way or another, everything in prison 
is about money. People will wash your 
clothes, hustle—anything to make 
money. I got it figured out. If I only spend 
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twenty dollars a week, I’ll have twenty-
three-hundred saved when I get out. 
RESEARCHER:  Do you make enough working here to 
spend twenty a week? 
ROGERS:  No way. I play [the card game] pinochle 
every week. Make about twenty-five 
bucks. 
 
Some prisoners operated as handymen, repairing others’ possessions for a small 
fee. If a pair of eyeglasses broke, for example, visiting the optometrist could entail long 
waits and potentially missing work; however, a prisoner with the proper skill (or access to 
helpful materials, often acquired through smuggling) could be commissioned to make the 
repair. When an older man working in the food factory, Delroy, appeared with a broken 
pair of glasses one morning, I asked him how he planned to get them fixed. He informed 
me: 
 
DELROY:  If I went through and waited for the, uh, 
optometrist, they’d tell me I can’t come 
in for work [until it’s fixed]. I got a 
friend—they got some special strong 
tape. He’s gonna fix ‘em up for me. 
RESEARCHER:  What do you pay for something like that? 
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DELROY:  Well, the first time they broke, another 
guy fixed it for me, and I gave him a, uh, 
a dollar [one soup].  
 
Prisoners with steadier flows of income—whether from family providing funds 
from the outside or from high wages earned in a top-tier prison job—could even hire other 
prisoners to work as their “private security” around the yard. It was not uncommon to see 
one call center worker, for instance, closely accompanied by one or two other men at all 
times as he traversed the open prison yard or housing units in following the work day. 
“These guys have more money, so they have more power on the yard,” said one staffer. 
Gesturing toward an incarcerated call center salesman closely flanked on either side by two 
other men, the staffer added: “They hire people.”  
Another common hustle was producing artistic “hobbycraft.” This was the practice 
of selling drawings, small sculptures, or other artworks to other prisoners. For instance, 
Alex, a recent addition to the sign shop crew at the time of fieldwork, was a renowned 
portrait artist around the institution. Because of the demand for his services, he shared that 
he did not rely heavily on wages from his work in the shop. “I could be making more 
[money] doing my portraits,” he said. “I’m in here for the experience, really.” He also 
designed tattoos for prisoners willing to pay. Showing me an intricate webbed design 
(which he referred to as a “fractal mandala”) that he had recently sketched for this purpose, 
he shared that he received the equivalent of fifteen dollars in soups for the image. This was 
lower than his normal fee “because the guy is a friend.” Typically, Alex would expect 
twenty or thirty dollars for tattoo artwork.  
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Many prisoners purchased tattoo designs from Alex or other incarcerated artists and 
paid other men to commit the art to their skin. Some were quite proud to show off their 
illicit ink. Twisting his arm to reveal a faded image of a heavyset, bikini-clad woman 
tattooed on the back of his forearm, BB proudly exclaimed, “This is my fat lady!” Joining 
in, one of his coworkers pulled up his sleeve to reveal a detailed brick wall on his shoulder. 
“Here’s my prison wall, see?” Pointing to a series of names, he added, “I got my kids here, 
down my arm. The bad thing is when you start out with children and you end up with 
grandchildren! [When] you start running out of canvas, it’s time to go home.” 
“Amen,” BB called back. His coworkers went on, this time gesturing to tattooed 
calendar pages floating beneath the prison wall. “And here’s my dates—‘04, ‘05. People 
on the outside will say your calendar is your badge of honor. No, it’s not. It’s a reminder 
of how long you took yourself away from what matters to you.” Nodding solemnly, BB 
added: “That’s right. People on the outside get tattoos for no reason. In here, every inmate 
tattoo means something. None of them are without meaning.”  
Purchasing hobbycraft artwork to use for tattoos or simply to adorn one’s bunk was 
not uncommon. However, many hobbycraft hustles depended on sales to those intending 
to send something nice home to their children or partners. Around the holiday season, 
Alex’s informal business shifted to drafting Christmas cards for others. One day in mid-
December, I found him leaning low over a sketchbook in between screen printing jobs in 
the sign shop. Looking at me from the corner of his eye, he shared that he was drawing a 
picture for his child as a gift and held up the book for me to see. The page contained a 
beautifully detailed pencil illustration of a lion, a tiger, and a dragon. I asked if he had been 
busy with holiday art commissions, to which he responded with a grunt: 
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Yeah, but I’ve been turning down a lot of it to work on things 
for my own family. And people get mad about it. Like, 
‘Here, I need you to fix my Christmas ‘cause I don’t know 
what to do. Take these four [photos] and draw them as one 
big picture and I’ll give you six dollars.’ ‘Uh, sorry man, I 
don’t have time right now to do that.’ And they huff off like 
‘Whatever!’ I’ve had four people do that to me and three of 
them are [coworkers] in the shop! 
 
 While Alex’s shadow labor grew in popularity, some hustles suffered. A decision 
some time back by the Deputy Warden had reclassified sculptures as contraband. At the 
time of fieldwork, prison officials had not yet forced anyone to discard such objects; 
however, they had banned them from the list of items that prisoners could mail home to 
family. As a result, enterprising sculptors like Lemmy had received far fewer orders for 
their wares. “I used to do hobbycraft,” he shared one day. “I made roses and football 
helmets and sold ‘em. Best roses you ever saw—ask anybody. They were great. But they 
marked ‘em contraband, so I had to stop that.” The process of creating these works of art 
was challenging, as clay and other sculpting materials were not available in the 
commissary. Instead, prisoners like Lemmy managed with what limited supplies they had 
on hand, often getting quite creative. Though typically quite reserved, Lemmy grew 
animated when I asked him how he made his football helmet sculptures one afternoon. “I 
made those out of denture cream and glue and baby powder. You can make a nice putty. I 
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shaped out the helmets, all the detail. The face masks were made out of rolled up paper.” 
He mimed the process of tightly rolling out the paper as he spoke. “I painted em—did all 
the logos, all the teams. Sold those for eight dollars. But since it’s unauthorized, I had to 
stop.”  
Lemmy later shared that one reason he had so persistently pursued a position in the 
sign shop was because the profits from his hustle had diminished after the contraband 
ruling. Still, this did not stop him from occasionally trying to make a sale, especially around 
the holidays. Noticing the football team logo that his coworker, Scotty, had drawn on a 
plastic cup one day, Lemmy gestured and said, “Hey, I can make you a football helmet! A 
real nice one—about this big,” cupping his hands to indicate a space of around four inches. 
“Eight bucks!” Raising his eyebrows, Scotty replied, “Somebody made me a big one a 
while back to send my son, but it broke. Are they letting us send ‘em out again?”  
“Nah, that’s the problem,” Lemmy sighed. “Man, I would if I could send it,” Scotty 
said. “As soon as we can send ‘em out again, I’ll buy one though.” Uttering a defeated-
sounding “Yeah, alright,” Lemmy nodded and turned to walk away. 
 
 
Discussion: The Risks of Informal Market Participation 
 
Federal Bureau of Prisons policy—shared by most state agencies—prohibits unauthorized 
prisoner sales and trading (U.S. Department of Justice 2011). DOC orders governing SSP 
reflected this. Nevertheless, participants reported a growing reliance on illicit trade and 
labor, sometimes culminating in debt, fear of potential violence, and risk of formal 
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punishments (via work demotion or expulsion, disciplinary tickets, or more). Stagnant 
wages often contributed to dependence on underground trade (Guilbaud 2012) and workers 
sorted into the bottom reaches of the penal labor hierarchy had less access to formal market 
outlets.  
Often, regulations prohibiting illicit trade were only selectively enforced; simple 
exchanges were often overlooked as an inevitable facet of prison life. One prison staffer 
shared, “I’m okay with letting little shit slide. I see it, but—,” he shrugged. Nevertheless, 
when overseers deemed a prisoner’s behavior to be excessive or problematic in some way, 
they could be quick to act. Men who operated “inmate stores,” for example, were at 
constant risk of being “rolled up” if their entrepreneurship was deemed disruptive to 
standard operations. To be rolled up was to have correctional officers arrive at your bunk 
unannounced in the middle of the night, wake you up, command you to collect all of your 
belongings and roll them up into your bedroll, and lead you to a bus to an unknown 
destination. Typically, rolled up prisoners would be driven to a new prison facility across 
the state. Sometimes they might even be relocated to a neighboring state as part of exchange 
deals between different DOC offices.  
 One day in the sign shop, a worker called Luisito, who rarely if ever missed his 
shifts, failed to show. I learned from shop chatter that he had been rolled up the night 
before. It turned out that Luisito had been operating a cigarette store out of his bunk on the 
side. No one had yet heard to where he had been moved. The civilian manager of the shop, 
Mr. Edwards, confirmed these rumors to me later. “Some of these guys run what you might 
call black market stores, which is illegal. I’ve been told in the past that Luisito buys 
cigarettes and sells them individually. That’s illegal.” Taking a long drag of his own 
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cigarette, Edwards shared that it was uncommon for higher-paid workers like his sign shop 
crew to run such stores; however, “for a lot of these guys [prisoners], that sort of business 
… is commonplace. It’s about survival.” Indeed, it was uncommon for a sign shop worker 
or call center salesman to be sanctioned in such a way. Another civilian staffer in the shop, 
Dempsey, said of the occurrence, “It’s rare for guys from in here to get rolled up.” Recall 
the words of CO Bush from Chapter 1: “You don’t want these guys moving from skilled 
jobs—the sign shop, the call center. … So, I’ll place a work hold on the skilled workers.” 
Still, despite the rarity of the occurrence for those who had reached the top, most had 
observed many roll-ups during their prison tenure. A few days after Luisito disappeared, 
another shop worker, Willie, took control of his work station and labors continued as usual, 
without further reference to the former colleague. 
These happenings were far more common in the middle and bottom tiers of the 
carceral employment system. Those unable to secure top-tier work typically remained 
financially needier than their higher-status counterparts and were forced to rely more 
heavily on black market channels. For them, the informal economy truly was central to 
“survival,” in the words of Edwards. As a result, they faced increased risk of sanctions 
from COs or administrators unhappy with their underground dealings. “The cops [COs]—
they don't like if you're selling stuff,” one man shared, adding, “and [if] they see you selling 
stuff, you're going to get in trouble for it. You know what I mean? But sometimes if you're 
hungry, you just got to do what you got to do.” The soft-spoken Josh relayed that many 
food factory workers stole food because they lacked other options. “But it's risky,” he said, 
“it’s a risk-versus-reward type thing.” For the majority, smuggling, hustling, and heavy 
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reliance on underground purchases often seemed the only viable alternatives. “People that 
are broke, [or] that can't work or don't,” said Josh, “they're pretty much S.O.L.” 
The highest-paid prisoners at SSP had notably different experiences of punishment, 
being largely buffered from much of this risk. They could purchase more commissary items 
and even avoid unappetizing state meals, buy TVs and other entertainment items to help 
pass the time of long sentences, upgrade to better quality boots or replenish other worn-
down clothing, visit the doctor as needed, and call home on a regular basis, or even send 
home prison remittances. Those who were able to save for reentry were able to leave prison 
in a much more stable position that those forced to exit with nothing. What’s more, not 
being driven to the black market helped these men avoid the risk of punishments like being 
sent to a higher security yard or receiving added time to their sentencing, which could 
otherwise directly impact prospects for (and time to) release. High-status prisoners who 
nevertheless opted to participate in the underground economy were privileged in this 
sphere as well, for they were better able to stockpile ramen noodles with which they could 
regularly pay others to complete menial services, acquire fresh produce and other healthier 
yet expensive foods, and all the while avoid going into debt with the operators of informal 
inmate stores. In these ways, the employment system’s function of sorting and sieving 
incarcerated laborers not only generated notably different experiences of carceral 
punishment, but differentially exposed the disadvantaged to greater risk. 
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CONCLUSION: 
Punishment & Labor Under Neoliberal Penology 
 
Of course, prisons and the system of forced labor do not correct the 
criminal; they only punish him and ensure society against the evildoer’s 
further attempts on its peace and quiet. 
– Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House 
 
Prisoners have always worked; only the State has been their exploiter, 
even as the individual employer has been the robber of organized labor. 
– Emma Goldman, “Prisons: A Social Crime and Failure” 
 
 
Labor has been central to penal punishment throughout the history of the United States 
(McLennan 2008). In the words of Jonathan Simon (1993), “Wherever you look in the 
development of modernist penality you will find labor. Exhort the offenders with religious 
tracts, but make them work. … Educate them as citizens, but make them work. Treat their 
pathological features, but make them work” (39). From the inception of the first 
penitentiary on American soil, federal, state, and private entities alike have relied on the 
extraction of prisoner labor power. More recent decades have seen heightened 
incarceration rates and rising privatization. The swelling prisoner population today is put 
to work at record numbers, with approximately two-thirds of current U.S. prisoners 
working behind bars (Stephan 2008). Rather than a far-removed total institution, the 
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carceral facility of the neoliberal era is more than ever embedded in the economic world 
through the work performed by the incarcerated.  
It is no surprise, then, that labor activities influence much of prison operations on-
the-ground. Prison life and operations are largely organized around work programming. 
Popular and political rhetoric would tell us that this centrality of work reflects the 
rehabilitative nature of imprisonment—that the hundreds-of-thousands of captive laborers 
are working toward the development of new, marketable skills as well as the restoration of 
work ethics. Conversely, critics contend that the pervasiveness of penal labor reveals its 
capacity to do great harm to these men and women already at odds with mainstream 
society—that such work is merely punitive at best and exploitative at worst.  
Beyond institutional operations at the administrative level, work remains central to 
the experience of prison for those enduring it. It occupies and organizes the daylight hours 
of most (Guilbaud 2010). Additionally, labor programming is vital for prisoners 
economically. In states where prisoners are paid for their labors, wages vary from pennies 
to over five dollars hourly (Sawyer 2017). With more and more penal expenses being 
shifted to the incarcerated—via the privatization of care and services, and rising fees 
associated with imprisonment (e.g., Buchanan 2007)—the prisoner pay gap directly affects 
the ability of incarcerated individuals to acquire basic goods and necessities through the 
prison commissary or through black market exchanges. Beyond material discrepancies, 
work also remains central to prisoner perceptions of self (see Maruna 2001 for more on the 
lingering effects of prison work on personal narratives).  
Given the impact that penal labor practices may have at these levels, important 
questions have lingered. As the project of mass incarceration got underway in the 1970s 
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(Garland 2001b; Western 2006), researcher access to the inside of the nation’s prisons 
largely vanished (Cunha 2014; Goodman 2011; King and Liebling 2008; Reiter 2014; 
Wacquant 2002). I have sought to illustrate the ground-level realities of life and labor in 
this shrouded institution. How is this system actually structured at the institutional level? 
How do prisoners navigate and endure the realities of carceral labor? How might 
institutional structure interact with prisoner practices and resources to shape experiences 
of punishment for different prisoner groups? Underlying all of this: How does contact with 
this institution shape inequalities along the lines of race, ethnicity, and class? These and 
related questions inspired this project. In this final chapter, I address what the answers to 
these questions may mean for the form of function not just of punitive labor, but of 
punishment writ large in the contemporary era. Inspired by the tradition of the Extended 
Case Method school of ethnography (Burawoy 1998, 2009), I take this opportunity to 
“extend outward” from the space and time of my fieldwork at Sunbelt State Penitentiary in 
order to discuss the broader social forces at play behind (or revealed by) the on-the-ground 
processes that I observed. To begin, I will summarize these observations. 
 
 
Prison Labor On-The-Ground 
 
As in many U.S. penal facilities, work was mandatory for able SSP prisoners and the 
institution housed a broad range of jobs. Prisoner and staff member participants alike 
described a hierarchy of desirability for work programs. Those that participants regarded 
as the “best” assignments within the institution shared many characteristics with “good 
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jobs” in the free world: significantly higher pay, exposure to skilled labor activities, and 
greater degrees of autonomy, stability, and opportunity for mobility (Kalleberg 2011). 
They also tended to be less exposed to the institution’s security apparatus and facilitated 
work experiences that reportedly enabled working prisoners to “escape prison in their 
mind.” Conversely, “bad prison jobs” offered relatively low pay, requiring workers to toil 
in deskilled labor with little autonomy amidst instability and limited opportunities for 
mobility. These sites were often referred to as “prison within the prison” and featured 
repressive oversight from the penal security system. Between these poles, certain positions 
at SSP were understood as “middle tier” work programs, whose combination of desirable 
and undesirable characteristics elicited prisoner ambivalence. 
While most desired access to the many perks and securities that good prison jobs 
had to offer, the structure of the prison employment system was competitive. It privileged 
those with valued combinations of characteristics, resources, and work skills. The most 
prized (i.e., personally and materially rewarding) work assignments were typically 
allocated to those already possessing a “proper understanding” of how to navigate job 
market and interview conventions (a store of cultural capital), strong ties to those already 
working in such positions or to correctional staff with the authority to influence hiring 
decisions (social capital), and professional and work skills relevant to the tasks carried out 
in desirable prison jobs (another form of cultural capital). These valued skills and resources 
were linked to perceptions wrapped up with race, ethnicity, and nationality. Patterns of 
ethnoracial discrimination were apparent in program assignments, as was task segregation 
within work sites. Whereas previous scholarship has revealed racial and ethnic disparities 
in incarceration rates (Simon 1993; Wacquant 2009; Wakefield and Uggen 2010) and in 
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hurdles to labor market reentry (Freeman 2008; Pager 2007; Western and Pettit 2010), 
these patterns reveal the continuation of discriminatory processes inside the prison and 
within the microcosms of prison work. Outside inequalities are reinforced in part through 
the process of job assignments; those better situated to succeed in outside labor markets do 
so on the inside as well, while those found lacking are denied opportunities to amass 
marketable capabilities. In this way, the carceral employment system acted as a sieve, 
filtering and sorting the prisoner population along criteria that the institution deems useful, 
resulting in notably different experiences of punishment in terms of material wellbeing as 
well as subjective understandings. 
While an extensive body of literature explores the effects of incarceration (and, to 
a lesser extent, specific prison experiences) on ex-prisoners’ reentrance to society, this 
project uniquely explores more immediate impacts of stratification while still behind bars. 
Work-related inequities shape, for instance, the form and outcomes of prisoners’ pursuits 
of personal dignity. I have outlined different strategies that prisoners rely on to assert and 
evaluate self-worth through labor, which I evaluated as “work games” (Burawoy 1979). 
These games varied across sites and represent different approaches to prisoner (in)dignity, 
shaped and limited by the structures of each. All sites housed some form of coping game: 
ritualized distractions from formal work routines aimed at breaking up the “long day’s 
grind” (Roy 1959). These playful diversions assisted in tolerating indignities germane to 
prison life. Less desirable work sites also housed “resistance games” (Burawoy 1979), 
through which low-status workers clashed with supervisors over despotic labor processes 
and staff expressions of arbitrary authority. These agentic expressions of grievances 
enabled penal laborers to defy indignity and express collective discontent. Lastly, upper-
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tier work programs allowed for what I have referred to as a “professionalism game,” in 
which prisoners sought overseer approval and distinction from lower-tier prisoners. By 
adopting and performing the role of professionals, contemporaries of workers in their fields 
in the outside world, prisoners sought to actively reinject dignity into their lives. Through 
participation in such games, these men implicitly consented to the underlying structures of 
penal labor. Practices and discourses involved in the professionalism game in particular 
reified justifications for the institution of penal labor itself. 
Additionally, this project has illustrated how labor sorting may differentially impact 
prisoner wellbeing. Workers’ positioning in the labor hierarchy—with a pay disparity 
ranging from approximately $0.05 per hour to over $1.00 per hour—shapes their ability to 
participate in the formal economic market. More lucrative work programs enable workers 
to afford supplemental food, medical care, telephone and mail contact with family, and 
entertainment and electricity access, all of which prisoners must pay for out of their scant 
wages. Lower-paid prisoners, conversely, depend more fully on the care of the state, the 
quality of which has markedly declined in recent years (Gottschalk 2010). Wages also 
influence access to underground prison markets, in which ramen noodle soup packets reign 
as the de facto informal currency. Those who can afford to procure ramen have access to 
additional nutritional and entertainment goods, as well as the skills of informal service 
providers working out of their prison bunks. Those with limited access to this packaged 
currency, however, often had few options but to provide these services in shadow labor 
markets—doing others’ laundry, bunk cleaning, providing security, and other unofficial 
jobs—to supplement limited wages. These illicit informal labors further exposed them to 
the surveillance and disciplinary structures of the prison, generating risk. 
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These phenomena map on to more macro scale developments in American penality. 
In what follows, I provide a quick overview of past and current scholarship on evolving 
corrections strategies in the United States and denote my own contributions to this 
enterprise. 
 
 
Penology: Old, New, & Beyond 
 
Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon (1992) highlighted the emergence of new penal 
processes following the 1970s. Before this era, U.S. penal policy was largely “concerned 
with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the 
individual offender” (Feeley and Simon 1992: 452). This “Old Penology” could be 
identified by the prevalence of traditional discourses emphasizing clinical assessment and 
retributive judgment, objectives centering on recidivism and the control of crime, and 
ostensibly more equitable techniques which targeted individual offenders and pathologies. 
According to these scholars, the criminal law of this time focused primarily on moral 
responsibility and the assignment of guilt, approaching incarceration as a route to 
rehabilitation. 
The conservative bent of 1970s and 1980s penal policy, however, signaled the 
arrival of a “New Penology.” This new approach to crime and punishment was more 
“concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by 
dangerousness” (Feeley and Simon 1992: 452). This in many ways reflected what John 
Irwin (1985) had said of the U.S. jail system in years prior—that it functioned in large part 
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to manage risk imposed by the “underclass” or so-called “rabble” of society. This new 
penal process was evidenced by the emergence of new penal discourses emphasizing 
probability and risk, systemic developments in penal objectives in favor of more efficient 
forms of population control, and techniques prioritizing aggregate offender groups rather 
than individuals. Demographic disparities in the rising prisoner population suggested that 
this new correctional strategy served to reinforce ethnoracial hierarchy through the 
warehousing of minority populations (Wacquant 2000) (a pattern that has been globalized; 
Davis and Gibson-Light forthcoming). 
In the years since Feeley and Simon systematized this penological transition, 
scholars have documented continuing developments in the carceral field. The current 
moment in U.S. carceral history may be characterized by several interwoven penological, 
political, and economic trends that have led to an emphasis on offenders as a threat to 
security as well as budgets. An expanding neoliberal emphasis on personal and fiscal 
responsibility (Wacquant 2010) has further shaped the prison system through increased 
privatization (Aviram 2015) and thinning penal budgets (leading, accordingly, to trimming 
back services) (Lynch 2010). Despite rising prisoner populations (Glaze and Kaeble 2014; 
Western et al. 2004), spending on prison operations per prisoner in state and private 
institutions alike has decreased (Kyckelhahn 2012). The most recent alterations to the U.S. 
penal landscape came with the Great Recession of the past decade, which precipitated 
anxieties over the per-prisoner costs of incarceration (e.g., Aviram 2016b).  
The culmination of these economic and political forces has produced a prison 
system that is overcrowded, underfunded, and offering fewer and poorer quality services. 
Though neoliberalism has been the dominant political-economic logic in the U.S. for some 
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decades (Schwartzman 2013), evolutions in neoliberal approaches to punishment in recent 
years have precipitated changes in the quality of care behind bars as well as in prisoner 
treatment and behavior. Men and women in today’s penal institutions face informal policies 
of “punitive frugality” (Lynch 2010)—administrations scaling back the quality and number 
of prison services, satisfying political agendas to remain “tough on crime” while 
maintaining fiscal responsibility (Gottschalk 2006, 2010). To this end, prisons have 
trimmed critical features like healthcare and psychiatric treatment (Clark 1972; Clements 
1985; Pogorzeleski et al. 2005), reduced the size and quality of meals and privatized food 
services (Gottschalk 2006; Smoyer and Lopes 2017), and slashed “nonessential” services 
such as educational and vocational training (Clements 1985; Gottschalk 2010; Schlanger 
2006). 
 
The emergent neoliberal penology 
 
A small but growing literature has begun to examine this shifting strategy as 
evidence of a Neoliberal Penology (or Penality). The majority of this work adopts a macro 
lens. Harcourt (2010) defines this phenomenon in political-philosophical terms as “a form 
of rationality in which the penal sphere is pushed outside political economy and serves the 
function of a boundary: the penal sanction is marked off from the dominant logic of 
classical economies as the only space where order is legitimately enforced by the state” 
(77). Wacquant (2009) frames this as an evolution in the form and function of social 
control, coalescing “around the shrill reassertion of penal fortitude, the pornographic 
exhibition of the taming of moral and criminal deviancy, and the punitive containment and 
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disciplinary supervision of the problem populations dwelling at the margins of the class 
and cultural order” (xx). Heavy reliance on carceral institutions (paralleled in punitive 
welfare policy), “partakes of a political project that responds to rising social insecurity and 
its destabilizing effects in the lower rungs of the social and spatial order” (ibid.: 172). 
Regarding this development in broad terms, as these authors do, is vital for interpreting on-
the-ground developments, yet can pose empirical challenges. As O’Malley (2015) notes, 
“the linkages between ‘neoliberalism’ and penality are often vague or merely assumed, 
rendering the [Neoliberal Penality] thesis highly problematic” (1). Not neglecting the 
difficulties necessarily entailed in attempting such linkages, I will here attempt to 
systematize the elements of changing penological approaches that have been observed. 
Following the model of Feeley and Simon (1992), I do so by examining emergent 
discourses, objectives, and techniques apparent in other recent empirical works as well as 
my own findings. 
First, in this changing political landscape, new correctional discourses have 
developed. Advancing beyond the New Penological emphasis on correctional punishment 
as a means of managing risk, post-recession political rhetorics have instead highly prized 
budgetary concerns (Gottschalk 2015). According to Hadar Aviram (2010), “The current 
financial crisis, complicated by the rise in correctional expenses and in their relative share 
in the budget, has yielded a new set of correctional discourses and practices, fueled by a 
language of scarcity” (2-3). To be sure, prison budgeting has become a “purple” issue, with 
conservative and liberal figureheads aligning in their critique of current carceral trends as 
excessively expensive, among other concerns (Lilly et al. 2019: 343). Rhetorical regard for 
the incarcerated has shifted as well. Particularly, “the advent of a neoliberal ethos has 
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transformed our understanding of the inmate, from … ward to a burden on the state’s 
budget and a consumer of its services” (Aviram 2015: 120, emphasis added). Others have 
documented new discourses of “responsibilization,” particularly in female institutions. 
These rhetorics assert the value of a self-governing, self-sufficient penal subject 
(Ballesteros-Pena 2017) and may accompany new practices and operational designs aimed 
at promoting such values (McCorkel 2003). 
Discourses of austerity and responsibilization correspond with the advancement of 
changing penological objectives as well: namely, reassessing and ensuring the fiscal 
efficiency of prison operations. In some cases, this is apparent in pushes for decarceration 
in part for purposes of financial prudence (Aviram 2016b). Continued support for prison 
privatization has also risen as a priority in this context (Williams and Battle 2017). Prisoner 
labor, already historically central to carceral punishment in the United States (McLennan 
2008), has been foundational in these developments. As Weiss (2001) notes:  
 
Today, at the end of the modern era…gaps in the labor 
market give new life to the idea of prison industry. Once 
again, prisoners are a potential resource; in this sense, they 
have come full circle. The ‘New Economy’ of service 
industries, globalization, and market liberalism can facilitate 
the return of prisoners to the circuit of production (264).  
 
Finally, other scholarship highlights recent evolutions in penological techniques. 
Most notable has been the transference of the financial burdens of imprisonment. Cost-
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shifting practices and fee structures behind bars—already prevalent in the years prior to the 
Great Recession (Buchanan 2007; Levingston 2007)—greatly expanded following this 
crisis (Aviram 2016a, 2016b). These “pay-to-stay” approaches to incarceration (Buchanan 
2007), fueled by discourses framing prisoners as consumers of institutional services 
(Aviram 2015), find individuals behind bars now expected to fund or supplement basic 
amenities that institutions have trimmed back (Gottschalk 2010). The new prisoners-as-
consumers are responsible for fees covering electricity, medical care, room and board, 
telephone use, and other amenities (Buchanan 2007; Gipson and Pierce 1996; Gottschalk 
2010; Jackson 2007; Levingston 2007; Lynch 2010; Von Zielbauer 2007). 
This dissertation research has contributed to the endeavor of mapping the changes 
in penology in the post-recession neoliberal era, first, by further elucidating what these 
contemporary penological discourses, objectives, and techniques look like in situ behind 
bars. The technique of cost-shifting, for instance, shaped the extent of the material strains 
experienced by low-status penal laborers at SSP. Similarly, discourses framing prisoners 
as consumers rather than primarily wards were evident in participant rhetorics regarding 
pay and the procurement of goods and services. Discourses of responsibilization also 
emerged in how prisoners and staffers discussed the value of work ethics and dedication to 
labor. This new penal environment contributed to varied carceral experiences between 
prisoner groups, generating and reproducing disparities amongst the prisoner population. 
In addition, this work has revealed another technique that has taken shape: the 
facilitation of internal labor market competition. In constructing a hierarchical penal labor 
market, with desirable positions—and their subsequent pay and perks—distributed 
competitively yet opaquely (maintaining the employment system’s “flexibility” 
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[Schwartzman 2013]), the contemporary prison in part ensures its objective of keeping 
institutional operations financially efficient whilst wielding subtler forms of control over 
the prisoner body. As one prisoner noted, “You know, if they brought somebody [a non-
incarcerated workforce] in here to do this, they’d pay ‘em at least ten dollars. … It’s a 
sweatshop in here, that’s all.” Instead, the institution sorts and sieves its captive labor force, 
allocating higher-paying, skilled positions primarily to those already in possession of 
valued forms of capital, relegating others to deskilled tasks to maintain facility operations. 
Furthermore, this system delivers on neoliberal discourses prizing 
responsibilization as well as the reframing of the prisoner-as-consumer. Consumption-
oriented prisoners at SSP were openly concerned with costs. Top-tier positions were 
competitive in part because laborers were driven to attain higher wages to spend behind 
bars. Some even related complaints regarding taxpayer spending. For instance, when 
discussing discrepancies between publicly-available prison menus and the actual chow 
served to the incarcerated during mealtime, DS revealed the reach of the invisible hand into 
prison life when he exclaimed: “I be damned if I sit here and let you and my people on the 
outside—the ones that’s not committing crimes—pay [taxes] for all this shit and be told 
it’s good.” Prison authorities, from his perspective, were not only complicit in the declining 
quality of care, but also kept taxpaying citizens in the dark. Prisoners like DS exhibited 
consumerist tendencies (frustrated with perceived misuse of funds and misrepresentation 
of goods) as well as a neoliberal emphasis on self-reliance and responsibility (concerned 
only for citizens not engaged in criminal activity). As the reinvented neoliberal state 
(Osborne 1993; Rondinelli and Cheema 2003) and prison (Wacquant 2010) continue to cut 
back on services and shift the cost of care to those in custody (Buchanan 2007; Levingston 
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2007; Lynch 2010), prisoners have come to rely more than ever on meager pay provided 
in exchange for increasingly deskilled labor. Within this system, in which prisoners feel 
“uncared for, ignored, frustrated, and humiliated” (Smoyer and Lopes 2017: 244), self-
sufficiency is made paramount. 
 
Table 6. Evolving U.S. Corrections Strategies 
 Discourses Objectives Techniques 
Old Penology 
Clinical diagnosis; 
retributive justice 
Recidivism; crime 
control 
Targeting the 
individual 
New Penology Probability; risk 
Efficient population 
control 
Targeting aggregate 
groups 
Neoliberal 
Penology 
Responsibilization; 
prisoner-as-
consumer 
Fiscally efficient 
operations 
Cost-shifting; 
internal labor 
competition 
 
Taken together, this set of penal discourses, objectives, and techniques corresponds 
with the conditions and priorities of contemporary, post-recession neoliberal polity. Just as 
the New Penology overlapped in many ways with (and had antecedents in) the Old 
Penology, the emergent Neoliberal Penology observable today builds to an extent upon the 
features of the prior era (driven no doubt by ongoing struggles between bureaucratic and 
political actors in the penal field [Goodman, Page, and Phelps 2017]) (see Table 6). 
The structure of prison labor itself maps on to these developments in penality. 
Indeed, classic prison theorists Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 2017) contend that labor 
needs directly correspond to penal form. Where supply of labor is low, according to this 
framework, “then the state and its penal institutions will be less ready to dispense with the 
valuable resources which their captives represent, and more likely to put offenders to work 
in some way or another” (Garland 1990: 93). Though scholars have problematized 
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particulars of Rusche and Kirchheimer’s work (cf. Sutton 2002), their contention that 
“every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to its 
productive relationships” remains compelling (Rusche and Kirchheimer [1939] 2017: 5). 
In Gilded Age America, penal labor was directly deployed to fulfil the labor demands of 
large-scale industrial interests via convict leasing arrangements (McLennan 2008). Firms 
contracted mass prisoner labor power to toil in mines, fields, and factories with little to no 
regulatory oversight (Thompson 2011). Around the advent of mass incarceration, new 
legislation once again expanded the prison’s ability to mobilize (and capitalize on) captive 
labor power (McLennan 2008). 
As this dissertation has sought to illuminate, the world of work behind bars today 
has continued to evolve and has in fact grown quite complex. The expansive and 
hierarchical carceral labor market within the neoliberal prison not only extracts labor for a 
wide variety of tasks but does so with the consent and indeed enthusiasm of a large swath 
of this population. Much like the free world worksites examined by labor scholars (e.g., 
Burawoy 1979; Lopez 2007; Sallaz 2015), the contemporary prison workplace is gamified 
in ways that help further engender productivity, helping to mitigate or redirect conflict that 
might otherwise be leveled at correctional and operational staff. In these ways, control in 
the contemporary American prison has taken new shape. 
In this manner, we might also maintain that, through labor, rehabilitation is 
fetishized. Recuperation of self-reliance and marketable skills through participation in 
labor is perceived as an alternative to the dog-eat-dog ethos of the prison yard. Yet, it is 
here, in the internal penal employment system, that competition and alienation flourish. 
The individualized quest for dignity and worth through work mystifies the productive force 
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of carceral labor. Rather than escaping this system of production by attempting to better 
one’s reentry prospects and break the imprisonment cycle plaguing the nation’s 
disenfranchised communities, competition and participation in the internal prison labor 
market instead inevitably supports the values and needs of the institution. As staffers noted, 
the prison employment system provides “a great incentive” because prisoners “have to 
have good behavior” in order to remain competitive for the top tier positions.18 Even in 
those (numerous) cases in which the incarcerated indeed find legitimate appreciation for 
the work they do in prison, much of the rewards that they perceive in fact exemplify the 
fulfillment of needs that the institution itself has actively shirked. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The expansive reliance on penal labor, the particular form that the prison employment 
system has taken, and the manner in which prisoners’ work is organized each map on to 
the ethics and productive needs of the post-recession neoliberal era. Scholars have pointed 
to pathways neoliberalism has taken in its rise as a dominant American discourse and 
rationale for penal practice (see Lacey 2013). Building on this, I have outlined the 
techniques of neoliberal penality as implemented within prison walls, providing an in-
depth look at the administration of neoliberal ethics within the carceral context. By 
focusing on prisoners’ experiences, I highlight the ways in which neoliberalism is 
incorporated into the administration of punishment through mechanisms such as 
responsibilization, cost-shifting, and the facilitation of labor competition. Unlike past 
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studies of the macro connections between political economy and punishment (e.g., Enshen 
2014; Lacey 2013; Sutton 2002), this research considers qualitative differences in carceral 
experiences, revealing ground-level influences of neoliberal trends on carceral outcomes. 
Burrowing beyond classical critical punishment scholarship, which attends to macro 
patterns of labor appropriation through incarceration (Rusche [1933] 1978; Rusche and 
Kirchheimer [1939] 2017), I call attention to the micro arenas in which labor is 
foregrounded in the contemporary prison, unpacking related consequences for prisoner 
wellbeing. Prison (and prison work) is not just removal from the outside world, a 
consequence in and of itself. It is, in a sense, its own world with its own consequences 
which matter to the people in it. But observations also remind us that this institution is a 
workplace, in many ways linked to external social and economic systems, and should be 
regarded (and regulated; see Appendix B) as such. 
Through the internal employment system, the prison facilitates markedly different 
experiences of imprisonment. Outside disparities are reinforced by how the facility sorts 
and sieves its wards into different jobs, how work sites are organized and supervised, and 
via prisoners’ practices in the workplace—through the interplay of the structure of the 
penal facility, the prison employment system, specific job contexts, formal and informal 
economic markets, and the strategic action of actors within these nested contexts. Thus, 
while contact with the prison system limits the job market opportunities of all ex-offenders 
(“marking them” [Pager 2007]), the resources, skills, and qualifications that they employ 
while inside the prison have powerful mediating and compounding effects on how 
individuals fare both during and following incarceration. In sum: carceral labor reproduces 
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and shapes inequalities along class, racial, and ethnic lines, highlighting the role of the 
prison as a contemporary site of deep and lasting stratification. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
This is an interview schedule for semi-structured, in-depth interviews. The following questions are 
meant to direct discussion about work. The interviewer will attempt to structure the conversation 
around the leading questions (indicated by “-”). If appropriate, the interviewer will ask probing 
questions (indicated by “⚫”). 
 
 
Basic autobiographical information 
“Without revealing your name or other identifying information…” 
- Tell me a little bit about yourself. 
- What is your background? 
• What kind of work did you do before prison? 
• [Follow participant’s lead. Probe if necessary. Discontinue if appropriate.] 
 
 
History of work (personal experiences with prison work) 
“Now, let’s talk about your work experience in prison…” 
- Tell me about your current work program assignment.  
• How long have you been in it? 
• How would you describe your job to someone who had no knowledge of it? 
• Was there ever been anything about this job that surprised you? 
• On the whole, how would you rate this job? Why? Have you always felt this way? 
(What changed?) 
• What are the benefits/perks of your work? Compared to other work programs? 
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• What are some down sides of your work? Compared to other work programs?  
- Tell me about the process of getting assigned to this work program. 
• How did you get involved with it? 
• Had you done similar work before? (Was this a consideration?) 
• Have you ever faced any barriers to getting the work you want? (How so?) 
- Do you get along well with other people in the work program? 
• Can you tell me a little bit about your relationships with other workers/inmates? 
• Who do you consider to be your boss at work? What are they like? Can you tell 
me about a recent experience with that person/one of those people? 
- What does your previous prison work experience look like? 
• Have you worked in other prison work programs? 
• Tell me about the process of moving from one work program to another. 
- In your opinion, do inmates make enough money? 
• What makes you feel this way? (Do you earn enough for food/other goods?) 
• What other ways do people that you know make money in prison? (Contributions 
from family? “Hustles”?) 
 
 
Plans for release 
“Let’s talk about the future…” 
- Do you have any plans for your release? What do you plan to do? 
• Have you thought about what type of work you will do? 
• Where will you work? How did you choose that? 
- How has your prison experience influenced your plans? 
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Conceptions of work (what work means to participants—assessing “work ethic”) 
“Now, I’d like to talk about work in general…” 
[Throughout—try to get at participants’ central logic for thinking about work.] 
- What, in your view, is good work? 
• What makes it good? 
• Do you think other people might have different views? (Such as?) 
- What is bad work? 
• What makes it bad? 
• Do you think others might have different ideas? (Such as?) 
- Is work meaningful to you? (Why?) 
• Is work important for a person in general? 
• Is work important for personal growth? (Why/not?) 
- During your life, have you changed your views on work? 
• How have your ideas changed? 
• What are the major lessons you’ve learned about work? 
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APPENDIX B: THOUGHTS ON POLICY 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has not been to directly contend with particular policy 
platforms; however, certain considerations did emerge as I engaged in the processes of data 
collection and writing. These primarily revolved around the observation that the 
contemporary American prison (perhaps even more so now than historically [see 
McLennan 2008]) is indeed a workplace and should be regulated as such.  
 First, paying $0.05 (or even $1.00-plus) per hour for the performance of mandatory 
labor assignments is tantamount to slavery. Indeed, the International Labor Organization 
(1930, 1957, 2016) under the United Nations, as well as other labor groups, such as the 
AFL-CIO (1997), contend that prisoners’ work in the United States in fact represents a 
form of forced labor akin to a “new slavery” (Bair 2008; see also Milman-Sivan 2013). 
According to this perspective, in many prisons, “slavery never ended…it was reinvented” 
(Benns 2015). As one participant in my study passionately noted: “It’s a sweatshop! A full 
day’s work might get you a soup.” Another noted, “Prison is supposed to be about 
rehabilitation, but it’s too expensive. So, what can we do?” What’s more, penal pay 
structures today vary greatly between job sites, institutions, and states (Sawyer 2017). To 
correct for this, a national prison minimum wage is worthy of consideration. On this point, 
one penal laborer suggested that, “they should pay us [federal] minimum wage and have 
me pay rent and social security and take taxes from it!” Instituting minimum wage behind 
bars may also positively impact the working-class writ large. The current state of paltry 
prisoner pay acts to undercut wages in the outside world; raising them to a livable standard 
would correct for this (Smith 2017). 
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 Another cause for alarm is that, in the midst of concerns over poor conditions and 
treatment, participants reported that grievance and claim structures remained ineffective 
and indeed risk-laden. Calavita and Jenness (2015) reveal that such issues are truly 
widespread. At ground-level, feelings of helplessness and frustration were pervasive. Such 
claim structures should be thoroughly reconstituted and monitored at a high level. 
Relatedly, general standards of care remain in dire need of enforcement. As Samuél pointed 
out, “We suffer for problems in the kitchen, problems on the yard, unsanitary conditions. 
… They don’t care ‘cause they don’t eat the food we eat, use the bathrooms we use. They 
don’t care.” Numerous court cases in recent years (for example, the class action suit 
alleging failure to meet basic mental health counseling needs in a Pennsylvania penitentiary 
[Thompson 2017] or the recurrent legal claims alleging willful prison healthcare 
inadequacy in Arizona [Schwartzapfel 2018]) highlight a continued failure to prevent or 
correct the dramatic degrees of service degradations that have been suffered by this 
vulnerable population. Such issues are likely to continue or worsen without increased 
public oversight. 
 Indeed, one reason that these and related issues are able to persist is that the prison 
remains a “black site,” obscured from public view (Reiter 2014). My ethnographic access 
to the inside of a state prison was truly unique, but it should not remain so. The ability to 
empirically examine the lived realities of American incarceration should be encouraged 
and facilitated at the institutional, state, and federal levels, lest we risk a slide into 
barbarism behind bars for lack of adequate shared knowledge of the internal workings of 
carceral punishment. The challenges faced by correctional staff within these public 
institutions are equally deserving of further research along these lines. 
272 
 
 Finally, any discussion, however brief, of penal reform is incomplete without some 
consideration of the prospect of abolition. The elimination of the death penalty and of 
solitary confinement are supported by ever-growing social movements in the United States 
and abroad. The abolition of penal labor, too, has champions (e.g., Incarcerated Workers 
Organizing Committee 2014). A series of national prison strikes and work stoppages in 
recent years has raised the issue in political consciousness (Kim 2016; Losier 2018). Given 
the conditions surrounding carceral labor in the U.S., including its impacts on the 
reproduction of inequality that I have outlined, the topic remains worthy of continued 
consideration.  
 As with concerns over pay, facility conditions, and grievance reporting, abolition 
was a topic broached by participants in my study. For example, one man, to whom I will 
refer only as “AS,” grew inquisitive when he spied me jotting down fieldnotes one day 
outside of one of the prison work sites. Pointing to my notebook, he asked: 
 
So, what’s the story here? Prison labor? And what a rotten 
thing it is? History shows, whenever you use prisoners for 
labor—indentured servitude, forced labor, call it what you 
will—historically, it never works out. [But] that’s the basis 
of Capitalism: labor, as cheap as you can get it, regardless of 
who it affects. The lobbyists push for it, subtly or otherwise, 
to keep things how they are. 
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Leaning in, he added, “We incarcerate more people than anywhere else in the world. And 
we use these people—they use us—to do this.” He quickly flicked his wrist toward his 
workplace, adding, “All of this? Profit.”  
 “So,” I asked, “what’s the solution to all of these issues?” He shook his head and 
responded, “I mean, how do you change any caste system? Any slavery system?” His eyes 
grew wide as he let the rhetorical question hang for a moment. Then, he gave a brief nod 
and swiped his hand as if to signal: do away with it. 
At one time, the end of the U.S. prison system as we know it seemed imminent—
and politically viable. For instance, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals (1973), sponsored by the Department of Justice, concluded in the 
1970s that the nation’s penal facilities had overwhelmingly failed at their stated goals. A 
ten-year moratorium on the construction of carceral institutions was recommended 
(National Advisory 1973). Other factors took sway over this platform, leading to the 
emergence of mass incarceration, but the abolitionist ideal nonetheless saw support. 
Though the fields of sociology and criminology have been slower to adopt abolitionist 
platforms than other social scientific disciplines (Brown and Schept 2016), current trends 
in incarceration and the reemergence of debates over prison reform invite us to contribute 
to this discourse. 
 To dismantle or substitute one facet of the broader prison system, such as forced 
penal labor, the death penalty, or solitary confinement, represents what abolitionist scholars 
(e.g., Mathiesen 1974; Simon 2018) have referred to as a “partial abolition.” Still, the 
prison remains one part of an interconnected patchwork resulting in—if not predicated 
on—inequality between social strata. In writing on the abolition of chattel slavery, W.E.B. 
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Du Bois ([1935] 2017) noted that “the abolition of slavery meant not simply abolition of 
legal ownership of the slave; it meant the uplift of slaves and their eventual incorporation 
into the body civil, politic, and social, of the United States” (170). With this in mind, penal 
abolitionist scholars today note that this endeavor, too, would necessarily require 
commitment to a “positive project”—not merely demolishing prison walls, but 
supplementing gradual decarceration with the introduction of major economic and political 
institutional structures designed to supplant those that have failed (see McLeod 2015). 
Indeed, “a more complicated framework may yield more options than if we simply attempt 
to discover a single substitute for the prison system” (Davis 2003: 106). In place of punitive 
criminal justice institutions that have time and again been deemed inequitable (and 
damaging) along the lines of class, race and ethnicity, and gender (Crittenden, Koons-Witt, 
and Kaminski 2018; Garland 2001b; Wakefield and Uggen 2010; Wacquant 2009a; 
Western 2006), this movement calls us to address social problems that precipitate the 
practices that we deem criminal. The goal of such a project, then, is “building the kind of 
society that does not need prisons” (Waskow 1972, quoted in Davis 2003).  
Such a massive project would indeed entail society-wide changes. These may 
include allocating greater funding toward and restructuring educational institutions in order 
to diminish the current trend of “priming some kids for college and others for prison” 
(Goffman 2015; see also Heckman and Masterov 2007). It would also require the bolstering 
of mental healthcare and rehabilitation programming to combat the harsh consequences of 
mental and emotional disorders, addiction, and dual diagnosis that plague many 
communities (Pogorzeleski et al. 2005). Relatedly, decriminalizing drug use, the criminal 
enforcement of which disproportionately falls on large swaths of minority populations 
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(Beckett et al. 2006; Wacquant 2009b), as well as reforming policing and surveillance 
structures that profile and punish already-disadvantaged communities (Alexander 2010; 
Meehan and Ponder 2002), is required in order to diminish disproportionate penal 
punishments. This broad project must likely even entail actively combatting popular media 
portrayals that serve to reinforce racialized perceptions of criminality and threat while 
reifying now-naturalized criminal justice responses to many of society’s ills (Carlson 2016; 
Davis 2003). And, against a central instrument of the maintenance of ethnoracial 
dominance from the ante-bellum through the contemporary era, a broad-reaching 
abolitionist future would necessarily challenge current conceptions of value linked to 
neoliberal ideals of self-reliance through formal labor, no matter how precarious or 
unrewarding (Brown 2018). Beyond the deconstruction of forced labor systems on the 
inside, this would include walking back the criminalization of labor market under- or non-
participation (Wacquant 2009a) while promoting social welfare and living wage 
programming on the outside to combat socio-economic inequality, which is conclusively 
linked to higher rates of incarceration (Gottschalk 2015, 2016).  
To be sure, this framework is quite comprehensive and complex, but so too are the 
political, economic, and social institutions that have coalesced to bring us to this current 
moment in carceral history. And it should not be forgotten that today’s prison fails at 
reducing recidivism (Cullen et al. 2011) and disproportionately disrupts the lives of racial 
and ethnic minorities and the lower classes, despite similar rates of reported criminal 
activity across racial and class divides (Morenoff 2005; Wheelock and Uggen 2008). I will 
close with words from one participant, Jake, who highlighted exactly this when he mused: 
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They round up poor people. Even though these white-collar 
types are more likely to fuck you over, they treat us like 
demons. They do it to whole neighborhoods. They do it to 
whole races! They treat a kid like a criminal, a villain, his 
whole life. It’s all he’s ever told he is. It’s the only version 
of himself he sees on TV. And they turn around and ask him, 
‘Why are you like this? Why didn’t you go out and get a job 
and work hard?’ But he never gets taught that. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1 In order to protect the confidentiality of participants, all names in this dissertation—including the names of 
individual prisoners and staffers, the institution itself, and certain departments or firms—are aliases. 
Specific information about the facility, such as its location or particulars regarding the size and 
characteristics of its prisoner population, have also been minimized to secure participant confidentiality. 
2 Debates persist over the usage of the term “inmate,” which is sometimes received as derogatory or 
dehumanizing to individuals behind bars; the term “prisoner,” conversely, highlights the involuntary nature 
of captivity. Acknowledging these concerns, I primarily refer to participants as “prisoners,” but will 
occasionally rely on the term “inmate” where appropriate for the simple reason that they commonly 
referred to themselves using both terms. 
3 “Able” prisoners refers to those deemed both physically and mentally capable of engaging in regular work 
tasks. Additionally, this refers to those who have not be labeled to represent a threat to security, which 
captures those in medium or low-security complexes. It is difficult to determine the proportion of 
incarcerated individuals held in this level of facility within state prison systems because such statistics are 
not publicly shared in some states and because not all states rely on the same ranking system of security 
level; however, the federal system offers a helpful metric: according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, over 
84% of prisoners under federal custody are held in medium, low, or minimum-security units, as of 2018 
(Federal Bureau of Prisons 2018). 
4 As always, there remain some exceptions. For instance, in his (2005) study of changing penal technologies, 
architecture, and strategy, John Irwin illustrates how “inmate society” has adapted to the emergence of 
“warehouse prisons” in the United States. Within this context, other qualitative scholars have examined 
processes such as the micro-level practices of race-making behind bars (Goodman 2014) and the struggle 
for dignity and sanity faced by prisoners and staffers within repressive penal environments (Rhodes 2004). 
Others have outlined the role of drug counseling programs in surveillance and disciplinary structures 
behind bars (McCorkel 2003, 2013), the ways in which religious affiliation and participation in religious 
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programming structures the social world of the imprisoned (Ellis 2017), and cross-national differences in 
outlooks towards gender and work in women’s prisons (Haney 2008, 2010). 
5 Other recent work connecting carceral experiences with prisoners’ outside communities and other social 
and economic structures in the U.S. and other nations (Clear 2007; Crewe 2009; Wacquant 2001, 2013) 
reveals that prison is not an isolated “total institution” or “world apart” (Goffman 1961). Instead, prisoner 
life is “translocal”—constituted by interlocked internal and external social systems—and is shaped by the 
constellation of prisoner ties to outside actors and institutions as much as by structures, practices, and 
policies on the inside (Cunha 2014). Work is central to this: “Though they [prisoners] have been removed 
from social life by judicial decision, they are nonetheless ‘organically’ linked to society by way of their 
productive labor” (Guilbaud 2010: 42). 
6 Stevens et al. (2008) discuss the utility of the sieve metaphor in understanding another major social 
institution: the school. 
7 Prisoner pay in prisons in the Sunbelt region exhibits a similar range. However, some states in this region 
do not pay any captive laborers under their supervision, while some others compensate workers in some 
but not all work programs. These numbers were compiled from online and archival sources with support 
from an NSF DDRI grant. The pay for work at SSP (which I report as ranging from $0.05 to over $1.00) 
has been modified slightly to help maintain confidentiality.  
8 2005 is the most recent year for which such statistics are currently available. Estimates suggest that these 
rates are the same today, if not higher (Benns 2015; Hatton 2017). 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
9 The value of the metaphor of “work-worlds” to capture the physical, hierarchical, innovative, relational 
nature of organizations is examined in Delbridge and Sallaz (2015). 
10 This is commonly remedial education and high school-equivalency instruction. The rest of the non-working 
body are largely those who have been classified as physically or mentally unfit for work, or deemed too 
great a security threat. 
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11 The notion of the prison as “a city within the city” and related metaphors were common. Another staffer 
would say: “It’s a monster in here! It’s basically its own city.” Similarly, one incarcerated worker referred 
to the prison as a distinct “biosphere,” while another saw it as a sinister “empire.” Many prisoners would 
also refer to the institution as a “giant warehouse” (sometimes as a site of labor, other times in the sense of 
storing bodies), with one going so far as to paint it as a “human cube farm.” 
12 It should be noted, however, that “racial politics” does not here refer exclusively to the racialized gangs 
with which many prisoners are affiliated. Rather, it refers to a more expansive system of rules and norms 
to which all prisoners, regardless of gang affiliation or lack thereof, may nevertheless be compelled to 
adhere. 
13 Prisoners were only able to make outgoing calls to pre-approved numbers of businesses throughout the 
country. Additionally, they did not have open access to email clients. Instead, they composed email 
messages, which were then forwarded to civilian staff members who vetted each message before 
forwarding on to clients. Similarly, incoming emails were first captured in staff inboxes, read and 
approved, and then forwarded to prisoners. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
14 Disadvantages along gender lines are also apparent, such as in the recent rise of black female imprisonment 
(Harmon and Boppre, 2016). 
15 The five groups representing the core of racial politics in the facility were whites, blacks, Native 
Americans, Mexican-Americans, and foreign nationals (a.k.a. “paisas”). The term “paisa” was short for 
“paisano” or “countryman” in Spanish. Most foreign nationals were citizens of Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, 
and other Latin American nations. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
16 The possibility of “selection bias” in regards to who attains a position in desirable work programming 
should be noted. Some men already possessing the characteristics recognized as “work ethic” (e.g., self-
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discipline, respect for authority, desire to work) may indeed self-select into the pursuit of top-tier work 
programs. Or, those already inclined to possess such features might be more likely to be hired. If this be 
the case, however, it merely serves to highlight the reproductive function of the prison employment system. 
Regardless of the perceptions with which they enter, prisoners will reflect or adopt the outlooks and 
practices privileged by the top-tier work site and by the professionalism game, or else they will likely 
struggle to maintain their position and any accompanying benefits. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
17 Most states pay something in the form of prison wages, with the exception of Arkansas, Georgia, and 
Texas, where the incarcerated receive no pay for their state-supervised penal labor assignments, nor for 
their “correctional industry” assignments through state-owned businesses (see note 7). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
18 It should also be recognized that, although the structure of the prison employment system enables some to 
acquire greater status and higher pay than others, all prisoners are nevertheless subject to an expansive 
system of dehumanization, control, uncertainty, and precarity. Yet, for those at the top of the penal labor 
hierarchy, wage exploitation is daily justified on the grounds of its relative context. The institution 
reproduces inequalities not by privileging or benefiting those of higher status, but by systematically 
oppressing others to a greater extent. The relative benefits experienced by these few function to engender 
competition as others pursue the chance to benefit from the perks of a top-tier position—at the possibility 
of injecting value into their own lives. 
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